B 
2 

B3 


UC-NRLF 


IDEA  AND  ESSENCE 

IN  THE  PHILOSOPHIES  OF  HOBBES 
AND  SPINOZA 


BY 

ALBERT  G.  A.  BALZ 


Submitted  in  partial  fulfilment  of  the  requirements  for 

the  degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy,  in  the  Faculty 

of  Philosophy,  Columbia  University 


Jleto  gorfe 

COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 
1918 


3 


COPYRIGHT,  1918 
BY  COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

Printed  from  type,  January,  1918 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Introduction I 

Part  I.    Hobbes 9 

Part  II.   Spinoza 26 

Conclusion 78 

Vita 87 


371112 


IDEA  AND  ESSENCE  IN  THE  PHILOSOPHIES  OF 
HOBBES  AND  SPINOZA 

INTRODUCTION 

It  might  appear  presumptuous  to  assert  that  Hobbes  and  Spinoza 
have  been  persistently  misunderstood,  were  not  the  results  of  present- 
day  investigations  into  the  history  of  philosophy  affording  a  continual 
justification  of  a  mistrust  of  our  histories  of  philosophies  as  commonly 
written.  Some  one  has  said  that  most  exegesis  is  really  eisegesis — 
and  Hobbes  and  Spinoza  have  suffered  from  a  habit  of  reading  into 
their  words  meanings  foreign  to  their  thought.  When  a  contemporary 
writer  translates  Hobbes's  "phantasm"  into  "state  of  consciousness," 
or  extols  Spinoza  as  the  first  great  expositor,  if  not  the  originator,  of 
psychophysical  parallelism,  a  belief  in  the  frequent  misinterpretation 
of  their  doctrines  is  sharpened.  The  most  persistent  misrepresenta- 
tions of  these  two  philosophers  depend  upon  misreading  their  psychol- 
ogy or,  more  precisely,  upon  according  to  them  a  type  of  psychological 
doctrine  which  was  alien  to  their  ways  of  thought.  We  are  so  habitu- 
ated to  a  psychology  of  psychical,  mental,  or  conscious  states,  that  we 
commit  the  error  of  endowing  these  thinkers  with  a  psychology  simi- 
larly based  upon  the  conception  of  psychical  existence.  The  purpose  of 
the  following  essay  is  to  show  that  this  conception  is  inapplicable  to 
Hobbes  and  Spinoza,  to  indicate  the  misrepresentations  which  result 
from  applying  it  to  them,  and  to  point  out  the  true  character  of  their 
teaching. 

It  is  a  fact  not  without  significance  that  psychology  for  a  long  time 
after  the  inception  of  the  modern  era  remained  an  integral  part  of 
philosophy  and  that  the  latter  differentiation  of  psychological  from 
epistemological  and  even  metaphysical  questions  was  unknown  to  in- 
vestigations of  that  earlier  day.  A  fairly  definite  assignment  of  the  psy- 
chological field  and  the  disentanglement  of  the  problem  and  methods  of 
psychology  from  those  of  epistemology  and  metaphysics  are  relatively 
recent  achievements.  We  have  come  to  look  upon  psychology  as  a  dis- 
tinct science,  with  varying  appreciation  of  the  degree  of  its  filiation  with 
epistemology  and  other  properly  philosophical  subjects.  Such  a  dis- 
tinction was  not  characteristic  of  early  modern  philosophers.  What  we 
today  would  call  the  psychological  doctrines  of  a  Descartes  or  Locke, 
as  distinguishable  from  their  epistemological  and  metaphysical  doc- 
trines, were  for  them  inextricably  bound  up  with  the  latter.  The  mod- 


*.2:.         *'  IDEA    AND    ESSENCE 

ern  historians'  separation  of  their  epistemology  from  their  psychology 
does  not  represent  discriminations  and  classifications  of  which  they 
were  cognizant.  Whatever  may  be  the  degree  of  interdependence  of 
psychology  and  philosophy,  it  is  not  a  negligible  fact  that  such  men  as 
Locke  and  Descartes  did  not  differentiate  two  such  orders  of  questions, 
of  standpoint,  and  of  purpose.  The  latter-day  philosopher  may  avail 
himself  of  psychological  research  in  the  solution  of  epistemological 
problems,  just  as  he  may  have  recourse  to  any  or  all  the  sciences. 
There  he  is  utilizing  the  results  of  study  in  a  field  that  he  recognizes  as 
distinct  despite  its  degree  of  affiliation.  Such  a  mode  of  thought  is  evi- 
dently inapplicable  to  a  time  when  the  relative  independence  of  psy- 
chology had  not  been  achieved. 

Several  interesting  considerations,  consequently,  confront  the  stu- 
dent of  historical  systems.  In  the  first  place,  since  philosophy  repre- 
sents the  matrix  from  and  in  which  psychology  developed  through  a 
long  period,  this  latter  science,  even  in  its  present  relative  indepen- 
dence, rests  upon  old  metaphysical  and  epistemological  notions  that 
have  persisted  in  more  or  less  attenuated  form  throughout  the  trans- 
formations of  psychology  itself.  Early  modern  "psychological"  inves- 
tigations were  most  often  initiated  under  the  auspices  of  what  we  to- 
day would  regard  as  an  irrelevant  metaphysics,  in  hoped-for  substan- 
tiation of  antecedent  philosophical  doctrines;  and  such  psychology 
naturally  developed  in  the  directions  assigned  to  it  by  impelling  inter- 
ests which  to-day  would  be  regarded  as  extraneous  and  falsifying.  Psy- 
chological doctrine  was  thus  often  shaped  by  metaphysical,  epistemo- 
logical, ethical,  and  even  religious  needs  and  purposes.  The  character 
of  psychology,  when  it  began  to  assert  its  independence,  was  de- 
termined by  the  character  of  its  heredity.  Inevitably  it  carried  over, 
generally  without  deliberate  recognition,  a  number  of  fundamental  pre- 
suppositions and  the  general  outlook  of  certain  influential  philosophies. 
Its  terminology,  since  it  was  derived  in  the  main  from  philosophical 
sources,  continued  to  have  the  implications  and  connotations  of  the 
terms  in  general  usage  in  the  doctrines  that  represent  the  commence- 
ment of  modern  psychology.  As  a  result,  in  modern  psychological 
terminology  there  linger  the  traces  of  meanings  which  the  terms 
properly  possessed  only  in  the  setting  of  the  historical  systems  wherein 
their  signification  was  fixed. 

The  chief  of  these  inherited  doctrines  in  our  psychology  is  the  theory 
of  the  duality  of  existence.  On  the  one  hand,  we  fine),  there  is  a  field 
of  existence  which  is  psychical  and  immaterial;  on  the  other  hand, 
there  is  a  field  which  is  physical  and  material.  The  attributes  that  de- 
fine the  two  fields  are  related  as  logical  contradictories.  The  immate- 
rial, psychical  order  of  existence  is  the  truly  'psychological'  realm;  it 
is  the  order  of  mental  states,  of  psychoses,  of  states  of  consciousness  or, 


INTRODUCTION  3 

in  more  emotional  language,  of  soul  and  spirit.  The  other  order  of  ex- 
istence comprises  the  bodily,  the  physical,  the  physiological,  and  the 
material.  All  existence  is  then  matter  and  physical  changes,  including 
neuroses;  and  soul,  spirit,  or  consciousness*  including  the  series  of 
psychoses.  This  doctrine  of  the  duality  of  existence  forms  a  presuppo- 
sition and  a  point  of  departure  for  most  of  our  psychological  teaching, 
and  the  results  of  research  are  formulated  in  terms  of  the  doctrine.  It 
is  generally  accepted  as  a  postulate.  Or  if  the  doctrine  be  expressly  re- 
jected as  foreign  to  the  science,  it  creeps  into  results  surreptitiously 
through  the  well-nigh  unavoidable  connotations  of  terms  which  derive 
their  import  from  the  doctrine  or  from  the  philosophical  sources 
wherein  the  doctrine  itself  originated. 

For  this  reason  our  psychology  has  been  in  the  main  a  science  of  men- 
tal states.  The  customary  definitions  of  psychology  as  the  science  of 
mental  or  conscious  states  are  the  natural  result  of  the  view  that  exis- 
tence is  dual.  More  recent  definitions  of  psychology ,  in  which  conduct 
or  behavior,  rather  than  mind  or  consciousness,  is  the  defining  term, 
apparently  promise  freedom  from  the  assumptions  involved  in  other 
definitions.  In  the  end,  however,  the  promise  is  seldom  fulfilled,  for 
the  dualistic  doctrine  reappears  in  circuitous  ways,  as  indicated  by  the 
resurgence  of  problems  that  the  new  standpoint  was  designed  to  avoid. 

The  facts  of  psychological  observation  and  experiment  and  their  ex- 
planatory formulae  gravitate,  accordingly,  in  one  of  two  directions. 
They  are  either  in  and  of  a  field  of  psychical  or  spiritual  existence  or  in 
and  of  an  opposed  field  of  material  existence.  Concordantly,  we 
have  two  sets  of  terms,  or  two  sets  of  meanings  of  terms,  in  which 
the  duality  of  existence  persists  in  direct  denotation  or  indirect  con- 
notation. The  manner  in  which  a  single  term,  such  as  "sensation," 
refers  on  occasion  to  either  type  of  existence  illustrates  how  the 
double  usage  perpetuates  the  dual  view. 

The  customary  formulation  of  the  duality  is  the  principle,  generally 
taken  as  heuristic  rather  than  as  final,  of  psychophysical  (or  psycho- 
neural)  parallelism.  To  a  strict  parallelist,  the  dual  character  of  exis- 
tence is  ineluctable.  If  he  wishes  to  be  metaphysical,  and  treats  the 
parallelism  as  fact  and  not  as  an  expedient  postulate,  he  may  seek  the 
unification  of  the  two  series  of  existents  by  reducing  them  to  contrasted 
manifestations  or  appearances  of  one  underlying  reality.  The  inter- 
actionist  opposes  the  parallelist,  not  primarily  by  denying  the  duality 
of  existence,  but  by  asserting  the  possibility  of  reciprocal  influence  be- 
tween the  two  fields.  Both  schools  really  maintain  the  same  tenet  of 
the  incommensurability  of  the  psychical  and  the  physical. 

It  will  hardly  be  doubted  that  our  psychology — and  one  might  ven- 
ture to  add,  common  sense — derives  its  dualistic  constitution  from  the 
circumstances  of  its  history.  It  is  rooted  in  a  lengthy  philosophical 


4  IDEA    AND    ESSENCE 

tradition.  But  historical  systems  are  many,  and  not  all  of  them  par- 
ticipate in  the  conceptions  which  became  the  guides  of  the  growth  of 
psychology.  There  is  consequently  the  danger  of  an  erroneous  ex- 
pounding of  historical  systems  through  the  indiscriminate  transference 
of  the  tenor  and  significations  of  our  own  psychology  to  the  words  of 
our  predecessors.  Because  of  this  we  are  led  to  attribute  to  philosophies 
of  widely  differing  purport  a  resemblance  they  do  not  really  possess, 
and  to  the  succession  of  doctrines  a  filiation  of  meaning  that  is  foreign 
to  it. 

As  has  been  asserted,  Hobbes  and  Spinoza  particularly  have  suffered 
from  such  misapprehensions.  The  misrepresentation  of  their  meaning 
rests  essentially  upon  the  introduction  into  their  psychology  of  that 
dual  view  of  existence  which  is  characteristic  of  modern  psychology. 
From  this  distortion  of  their  psychological  tenets  there  ensues  a  correla- 
tive distortion  of  their  epistemological  and  metaphysical  opinions. 
When  we  have  equated  the  mental,  the  spiritual,  the  conscious,  and 
the  psychical,  or  have  taken  these  terms  as  referring  to  a  single  spiritual 
principle  or  substance,  and  from  this  equation  have  derived  the  content 
for  the  Hobbeistic  and  Spinozistic  phraseology,  we  have  started  our 
study  of  their  systems  with  the  assumption  that  the  notion  of  existence 
as  dual  is,  either  obscurely  or  patently,  a  regulative  force  in  their 
philosophies. 

With  respect  to  Hobbes,  it  may  be  asserted  that  the  failure  to  com- 
prehend him  begins  with  the  attempt  to  square  his  thought  and  termi- 
nology with  the  later  distinction  between  epistemology  and  psychology. 
In  one  sense,  Hobbes  may  be  said  to  have  had  no  "psychology"  at  all. 
What  we  call  psychological  facts  were  to  hmi  a  part  of  the  subject-mat- 
ter of  physics,  and  in  no  essential  way  different  from  the  rest  of  that 
subject-matter.  The  peculiar  character  of  the  problems  and  stand- 
point, implied  in  our  minds  by  the  notion  of  psychology  as  a  distinct 
science,  was  beyond  his  ken./  If  we  should  think  of  all  "psychology"  as 
nothing  but  physiology,  and  of  physiology  as  a  branch  of  physics,  sub- 
servient to  the  latter's  laws,  illustrative  of  its  principles,  and  happening 
to  be  concerned  with  the  activities  of  a  living  organism,  we  would  be 
near  the  viewpoint  of  Hobbes.  His  metaphysics  is  in  the  main  physics, 
and  his  "psychology"  a  study  of  certain  physical  facts  that  happen  to 
be  of  peculiar  importance  because  the  knower  is  a  sentient  organism. 
The  name  "psychology,"  in  so  far  as  it  connotes  a  science  established  on 
the  foundations  of  psychophysical  parallelism  or  whose  field  of  investi- 
gations is  wholly  or  even  partly  the  psychical,  is  improperly  applied  to 
the  teachings  of  Hobbes.  When  the  word  is  divested  of  these  connota- 
tions, we  are,  of  course,  at  liberty  to  speak  of  Hobbes's  psychology. 

Hobbes's  philosophy,  therefore,  has  no  concern  with  mental  states  in 
so  far  as  the  phrase  signifies  conscious  processes  in  a  psychical  realm  of 


INTRODUCTION  5 

existence.  Hobbes  is  no  more  concerned  with  mental  or  spiritual  enti- 
ties or  states  than  the  modern  physicist.  His  devotion  to  the  rising  me- 
chanical natural  philosophy  brought  psychological  facts  within  the 
sphere  of  a  dynamics  of  nature,  rather  than  relegated  them  to  a  sepa- 
rate realm.  This  statement  the  treatment  of  Hobbes  will  substantiate. 

Spinoza,  to  a  greater  extent  than  Hobbes,  is  customarily  miscon- 
strued, and  for  much  the  same  reason.  Certain  peculiarities  of  expres- 
sion favor  an  incorrect  rendering  of  his  theory  when  his  writings  are 
approached,  as  generally  happens,  with  the  conception  of  a  duality  of 
existence  in  mind.  The  common  approach  is  to  pass  from  the  dualisms 
of  Descartes  to  Spinoza  as  to  one  self-appointed  for  the  task  of  the 
unification  of  the  dualisms.  As  with  Hobbes,  the  most  common  fail- 
ures to  apprehend  Spinoza's  doctrine  originate  in  the  fallacy  of  ascrib- 
ing to  his  thought  the  notion  of  psychical  existence  as  one  of  its  leading 
elements.  The  doctrine  of  attributes,  the  series  of  ideas  in  thought  and 
of  things  in  nature,  are  readily  turned  into  psychophysical  parallelism 
by  interpreting  the  attribute  of  thought  as  denning  spiritual  existence 
(after  analogy  with  the  finite  thinking  substance  of  Descartes)  and 
ideas  as  signifying  psychical  elements  of  existence,  the  series  of  which 
constitute  the  thought  attribute.  We  have  then  a  series  of  psychical 
thought  existents  opposed  to  a  material  and  physical  order  of  existents. 
The  consequence  is  that  there  are  two  fields  of  existence,  and  their  in- 
commensurability follows  from  the  contradictoriness  of  their  predi- 
cates. Spinoza's  dictum  concerning  the  order  and  connection  of  ideas 
as  the  same  as  the  order  and  connection  of  things  is  accordingly  hailed 
as  an  explicit  formulation  of  psychophysical  parallelism. 

One  of  the  purposes  of  the  following  essay  is  to  demonstrate  the 
untenability  of  these  several  constructions.  But  at  the  very  outset,  a 
verbal  obstacle  must  be  circumvented.  The  misinterpretations  of 
Hobbes  and  Spinoza,  it  is  maintained,  originate  in  that  assumption  of 
two  separate  fields  or  kinds  of  existence  which  comes  to  be  implied  by  so 
many  philosophical  terms.  From  the  negative  side,  the  thesis  of  this 
essay  is  an  insistence  that  the  notion  of  spiritual  substance  and  the  con- 
ceptions derived  therefrom  must  be  eradicated  from  any  interpretation 
of  Hobbes  and  Spinoza  which  is  to  be  adequate  and  exact.  But  in 
making  this  insistence  it  is  verbally  difficult  to  avoid  translating  the 
writer's  discontent  with  the  misconstructions  just  outlined  into  terms 
of  a  reaction  by  Hobbes  and  Spinoza  themselves  against  the  notion  of 
dual  existence  and  its  derivatives.  The  danger  is  that  in  a  furtive  man- 
ner our  philosophers  will  be  represented  as  consciously  recognizing  a 
dualistic  position  as  the  antithesis  of  their  own  doctrines,  against  which 
they  were  in  deliberate  revolt,  and  the  overthrow  of  which  constituted 
a  strong  motive  for  the  development  of  their  own  thought.  One  design- 
ing to  furnish  an  exposition  of  Hobbes's  and  Spinoza's  doctrines  that 


6  IDEA    AND    ESSENCE 

will  reveal  the  untenability  of  expositions  that  begin  with  dualisms  of 
substance  or  existence,  faces  the  somewhat  delicate  task  of  escaping  the 
presentation  of  Hobbes  and  Spinoza  as  themselves  essentially  interested 
in  combating  such  dualisms,  and  as  propounding  their  systems  in  refu- 
tation of  notions  concerning  spiritual  substance  and  existence  as  dual. 

The  point  is  that  a  dualism  of  substances,  or  of  body  and  soul,  or  of 
existence  (Cartesian  or  otherwise),  can  not  justly  be  exhibited  as  the 
point  of  departure  for  these  two  philosophies.  The  temper  of  the  two 
systems  does  not  own  an  active  antagonism  to  these  dualistic  tenets 
as  the  animating  agency  that  quickened  the  thought  of  the  two  men 
into  vigorous  life.  The  impelling  influences  lie  otherwhere,  as  will 
appear  in  the  sequel.  It  may,  of  course,  be  pointed  out  that 
Hobbes  does  repudiate  spiritual  substance,  and  that  Spinoza  asserts 
the  oneness  of  substance.  But  it  is  more  faithful  to  the  spirit  of  these 
thinkers  to  state  that  the  one  found  the  conception  of  spiritual  sub- 
stance to  be  at  variance  with  his  own  position  and  foreign  to  its  char- 
acter, and,  therefore,  dismissed  it  as  a  superstition,  while  the  other 
started  with  certain  convictions  of  the  oneness  of  substance  and  its 
nature,  and  consequently  was  indifferent  to  and  generally  neglectful  of 
whatever  dualistic  or  pluralistic  beliefs  came  under  his  survey.  This  is 
historically  more  authentic,  and  as  interpretation  more  scrupulous, 
than  to  see  in  the  notions  of  spiritual  substance  and  of  the  dual  char- 
acter of  existence  the  great  ideas  against  which  Hobbes  and  Spinoza 
reacted,  and  in  the  rebound  from  which  they  were  led  to  their  several 
speculations.  The  picture  of  Hobbes  as  rebelling  against  Descartes's 
dualism,  and  of  Spinoza  as  coming  to  relinquish  it  as  untenable,  which, 
without  this  precautionary  warning,  this  essay  might  be  regarded  as 
presenting,  may  color  the  relations  of  the  three  with  a  certain  attractive 
consecutiveness,  but  it  would  scarcely  be  historical.  Such  consecutive- 
ness  is  more  apparent  than  real  and  exact. 

There  is  a  different  way  of  stating  the  point.  It  is  hardly  possible  to 
avoid  using  the  terms  "physical,"  "material,"  and  the  like  in  a  treatment 
of  Hobbes  and  Spinoza.  Such  terms,  however,  are  to  most  readers 
freighted  with  connotations  of  two  contrasted  orders  of  existence,  and 
an  effort  is  required  to  strip  them  of  such  implications.-  Now  it  is  main- 
tained that  the  significance  and  content  of  such  terms  when  used  by 
Hobbes  and  Spinoza,  are  not  derived  from  a  contrast  between  sub- 
stances, or  between  body  and  mind,  or  between  types  of  existence.  The 
words  are  not  loaded  with  such  allusions,  and  when  used  in  expounding 
the  two  philosophies  must  be  deprived  of  them.  And  so  the  writer 
wishes  to  make  clear  that  in  using  these  terms  there  is  no  intention  of 
attributing  to  the  two  thinkers  any  such  latent  meanings.  To  guard 
against  this  the  words  will  generally  be  inclosed  within  quotation 
marks.  Whatever  reaction  against  these  ideas  is  involved  in  the  expo- 


INTRODUCTION  7 

sition  which  follows  is  directed  against  such  implications  as  are  fre- 
quently conveyed  in  orthodox  accounts  of  these  philosophers.  The 
negative  side  of  the  thesis  to  be  presented  refers  to  what  the  writer  con- 
ceives to  be  such  misinterpretations. 

The  thesis  advanced  has  a  negative  and  a  positive  aspect.    The  nega- 
tive side  consists  in  a  denial  that  either  philosopher  was  actuated  by 
the  conception  of  existence  as  dual,  or  that  the  notion  of  the  "psychi-  y 
cal"  or  "spiritual"  played  an  influential  role  in  their  speculations.  -  \ 
Neither  thinker  conceived  of  idea  or  of  thought  as  a  "psychical"  or 
"spiritual"  entity,  state,  or  process.    The  problems,  consequently,  of 
relating  two  opposed  fields  of  existence  and  of  demonstrating  the  corre- 
spondence in  cognition  of  "immaterial"  soul  states  or  ideas  to  "mate- 
rial" changes  in  another  sphere  of  existence  do  not  arise  as  genuine 
problems  in  their  systems. 

The  positive  side  of  the  thesis  may  be  rendered  as  follows:  (First, 
it  is  maintained  that  Hobbes  and  Spinoza  conceived  of  existence  as 
one,  and  that  this  order  of  existence  is,  as  we  should  say,  the  "physical." 
Existence  is  just  existence,  nature,  the  field  of  physical  science,  of 

'  "natural  philosophy."  Both  men  are  content  to  take  existence  and 
.nature  as  it  is  described  by  science.  This  is  the  metaphysical  position. 
Secondly,  with  reference  to  psychological  doctrine,  it  is  asserted  that 

'  with  both  investigators  psychology  is  purely  physiological  in  character  .X~ 
"Psychological"  facts  are  to  them  just  exactly  what  they  turn  out  to  be 
as  physiological  functions  or  processes — and  they  are  just  that  and 
nothing  more.    Their  psychology  is  a  doctrine  of  the  operation  of  the 
animal  spirits,  or  in  more  recent  phraseology,  of  processes  in  the  ner- 
vous system.     For  Hobbes,  what  we  should  call  "mental  sta 
physical  offcets;   and  Spinoza's  opinions  are  essentially  in  agreement 
with  those  of  Hobbes.    Their  respective  psychologies  are  to  them  parts  ,x 
of  physics;  for  them  the  distinctions  between  physics,  physiology,  and 
"psychology"  are  matters  of  expedience,  implying  no  ultimate  and 
irreducible  diversity  in  the  nature  of  the  phenomena  to  be  investigated. 

The  last  element  of  the  thesis  concerns  the  epistemological  teachings  \ 
connected  with  such  metaphysical  and  psychological  views.    With  re-  I 
spect  to  Hobbes,  the  brain  state  is  related  to  extra-organic  object  as  J 
effect  to  cause.     This  relation  affords  us  knowledge  of  probability, 
unscientific  or  conjectural  knowledge.    Scientific  or  genuine  knowledge 
depends  upon  the  signification  and  use  of  the  terms  of  discourse. 

With  regard  to  Spinoza,  it  is  maintained  that  by  "idea"  in  the  episte-   , 
mological  sense  he  means  logical  essence.     In  so  far  as  there  is  a 
"psychological"  account  of  the  idea  and  of  thinking,  ideas  and  thinking   j 

>  are  explained  in  physiological  terms  as  truly  as  the  phantasm  in   I 
Hobbes's  teaching.    With  reference  to  knowledge  the  term  "idea"  sig- 
nifies a  logical  entity,  the  pure  concept.    It  is  a  truth.    Spinoza's  classi- 


8  IDEAANDESSENCE 

fication  of  ideas  is  logical,  not  psychological.  All  "things,"  happenings, 
-  events,  are  "physical."  The  correspondence  of  the  order  and  connec- 
tion of  ideas  with  the  order  and  connection  of  things  is,  therefore,  a 
harmony  of  ideas  or  the  logical  truths  of  things  as  deductively  ordered 
and  systematized  about  and  under  the  concept  of  substance,  with  the 
system  of  events  that  makes  up  all  existence  or  nature.  In  short,  his 

I  basic  principle  is  that  the  coherent  logical  system  of  concepts  corre- 

[  jsppnds  to  the  orderly  system  of  nature. 


PART  I 

HOBBES 

The  general  revolt  against  scholasticism  assumed  too  many  forms  to 
enable  one  to  summarize  it  in  a  phrase.  In  some  quarter  or  other  re- 
actions against  every  element  of  the  doctrine  of  the  school  occurred. 
The  movement  towards  the  inductive  and  experimental  investigation 
of  nature,  of  which  Francis  Bacon  was  the  protagonist,  was  by  no 
means  limited  to  him.  Moreover,  this  movement  can  not  be  taken  as 
signalizing  the  whole  meaning  of  the  revolt.  The  rebellion  had  its 
religious,  moral,  metaphysical,  artistic,  and  political,  as  well  as  "scien- 
tific," moments.  Only  as  a  very  general  transformation  of  view- 
point, of  desire,  purpose,  and  insight,  can  the  new  currents  of  thought 
be  called  one. 

Thomas  Hobbes  affords  an  interesting  example  of  participation  in  a 
common  dissatisfaction  and  repudiation  of  the  scholastic  standpoint 
with  striking  divergences  from  the  philosophical  endeavors  of  other 
prophets  of  the  new  era.  Hobbes's  intimacy  with  Bacon  suggests  the 
picture  of  a  relation  of  master  and  follower  between  them,  but  such  a 
picture  is  assuredly  misleading.  Toennies  l  and  Robertson  2  both  ob- 
ject to  such  a  depiction  of  the  relationship  of  the  two  men.  The  true 
intellectual  progenitor  of  Hobbes  is  Galileo.  Galileo  had  destroyed 
the  medieval  concept  of  purpose  as  a  category  applicable  to  nature. 
The  conception  of  nature  as  a  system  of  mechanical  forces  measurable 
in  terms  of  mathematics  took  captive  the  imagination  of  Hobbes,  and 
was  at  least  instrumental  in  the  clarification  of  his  thought,  if  it  did  not 
determine  its  course.  Toennies  3  declares  that  the  epistemological 
question  of  the  time  was  whether  knowledge  attaining  the  level  of  the 
certainty  of  mathematics,  of  geometrical  demonstration  from  axioms 
and  definitions,  was  possible,  and  how  it  was  possible.  When  Hobbes, 
relatively  late  in  life,  made  the  acquaintance  of  Euclid,  it  was  this 
problem  that  was  formulated  in  his  mind.  It  was  the  natural  conse- 
\  quence  of  Galileo's  work.  Galileo  regarded  mathematics  as  the  indis- 
pensable prelude  to  philosophical  study 4  and  Hobbes  shared  the 
opinion.  The  former,  according  to  Toennies,  really  inaugurated  the 
age  of  mathematical  deduction.  Such  deduction  was  to  become 

1  "Anmerkungen  uber  die  Philosophic  des  Hobbes,"  Vierteljahrsschrift  fur  wissenschaftliche  Philoso- 
phic, Vol.  3,  1879,  pp.  459-460. 

1  "Hobbes,"  Blackwood's  Philosophical  Classics. 

*ibid,  p.  461. 

*  cf.  Toennies,  ibid,  p.  456. 


10  IDEA    AND    ESSENCE 

Hobbes's  ideal  of  method.  Bacon  can  hardly  be  said  to  have  grasped 
this  epistemological  problem ;  and  the  correlative  ideal  of  method  was 
not  a  part  of  his  thought.  In  the  light  of  this,  therefore,  Bacon  can  not 
be  regarded  as  the  immediate  forerunner  of  Hobbes.  Seth  remarks 
that  Hobbes's  quarrel  with  scholasticism  "concerns  the  subject-matter, 
not  the  method,  of  that  philosophy.  He  does  not  join  in  Bacon's 
protest  against  the  scholastic  habit  of  anticipating  nature,  of  deducing 
facts  from  theories;  he  has  no  thought  of  substituting  a  scientific  in- 
duction for  the  deductive  rationalism  of  scholastic  philosophy.  So  far 
as  the  question  of  method  is  concerned,  he  is  the  opponent  rather  of 
Bacon  than  of  the  schoolmen;  for  him  science,  as  such,  is  rationalistic 
or  deductive,  not  empirical  and  inductive.  Rational  insight,  not 
empirical  knowledge,  is  his  scientific  ideal."  5 

It  was,  then,  the  teleological  character  of  the  old  physics  that  was  a 
chief  point  of  reaction  for  Hobbes.  The  mechanistic  character  of  the 
new  physics  implied  a  difference  in  procedure.  In  place  of  the  older 
process  of  the  classification  of  qualities,  the  study  of  nature  in  terms  of 
quantity  was  inaugurated.  This  change  in  the  character  of  physics 
literally  meant  the  application  of  mathematics  to  nature.  So  that  the 
new  epistemological  problem,  the  new  conception  of  nature,  and  the 
geometric  ideal  of  method  are  elements  of  one  movement.6 

A  detailed  account  of  the  sources  and  of  the  arising  and  maturing  of 
Hobbes's  thought  is  out  of  place  here.  His  attitude  toward  the  doc- 
trine of  the  plurality  of  substances  and  the  cognitive  correspondence  of 
idea  and  object  are  our  first  concern. 

i/~  When  nature  is  conceived  as  a  vast  mechanical  system,  nature  is  but 
one  substance.  But,  unlike  Descartes,  Hobbes  does  not  rule  the 
"mind"  out  of  nature  and  devise  a  second  substance  in  which  the  mental 
life  may  be  conceived  as  taking  place.  Human  nature  is  a  part  of  na- 
ture; it  is  a  product  of  the  same  forces;  it  is  regulated  by  the  same 
laws  as  nature  itself.  The  reduction  of  qualities  to  quantities  applies  in 
the  sphere  of  the  psychological  since  that  is  but  an  integral  part  of  the 
whole  physical  system.  Hobbes  speaks,  to  be  sure,  of  the  "two  princi- 
pal parts  of  man,"  body  and  mind.  But  no  duality  of  substance  is 
intended.  Mind  is  defined  only  by  an  enumeration  of  "mental"  facul- 
ties. There  is  but  one  substance,  body.  "The  word  body,  in  the  most 
general  acceptation,  signifieth  that  which  filleth,  or  occupieth  some  cer- 
tain room,  or  imagined  place;  and  dependeth  not  on  imagination,  but 
is  a  real  part  of  the  universe.  For  the  universe,»being  the  aggregate  of 
bodies,  there  is  no  real  part  thereof  that  is  not  also  body."7  Spirit,  ac- 
cording to  Hobbes,  originally  meant  air,  or  breath,  and  comes  to  mean 

5  English  Philosophers  and  Schools  of  Philosophy,  p.  58. 
8  cf.  Toennies,  ibid. 

i  Works  of  Hobbes,  Molesworth  edition,  1839,  Vol.  3,  Leviathan,  pt.  3,  ch.  34;  all  references  are  to 
this  edition. 


HO  B  B  E  S  II 

incorporeality  from  having  originally  indicated  subtle  body.  "Matter 
is  the  same  with  body;  but  never  without  respect  to  a  body  which  is 
made  thereof.  Form  is  the  aggregate  of  all  accidents  together  .  .  . 
spirit  is  this  fluid,  transparent,  invisible  body."8  The  notion  of  an  in- 
corporeal substance  is  a  contradiction  in  terms,  a  vain  idea  induced  by 
apparitions,  hallucinations,  and  dreams.  It  is  a  sort  of  mental  hob- 
goblin. Hobbes  uses  the  terms  "ghost"  and  "incorporeal  substance"  in 
juxtaposition,  and  is  serious  in  so  doing.9  From  Hobbes's  objections  to 
Descartes  it  appears  that  he  was  either  unable  to  understand  Descartes's 
notion  of  the  immateriality  of  thought  or,  what  is  more  probable, 
perversely  refused  to  comprehend  it.  In  this  Gassendi  resembled 
Hobbes.  The  notion  of  immateriality,  at  least  in  the  sense  of  the  imma- 
teriality or  ideality  of  form,  was  a  commonplace  to  those  imbued  with 
the  scholasticism  of  the  traditional  education  of  that  age.  Descartes's 
soul  substance  represents  not  so  much  an  innovation  and  a  novel 
distinction,  as  a  renovation  of  a  time-honored  conception,  coupled 
with  a  more  explicit  comprehension  of  the  implications  of  the  reduc- 
tion of  a  plurality  of  substances  to  two.  To  Hobbes  and  Gassendi, 
archheretics  of  the  age,  Descartes  appeared  the  victim  of  a  great 
superstition,  as  bad  as  that  of  belief  in  occult  powers.  On  the  one 
hand,  in  their  eyes,  he  was  proclaiming  allegiance  to  the  new  science  of 
nature;  on  the  other,  he  was  asserting  the  validity  of  a  nonsensical 
notion  that  was  one  of  the  rankest  growths  of  scholasticism. 

The  animus  of  Hobbes's  strictures  on  the  notion  of   incorporeal 
substance  was  derived  not  so  much  from  a  devotion  to  a  monism  of 
substance  as  from  a  conviction  of  the  worthlessness  of  the  concept  of 
substance  as  such.     He  does,  of  course,  speak  of  body  substance,  but 
concerning  this  single  substance  he  really  has  little  to  say.    At  bottom,  he 
is  of  the  opinion  that  any  and  every  notion  of  substance  is  vain,  empty, 
and  unfruitful.    Its  serviceableness,  in  so  far  as  it  has  any,  is  in  its  use 
as  a  limiting  idea.    The  phenomena  of  nature,  and  these  include  the 
phenomena  of  human  nature,  are  motions.    The  science  of  nature  is 
essentially  the^science  of  dynamics  or  mechanics — a  mathematical 
quantitative  investigation  of  the  sequence  of  physical  events.     The 
new  conception  of  nature  serves,  for  Hobbes,  all  the  purposes  formerly 
served  by  the  concept  of  substance.  The  thought  of  nature  as  a  dynami- 
cal system  is  so  fundamental  with  Hobbes  that  he  seems  well-nigh  to  con-  . 
found  pure  mathematics  with  its  applied  forms.    The  true  relationship  I 
between  mathematics  and  physical  science  is  obscured  in  his  thinking  I 
through  the  discovery  that  nature  possesses  a  sort  of  mathematical  I 
structure.   And  it  is  this  vision  that  fructifies  his  thought,  rather  than  the 
notion  of  the  oneness  of  substance.   As  has  been  indicated,  he  desired  to 

8  Anra-er  to  Z?/s/zo£  Bramhall,  Vol.  4,  p.  309. 

9  De  Cor  pore.  Vol.  i,  pt.  4,  ch.  25,  p.  399. 


1 


12  IDEA    AND    ESSENCE 

give  knowledge  of  nature  the  certainty  of  geometry.  The  practical  identi- 
fication of  geometry  and  mechanics  raises  the  laws  of  motion  to  the 
rank  of  geometrical  axioms  and  definitions,  and  mechanics,  as  the 
science  of  all  nature,  thereby  attains,  in  his  mind,  a  position  comparable 
to  the  deductive,  demonstrative  certainty  of  geometry.10  Motion  thus 
becomes  the  chief  category  of  his  thought  while  the  concept  of  sub- 
stance lapses  from  mind.  For  once  science  as  the  study  of  motion  is 
launched,  the  notion  of  body  retreats  from  sight ;  and  one  could  properly 
say  that  the  notion  of  substance  takes  the  form  of  the  conception  of 
nature  as  a  uniform,  mechanical  system.  This  opinion  is  corroborated 
by  the  fact  that  Hobbes  seems  at  little  pains  to  determine  the  nature  of 
substance.  Having  served  its  purpose  as  a  counter  blast  to  pluralisms 
and  dualisms  of  substances,  it  becomes  a  shadowy  sort  of  metaphysical 
background  for  science.  Owing  to  this  fact,  Hobbes's  philosophy  is 
sometimes  called  phenomenalistic.  Space  and  time  are  phantasms. 
Accidents  do  not  "inhere"  in  bodies,  but  are  our  ways  of  conceiving 
body.  All  accidents  can  be  thought  away  from  body,  save  magnitude. 
The  accidents  of  body  are  phenomena  of  motion,  and  science  is  knowl- 
edge of  these  accidents.  Thus  natural  philosophy  deals  with  a  world  of 
motions  and  accidents,  the  relation  of  which  to  substance  remains  un- 
settled; and  it  so  remains,  probably,  because  Hobbes  thought  of  the 
problem  of  this  relation  as  vain  and  fruitless.  Had  he  not  regarded  the 
notion  of  substance  as  empty,  he  must  have  raised  questions  concerning 
the  relation  of  motion  to  substance.  But  in  the  main,  questions  of  that 
type  are  left  to  one  side. 

It  is  noteworthy  that  Hobbes's  psychology  is  developed  largely  in  the 
interest  of  physics.  Of  the  psychology  of  sensation  and  perception,  at 
least,  this  is  true.  As  all  psychological  process  is  really  motion,  psy- 
chology is  a  branch  of  physics.  A  brief  survey  of  his  psychology  will 
indicate  this. 

The  subject  of  sense  is  the  sentient  itself.  And  it  is  of  prime  impor- 
tance to  observe  that  this  "subject  of  sense"  is  neither  consciousness, 
nor  soul,  nor  mind,  but,  in  Hobbes's  own  phrase,  "some  living  creature." 
Sense  is  motion  in  the  sentient.  All  qualities  "called  sensible,  are  in  the 
object,  that  causeth  them,  but  so  many  several  motions  of  the  matter, 
by  which  it  presseth  our  organs  diversely."  u  These  motions  are  propa- 
gated on  into  the  organism.  But  this  motion  meets  an  "outward"  mo- 
tion, and  this  clash  of  motions  is  sense.  "Sense  is  a  phantasm  made  by 
the  reaction  and  endeavor  outwards  in  the  organ  of  sense  caused  by  an 
endeavor  inwards  from  the  object,  remaining  for  some  time  more  or 
less."  12  "Neither  in  us  that  are  pressed,  are  they  (qualities)  anything 

10  cf.  Toennies,  ibid.  Vol.  4,  1880,  p.  69;  Philosophical  Elements,  sect.  2  ;  De  Homine,  ch.  10,  5. 

11  Vol.  3,  ch.  I,  p.  2, 

12  Concerning  Body,  Vol.  I,  pt.  4,  ch.  25,  p.  301. 


HOB  B  E  S  13 

else,  but  divers  motions;  for  motion  produceth  nothing  but  motion."13 
In  Chapter  25  of  the  Concerning  Body,  we  learn  that  qualities  are  not 
accidents  of  the  object,  for  light  and  color,  for  example,  are  merely 
phantasms  of  the  sentient. 

How  thoroughly  the  psychology  of  sensation  and  perception  is  re- 
garded by  Hobbes  as  an  integral  part  of  physics  is  indicated  by  the  fact 
that  Hobbes  raises  the  question  whether  there  is  not  sensation  in  all 
bodies.14  For  reaction,  as  well  as  action,  characterizes  all  bodies,  and 
sensation  is  a  phenomenon  of  a  type  describable  in  such  categories. 
He  falls  back  on  the  fact  that  the  human  body  retains  the  prior  motion 
,  as  a  dampened  but  persistent  organic  reverberation ;  and  in  this  resides 
the  possibility  of  memory.  Or,  to  speak  more  accurately,  memory,  in 
Hobbes's  sense  of  the  term,  is  an  essential  part  of  sense.  He  does  not 
seem,  however,  to  offer  an  explanation  of  how  the  motions  from  sense 
persisting  in  subliminal  form  come  to  attain,  when  we  remember,  a 
state  of  excitement  approximating  that  of  the  original  experience.  "For 
by  sense,  we  commonly  understand  the  judgment  we  make  of  objects 
by  their  phantasms;  namely,  by  comparing  and  distinguishing  those 
phantasms;  which  we  could  never  do,  if  that  motion  in  the  organ, 
by  which  the  phantasm  is  made,  did  not  remain  there  for  some  time, 
and  make  the  same  phantasm  return.  Wherefore  sense  .  .  .  hath 
necessarily  some  memory  adhering  to  it."  15  Hence  the  "nature  of 
sense  can  not  be  placed  in  reaction  only,"16  but  an  organic  continuance 
of  the  motion,  or  reverberation,  must  be  added  to  the  action-reaction 
scheme.  Yet  it  is  to  be  noted  that  this  does  not  remove  sense  psychol- 
ogy from  physics,  for  the  persistent  motion  is  just  motion  in  a  given 
body.  Rather  it  means  that  the  physics  of  sense  deals  with  an  added 
factor. 

Since  all  ideas  are  originally  from  sense,  they  are  also  motions  in  the 
sentient.  Hobbes  is  loose  in  his  use  of  terms,  and  he  maintains  with 
consistency  no  distinctions  between  images,  representations,  ideas,  and 
conceptions.  They  are  all  really  images.  All  psychological  facts  are  j 
motions  or  clashes  of  motions.  Sense  processes  differ  from  ideas  and  I 
images  only  in  that  the  latter  are  revived  motions  or  motions  continuing 
in  the  absence  of  the  object.  All  mental  processes  are  at  bottom  of  two 
kinds,  either  sensations  (perceptions)  or  images.  The  general  name  for 
both  kinds  is  "phantasm."  "The  imagery  and  representations  of  the 
qualities  of  the  thing  without,  is  that  we  call  our  conception,  imagina- 
tion, ideas,  notice,  or  knowledge  of  them;  and  the  faculty  or  power  by 
which  we  are  capable  of  such  knowledge,  is  that  I  here  call  cognitive 
power,  or  conceptive,  the  power  of  knowing  or  conceiving."17  Imagina- 

»Vol.  3,  ch.  i,  p.  2. 

14  Concerning  Body,  Vol.  I,  p.  393.    L 

«  ibid. 

M  ibid. 

17  Human  Nature,  Vol.  4,  ch.  i. 


14  IDEA    AND    ESSENCE 

tion  is  defined  as  "conception  remaining,  and  little  by  little  decaying 
from  and  after  the  act  of  sense."18  The  representative  image  is  a  state 
of  sense  overpowered  by  another  and  later  sense  experience.  Produc- 
tive imagination  is  the  composition  of  motions  in  the  brain. 

The  phantasm  is  called  the  "act  of  sense."  "From  this  reaction  by 
the  motions  in  the  sentient  phantasm  or  idea  hath  its  being."  Hobbes 
says  with  reference  to  phantasm  as  the  act  of  sense,  that  "the  being  a 
doing  is  the  same  as  the  being  done-"19  he  adds  that  "a  phantasm  being 
made,  perception  is  made  together  with  it."  This  seems  to  mean  that 
the  motion  process,  or  the  clash  of  motions,  is  itself  the  idea  or  percep- 
tion, the  phantasm. 

Hobbes  distinguishes,  or  seems  to  distinguish,  between  the  cognitive 
or  conceptive  faculty  and  the  imaginative  or  motive  faculty.  "For  the 
understanding  of  what  I  mean  by  the  power  cognitive,  we  must  re- 
member and  acknowledge  that  there  be  in  our  minds  continually  certain 
images  or  conceptions  of  the  things  without  us,  .  .  .  the  absence 
or  destruction  of  things  once  imagined  doth  not  cause  the  absence  or  de- 
struction of  the  imagination  itself.  This  imagery  and  representations  of 
the  qualities  of  the  thing  without,  is  that  we  call  our  conception, 
imagination,  ideas,  notice,  or  knowledge  of  them  ;  and  the  faculty  or 
power  by  which  we  are  capable  of  such  knowledge,  is  that  I  here  call 
cognitive  power,  or  conceptive,  the  power  of  knowing  or  conceiving."20 
But  then  Hobbes  proceeds  to  equate  obscure  conception  and  phantasy 
or  imagination,21  so  that  the  distinction  between  the  two  faculties  is  left 
inexact.  Certainly  no  distinction  between  image  and  conception  ap- 
pears from  these  citations.  But  while  Hobbes,  as  a  matter  of  termi- 
nology, does  not  distinguish  between  image  and  conception  as  existences, 
he  has  a  certain  distinction  in  use  and  meaning  that  can  be  most  easily 
denoted  by  these  terms.  To  make  this  clear,  it  will  be  necessary  to  turn 
briefly  to  his  idea  of  knowledge. 

Hobbes  has  in  mind  a  knowledge  system  comparable  to  geometry  in 
method  and  certainty.  This  universal  system,  which  represents  the 
ideal  of  knowledge,  is  contrasted  with  the  particularity  of  sense  experi- 
ence. The  opposition  between  the  universal  principle  in  which  alone 
consists  true  knowledge  and  the  empirical  manifold  does  not  lead  in  the 
case  of  Hobbes  to  an  attempt  to  derive  knowledge  from  sense  experi- 
ence. His  problem  is  not  stated  in  the  form  :  How  can  we  obtain  from 
sense  experience  the  organized  body  of  universal  principles?  The  con- 
trast between  principle  and  particular  sense  experiences  develops  rather 
into  an  antithesis  that  runs  through  his  theory  of  knowledge.  The  ex- 
periences of  sense  are,  in  conformity  with  Hobbes's  mechanistic  view 


.  ch.  3,  I. 

19  Vol.  I,  pt.  4,  25,  p.  392. 

20  Human  Nature,  Vol.  4,  pp.  2-3. 

21  cf.  ibid,  p.  9. 


HOBBES  15 

of  nature,  effects.  They  are  not  differentiated  from  other  effects  in 
nature  because  they  involve  a  unique  principle.  The  fact  that  sense 
effects  happen  to  concern  a  sentient  being  does  not  signify  that  they 
are  of  an  order  essentially  different  from  other  sorts  of  effects,  for  the 
sentient  being  is  an  integral  part  of  the  mechanical  system.  Now  true 
knowledge  is  knowledge  of  causes,  and  causes  in  Hobbes's  system  of 
knowledge  are  to  correspond  to  the  first  principles  of  mathematics. 
Therefore  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  universal  principles  and  sense 
experience  is  formulated  in  terms  of  cause  and  effect.  In  consequence, 
there  arises  an  antithesis  between  knowledge  from  causes  to  effects  and 
knowledge  from  effects  to  causes. 

Geometry,  the  model  that  Hobbes  seeks  to  follow,  begins  with 
axioms  and  definitions  and  proceeds  deductively  to  the  exposition  of 
consequences.     But  why  is  geometry  demonstrable?     Because  the 
power  to  construct  the  object  of  thought  is  in  the  demonstrator.22 
But  with  respect  to  knowledge  of  fact,  sense  experience  can  not  give  us 
general  notions,  universal  principles,  definitions,  and  axioms.     We 
do  not  know  the  construction  of  things.    Science,  imitating  geometry, 
proceeds  deductively  from  causes,  which  are  the  axioms  and  first 
principles  of  science,  to  effects.     Sense  experience  is  an  effect,  and, 
therefore,  can  not  in  any  direct  fashion  supply  the  starting-points  for        * 
scientific  knowledge.    From  sense  effects,  or  from  effects  generally,  we      I'  ~ 
can  demonstrate,  not  the  real  causes,  but  only  possible  causes,  of  the      PQ 
effects.    So  the  antithesis  takes  the  following  form :  on  the  one  hand       {' 
is  scientific  knowledge — the  only  real  knowledge — proceeding  from        |P 
causes  to  effects  and  revealing  necessities  of  connection;  on  the  other        j^ 
hand,  we  have  knowledge  of  possible  causes  of  real  effects,  and  this  is         I' 
mere  knowledge  of  probability,  knowledge  of  experience,  unscientific 
knowledge. 

Hobbes  does  not  give  a  satisfactory  account  of  how  we  are  to  obtain 
the  first  notions  of  science.  If,  however,  he  does  not  solve  this  diffi- 
culty, two  things  aid  him  in  glossing  it  over  and,  perhaps,  convincing 
him  that  he  has  solved  it.  First  of  all,  there  is  that  identification  of 
mathematics  and  mechanics  already  referred  to.  By  analytic  proce- 
dure the  primitive  notions  (axioms  and  definitions  of  physical  science) 
are  to  be  secured,  and  then,  proceeding  synthetically,  the  effects  are  to 
be  demonstrated  from  their  causes  or  first  principles.  The  body  of 
definitions,  or  primitive  truths,  thus  obtained  by  analysis  would  form 
First  Philosophy. 

The  second  recourse  afforded  Hobbes  is  language,  an  instrument  that 
makes  possible  the  transcendence  of  the  limitations  of  experience.  Rea- 
soning is  computation,  addition  and  subtraction;  and  judgment  is  the 
uniting  of  two  names  by  the  copula  "is."  The  universal  name  is  a 

*cf.  Six  Lessons  to  the  Professor  of  Mathematics,  Vol.  7,  p.  134;  cf.  Toennies,  op.  cit.t  Vol.  4. 


16  IDEA    AND    ESSENCE 

counter  or  symbol,  and  truth  is  consistency  in  the  use  of  terms.  The 
universal  name  does  not  represent  any  particular  existing  object,  nor 
any  particular  image.  It  may  indicate  indifferently  any  individual  ob- 
ject of  a  class,  or  an  image  of  any  individual  object  of  a  class.  In 
short,  it  is  a  matter  of  no  importance  what  image  is  attached  to  the 
name.  The  essential  thing  is  that  the  signification  of  the  name  be 
clearly  determined  upon  and  that  it  be  accepted. 

Now  to  return  to  the  distinction  of  .image  and  conception.  The 
image,  particularly  in  so  far  as  Hobbes  uses  conception  as  termino- 
logically  equivalent  to  image,  is  itself  an  existence,  a  motion  in  the 
sentient,  a  physical  effect.  Experience  is  "store  of  phantasms,"  and 
phantasms  are,  as  existents,  effects,  the  source  of  problems.  The  image 
is  literally  like  the  images  in  a  mirror.  The  shilling,  observed  through 
a  glass  of  a  certain  figure,  is  seen  as  twenty  shillings.  The  shilling  is  a 
body — the  images  given  by  the  glass  are,  in  Hobbes's  own  terms,  fan- 
cies, idols,  mere  nothings,  echoes.23  The  proposition  that  "there  is 
nothing  without  us  (really)  which  we  call  an  image  or  colour"  is  proved 
pointing  out  that  "the  image  of  anything  by  reflection  in  a  glass  of  water 
or  the  like,  is  not  anything  in  or  behind  the  glass,  or  in  or  under  the 
water." 24 

Conceptions,  in  so  far  as  they  are  composed  of  images,  are  like  all 
other  images.  But  conception  as  a  name  standing  for  a  class  of  objects 
(or  class  of  images)  and  accompanied  by  an  image  of  a  particular  object 
of  the  class,  means  the  term  of  discourse.  What  we  should  ordinarily 
intend  by  "conception"  or  "general  idea"  signifies  for  Hobbes  symbolic 
word  counters  with  meanings  determined  and  agreed  upon,  which  form 
the  terms  in  the  process  of  reasoning.  Image  and  conception  as  psy- 
chological existents  are  one  and  the  same.  But  with  reference  to 
knowledge,  conception  is  the  universal  name  standing  for  a  group  of 
particular  empirical  facts  (images  or  sense  perceptions) ,  and  knowledge 
based  upon  such  terms  is  universal,  scientific  knowledge;  while 
knowledge  based  upon  particular  images,  or  trains  of  images,  is  unscien- 
tific and  not  of  universal  validity.  This  is  clarified  by  a  reference  to 
Hobbes's  Objections  to  Descartes.  The  latter  has  said  that  he  does  not 
understand  by  the  imagination  what  the  wax  is,  but  conceives  it  by  the' 
mind  alone.  A  distinction  between  image  as  physiological  process  and 
idea  as  an  immaterial  spiritual  entity  is  thus  implied.  Hobbes 
objects  to  this  as  follows:  "There  is  a  great  difference  between  imagin- 
ing, i.e.,  having  some  idea,  and  conceiving  with  the  mind,  i.e.,  in- 
ferring, as  the  result  of  a  train  of  reasoning,  that  something  is,  or  ex- 
ists. .  .  But  what  shall  we  now  say,  if  reasoning  chance  to  be 
nothing  more  than  the  uniting  and  stringing  together  of  names  or 

M  Decameron  Physiologicum,  Vol.  7.  pp.  78-79. 
14  Human  Nature,  Vol.  4,  pp.  4-5. 


HOB  BES  17 

designations  by  the  word  is?  It  will  be  a  consequence  of  this  that  rea- 
son gives  us  no  conclusion  about  the  nature  of  things,  but  only  about 
the  terms  that  designate  them,  whether,  indeed,  or  not  there  is  a  con- 
vention (arbitrarily  made  about  their  meanings)  according  to  which  we 
join  these  names  together.  If  this  be  so,  as  is  possible,  reason- 
ing will  depend  on  names,  names  on  the  imagination,  and  imagina- 
tion ...  on  the  motion  of  the  corporeal  organs.  Thus  mind 
will  be  nothing  but  the  motions  in  certain  parts  of  an  organic 
body."25  "It  is  evident  that  essence  in  so  far  as  it  is  distinguished 
from  existence  is  nothing  else  than  a  union  of  names  by  means  of  the 
verb  is"  26 

In  short,  in  terms  of  psychology7,  there  is  no  distinction  between  con- 
ception and  image.  Words,  one  would  suppose,  are  also  images.  But 
with  reference  to  knowledge,  conception  as  universal  names  signifying  a 
class  of  objects  or  an  abstract  principle  is  in  sharpest  contrast  to  the 
particular  image.  While  for  Descartes  the  image  is  what  Hobbes 
would  have  it  be,  namely,  motion  (or  some  purely  physical  change)  in 
the  sentient  organism,  the  idea  or  conception  is  an  entity  in  an  imma- 
terial soul  substance. 

Mention  has  been  made  of  what  has  been  called  Hobbes's  "phenom- 
enalism." In  connection  with  the  meaning  of  this  term  as  applied  to 
Hobbes  certain  questions  concerning  qualities  arise.  First  of  all,  what 
is  the  "object"  of  perception?  It  is  not  any  sense  quality,  or  a  combina- 
tion of  them,  and  merely  that.  The  object  of  sight,  he  says,  is  neither 
light  nor  color  (which  are  phantasms  in  the  sentient),  but  the  object 
that  is  light  or  colored.27  "The  whole  appearance  of  figure,  and  light 
and  color  is  by  the  Greeks  commonly  called  eidos  .  .  .  and  by  the 
Latins,  species  or  imago;  all  which  names  signify  no  more  but  appear- 
ances."28 Now  subtracting  from  the  "object"  these  secondary  qualities, 
what  remains?  Motion,  and  in  some  obscure  sense,  body,  substance. 
Consider  briefly  in  connection  with  this  certain  aspects  of  Hobbes's 
account  of  qualities. 

The  causes  of  sensible  qualities,  he  says,  can  not  be  known  until  we 
know  the  causes  of  sense.29  Sensible  qualities  from  the  side  of  the 
object  are  "so  many  several  motions,  pressing  our  organs  diversely"; 30 
from  the  side  of  the  perceiving  subject,  they  are  again  "nothing  but 
divers  motions."31  Qualities  are  apparitions  of  the  motions  produced 
by  the  object  on  the  brain;  but  the  apparitions  or  images  are  also 
said  to  be  "nothing  really,  but  motion  in  some  internal  substance  of  the 

*  Philosophical  Works  of  Descartes,  Ross  and  Haldane,  Vol.  2,  p.  65. 

28  ibid,  p.  77. 

"Vol.  i,  p.  404. 

18  ibid,  pp.  404-405. 

"Vol.  i,  p.  72. 

»•  Vol.  3,  P.  2. 

«  ibid. 


18  IDEA    AND    ESSENCE 

head" 82  Four  propositions  are  advanced  33  that  should  be  considered 
here:  "That  the  subject  wherein  colour  and  image  are  inherent,  is  not 
the  object  or  thing  seen.  That  there  is  nothing  without  us  (really)  which 
we  call  an  image  or  colour.  That  the  said  image  or  colour  is  but  an 
apparition  unto  us  of  the  motion,  agitation,  or  alteration,  which  the 
object  worketh  in  the  brain,  or  spirits  .  .  .  that  as  in  vision,  so  also  in 
conceptions  that  arise  from  the  other  senses  the  subject  of  their  in- 
herence is  not  the  object,  but  the  sentient" 

It  would  appear,  therefore,  that  the  "object"  reduces  to  motions  of 
body.  Secondary  qualities  at  least  depend  on  the  organism  and  are  in 
the  organism.  Hobbes's  position  is,  then,  in  general,  that  of  modern 
physics.  For  the  physicist  the  given  color  is  just  so  many  vibrations 
per  second  in  the  medium,  that  is,  a  certain  kind  of  motion.  For 
Hobbes  as  physicist,  the  subject-matter  of  investigation  is  the  various 
kinds  of  motion.  Body  is  distinguished  from  its  "appearances."  Body 
as  a  principle  beyond  appearances  affords  a  problem  for  metaphysics 
rather  than  for  physics.  Appearances  as  phenomena  of  motion  form 
the  subject-matter  of  physics.  Body  as  substance  ranks  as  a  sort  of 
general  postulate  of  physical  science.  This  seems  to  be,  in  a  general 
way,  the  drift  of  Hobbes's  meaning. 

To  return  for  a  moment  to  the  psychology  of  perception.  It  is  to  be 
noted  that  while  the  cause  of  perception  is  the  motion  which  is  propa- 
gated through  the  medium  into  the  organ  of  sense  and  then  on  into  the 
brain,  this  motion  is  not  in  and  by  itself  the  sensation  quality  or  the 
perception.  The  perception  (sensation)  arises  only  when  the  inward 
motion  clashes  with  the  outward  motion  or  "endeavor."  The  "appari- 
tion" or  phantasm  is  then  not  the  incoming  motion  itself.  But  then  we 
may  ask :  Is  the  phantasm  the  clash  of  the  motions?  Is  the  psychologi- 
cal process  just  this  reaction  upon  another  motion,  a  sort  of  compound 
motion  resulting  from  the  combination  of  the  inward  and  outward 
motions,  or  is  it  the  way  in  which  the  total  motion  process  appears  to 
the  percipient?  There  seem  to  be  two  possible  interpretations  of 
Hobbes's  thought:  either  the  clash  of  the  "endeavour  inwards"  and  the 
"endeavour  outwards"  is  in  itself  the  apparition  or  quality;  or  the 
qualities  depend  on,  but  are  something  more  than,  the  motion  reaction  in 
a  nervous  substance  on  the  inward-going  motion  which  is  a  continua- 
tion of  the  motion  originating  in  some  extra-organic  source.  The 
"clash"  is  either  the  apparition  or  sense  quality  itself,  or  that  which 
appears  in  sense  perception  as  the  quality. 

Hobbes's  own  statements  afford  no  ground  for  doubting  that  for  him 
the  clash  of  motions  is  itself  the  quality,  apparition,  or  phantasm.  Or 
in  terms  characteristic  of  his  age,  they  are  simply  movements  of  the 

32  Human  Nature,  Vol.  4,  ch.  7.  p.  i ;  cf.  ch.  8,  i,  and  ch.  10,  i. 
88  Human  Nature,  Vol.  4,  p.  4. 


HO  B  B  E  S  19 

animal  spirits,  vibrations  in  the  nerves;  the  only  qualification  is  that 
they  are  compound  movements  or  vibrations.  The  idea  may  be  un- 
tenable, the  theory  superficial  and  neglectful  of  real  difficulties,  but  it  is 
Hobbes's  answer. 

We  may  ourselves  introduce  the  question  of  consciousness,  in  order 
thereby  to  indicate  the  unsatisfactory  character  of  this  psychology. 
But  then  we  are  injecting  into  the  exposition  of  his  thought  an  order  of 
questions  of  which  he  was  not  cognizant  or,  being  aware  of  them,  simply 
neglected.  Having  denied  the  existence  of  incorporeal  substance,  he 
could  not  and  would  not  regard  the  apparition  or  conception  or  image 
as  a  soul  state,  a  spiritual  event,  in  an  immaterial  soul,  and  correspond- 
ing to,  rather  than  being,  a  physical  motion.  It  is  the  result  of  an  in- 
adequate historical  perspective  to  raise  the  question  of  the  relation  of 
the  "clash"  of  motions  to  "consciousness,"  or  to  make  the  immediate 
object  of  sense  a  "state  of  consciousness"  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the 
term  (see  below). 

The  source  of  misunderstanding  is  the  question  of  what  is  meant  by 
the  "object,"  and  to  this  we  must  return.  What  the  object  is  does  not 
hinge  upon  any  question  of  a  relation  to  consciousness,  but  upon  the 
relation  of  the  question  of  psychology  to  the  question  of  physics.  In 
terms  of  Hobbes's  physics,  which  we  must  remember  is  essentially  me- 
chanics, the  "object"  is  a  set  of  "divers  motions,"  connected  in  a  manner 
not  wholly  explained  with  substantial  body.  The  accidents  of  body, 
for  Hobbes  the  physicist,  are  those  divers  motions.  All  accidents  can 
be  generated  or  destroyed,  save  those  of  magnitude  and  extension; 
body  can  never  be  generated  or  destroyed.  Bodies  are  things  and  are 
not  generated,  accidents  (save  magnitude  and  extension)  are  generated 
and  are  not  things.  These  statements  define  the  subject-matter  of 
physical  science. 

But  the  "object"  as  that  which  the  sentient  has,  or  as  the  content  of 
the  sentient's  experience,  is  not  precisely  the  same  as  the  "object"  exist- 
ing outside  the  sentient.  It  is  not  these  "divers  motions"  constituting 
the  extra-organic  object,  but  the  immediate  object  of  sense,  and  this  is 
a  phantasm,  apparition,  or  combination  of  phantasms.  Now  the 
explanation  of  the  psychological  process  and  fact  is  cast  in  terms  of 
physics.  The  external  cause  of  the  phantasm  is  motion  in  the  extra- 
organic  object.  In  fact,  it  would  be  accurate  to  say  that  the  cause  is 
that  set  of  motions  which  is  the  extra-organic  object.  The  phantasm 
itself,  as  a  matter  of  existence,  is  motion;  but  not  the  motion  propa- 
gated into  the  organism  without  alteration.  On  the  contrary,  it  is 
rather  the  product  of  the  combination  or  interaction  of  two  mo- 
tions or  two  sets  of  motions.  That  which  forms  the  content  of  the 
sentient's  perception  is,  therefore,  a  complex  of  sense  qualities;  and  it 
is  the  joint  product  of  the  extra-organic  object  and  the  equally  physical 


2O  IDEAANDESSENCE 

living  organism.  The  psychological  fact  is  thus  not  the  "divers  mo- 
tions" of  the  external  object,  but  another  set  of  "divers  motions"  dif- 
fering from  the  former  in  two  ways :  first,  in  that  the  latter  are  motions 
in  the  sentient  organism,  and  secondly,  in  that  they  are  the  results  of  the 
former  set  of  motions  acting  upon,  and  being  reacted  upon  by,  the  per- 
cipient organism.  In  other  terms,  the  psychological  content  is  the  i 
mediate  data  of  sense;  for  physics  it  is  the  motion  accidents  of  body. 
A  remark  of  Hobbes's34  may  elucidate  the  point.  The  sun,  he  says, 
seems  to  the  eye  no  bigger  than  a  dish :  but  "there  is  behind  it  some- 
where something  else,  I  suppose  a  real  sun,  which  creates  these  fancies, 
by  working,  one  way  or  other,  upon  my  eye,  and  other  organs  of  my 
senses,  to  cause  that  diversity  of  fancy."  The  "real  sun"  indicates  the 
external  object  stimulus;  the  "diversity  of  fancy,"  the  sun-having-the- 
size-of-a-dish,  is  the  content  of  the  perception. 

We  are  simply  endeavoring  here  to  render  clear  the  difference  be- 
tween the  phantasm  and  its  extra-organic  correspondent  as  Hobbes 
himself  saw  it.  Both  phantasm  and  extra-organic  object  are  physical 
effects — neither  is  "mental."  But  the  phantasm  is  not  an  exact  replica 
of  the  "object,"  for  they  are  two  "sets  of  divers  motions,"  and  that  set 
which  is  phantasm  differs  from  the  correlated  set  which  is  the  outside 
"object"  by  the  extent  to  which  motions  native  to  the  sentient  fuse 
with  the  motions  propagated  from  the  external  object  into  the  sentient. 
This  is  consequently  no  denial  of  a  correspondence,  nor,  for  that  mat- 
ter, of  some  degree  of  similarity,  between  phantasm  and  outside  ob- 
ject; that  which  is  denied  is  the  exact  and  complete  similarity  of 
phantasm  and  the  object  without  the  sentient.  In  brief,  the  fact  that 
motions  from  without  enter  a  living  organism  makes  a  difference  to 
those  motions. 

In  the  light  of  this,  the  assertion  that  Hobbes's  doctrine  has  nothing 
to  do  with  "mental  states"  seems  justified.  Phantasms  are  neither 
"mental,"  "spiritual,"  "psychical,"  nor  are  they  "states  of  consciousness." 
Such  terms  with  their  customary  and  modern  connotations  are  totally 
inapplicable  to  a  psychology  of  the  type  of  Hobbes's.  Seth35  affords  a 
curious  instance  of  this  misapplication.  "The  immediate  objects  of  the 
senses  are,  Hobbes  finds,  mere  'phantasms'  or  'appearances' — as  we 
should  say,  states  of  consciousness,  having  no  existence  outside  the 
mind  itself  .  .  .  the  object  of  sense  perception  is  purely  subjective, 
and  totally  unlike  the  real  object,  which  is  the  cause  of  the  sense  ap- 
pearance." But  one  is  forced  to  protest  that  by  "appearances,"  Hobbes 
does  not  mean  what  "state  of  consciousness,  having  no  existence  outside 
the  mind"  means  for  us.  "Appearances"  for  Hobbes  are  related  to  the 
real  thing  as  the  image  in  the  mirror  to  the  object  mirrored;  they  do 

14  Decameron  Physiologicum,  Vol.  7,  pp.  80-81. 

35  English  Philosophers  and  Schools  of  Philosophy,  pp.  61-62. 


HOBBES  21 

not  imply  an  order  of  existences  of  a  nature  radically  different  from  the 
objects  of  which  they  are  the  appearances.  They  are  existences,  ef- 
fects, of  precisely  the  same  nature  as  the  "real  thing." 

The  image  is  thus  related  to  the  object  as  effect  to  cause,  as  an  echo 
to  the  sounding  body,  or  as  a  reflection  in  a  mirror  to  the  source  from 
which  ether  vibrations  spring.  Now  the  question  may  here  be  raised  : 
Are  not  images,  these  echoes  and  reflections,  equivalent  to  states  of  con- 
sciousness? The  answer  must  obviously  depend  upon  what  is  the  pre- 
cise meaning  here  ascribed  to  "states  of  consciousness."  If  we  define  the 
phrase  as  denoting  simply  what  we  are  aware  of  in  the  operations  of 
sense,  and  mean  literally  that,  with  no  implied  reservations  and  con- 
siderations concerning  the  status  of  things  "in  consciousness,"  or  de- 
pendent for  their  existence  or  for  their  being  experienced  "on  conscious- 
ness," or  "having  their  existence  only  in  the  mind" — in  short,  if  the 
phrase  be  emptied  of  all  so-called  subjectivistic  implications,  Hobbes's 
phantasms  are  states  of  consciousness.  But  it  is  essential  that  all 
these  qualifications  be  made.  It  is  easy  to  imagine  that,  were  Hobbes 
asked  what  we  are  aware  of  in  perceptions,  he  would  regard  the  ques- 
tion as  rather  stupid,  since  every  man  possessing  vision  saw  colors, 
and  having  ears  heard  sounds — in  other  words,  was  aware  of  images, 
echoes,  reflections,  phantasms.  If  states  of  consciousness  are  simply 
what  we  are  aware  of,  Hobbes  would  regard  it  as  trifling  to  ask  if  what 
we  are  aware  of  are  states  of  consciousness.  On  the  other  hand,  had 
Hobbes  been  asked  if  phantasms  were  "subjective,"  if  they  were  de- 
pendent for  their  existence  on  consciousness,  or  the  soul,  or  the  mind ; 
or  had  he  been  asked  if  the  nature  of  phantasms  were  altered  by  the 
fact  that  some  consciousness  was  aware  of  them,  he  would  have  been 
sorely  puzzled  to  discover  what  the  question  was  about.  He  would 
probably  have  looked  upon  it  as  on  a  par  with  asking  if  the  image  in 
the  mirror  were  altered  by  the  mirroring.  Not  to  labor  the  point  fur- 
ther, we  may  conclude  that  such  questions  almost  unavoidably  inject 
into  Hobbes's  doctrine  elements  not  merely  foreign  to  it,  but  beyond 
the  ken  of  its  author.  The  questions  as  to  the  adequateness  to-day  of  I 
Hobbes's  psychology  of  perception,  of  the  relation  of  that  psychology  I 
to  present-day  positions,  and  of  whether  we  should  hold  that  Hobbes's  / 
phantasm  is  all  that  "state  of  consciousness"  should  signify,  are  very ' 
different  from  the  question  of  what  Hobbes  did  mean  to  say. 

If  by  "mind,"  in  the  statement  quoted,  Seth  intends  the  subject  of 
sense  in  Hobbes's  meaning  of  the  term,  then  it  is  true  that  appearances 
have  no  existence  outside  the  mind  itself — but  then  they  are  not  "states 
of  consciousness."  For  the  subject  of  sense  Hobbes  does  not  call  mind 
or  soul  or  consciousness,  but  "some  living  creature" — and  this  is  a  sig- 
nificant fact.  Hobbes's  phantasms  are  what  he  calls  them,  store  of 
experience.  The  manifold  of  experience  is  this  store  of  phantasms.  It 


22  IDEA    AND    ESSENCE 

is  for  Hobbes  what  the  sequence  of  states  of  consciousness  is  for  the 
modern  subjectivist.  Hobbes's  manifold  of  experience  are  states  of  a 
living  creature,  phenomena  of  motion,  but  the  series  of  states  of  con- 
sciousness, as  the  phrase  is  generally  used  in  later  subjectivistic 
thought,  implies  a  group  of  conceptions  and  distinctions  which  simply 
did  not  exist  for  Hobbes.  It  is  even  unfair  to  Hobbes  to  say  that  his 
store  of  phantasms  is  identical  with  the  sequence  of  physiological  pro- 
cesses or  neuroses  which  in  most  modern  psychology  is  regarded  as  par- 
alleling a  very  dissimilar  sequence  of  psychical  states.  It  is  unfair 
because  it  tends  to  represent  Hobbes  as  reacting  against  a  distinction 
in  orders  of  existence  and  as  erasing  the  whole  world  of  the  "psychical" 
in  order  to  maintain  the  sufficiency  of  the  world  of  the  "physical."  The 
point  on  which  too  much  insistence  can  hardly  be  laid,  however,  is  that 
such  a  picture  of  Hobbes  is  unhistorical,  not  founded  on  Hobbes's  own 
words,  and  that,  therefore,  the  questions  that  we  have  been  considering 
are  irrelevant. 

The  trouble,  to  repeat,  is  that  subjectivity  and  objectivity,  conscious- 
ness, mental  states,  psychical  existences,  and  the  like  elements  of  later 
psychological  and  epistemological  instruments  of  terminology  are  com- 
pletely beyond  the  sphere  of  Hobbes's  thought.  The  appearances  and 
the  real  objects  can  not  be  subsumed  under  these  categories.  They 
belong  to  the  one  order  of  existents.  The  unlikeness  of  one  to  the  other 
is  simply  the  unlikeness  of  one  motion  to  another,  of  object  to  reflected 
image,  and  not  the  unlikeness  of  a  "subjective  conscious  state"  to  an 
"objective  real  object." 

When  we  inquire  concerning  Hobbes's  position  with  reference  to  the 
cognitive  correspondence  of  idea  and  thing,  we  are  in  danger  of  forcing 
his  thought  into  channels  foreign  to  it,  if  we  seek  to  compel  an  answer. 
The  danger  lies  in  assuming  that  the  cognitive  correspondence  of  idea 
and  thing  is  at  the  same  time  a  psychophysical  correlation  of  idea  as 
psychical  state  with  a  physiological  state  (and  since  the  latter  is  the 
effect  of  an  extra-organic  physical  cause,  the  correlation  extends  to  that 
of  psychical  state  and  physical  object).  It  is  this  confusion  which  is 
at  the  bottom  of  Seth's  misinterpretation  considered  above.  In  for- 
cing this  meaning  upon  Hobbes,we  should  be  introducing  surreptitiously 
that  very  dualism  of  substances  which  he  has  explicitly  repudiated. 

In  terms  of  Hobbes's  psychology,  there  is  no  such  correlation  of 
psychical  idea  with  object,  since  there  is  nothing  that  is  psychical  or 
spiritual  or  "mental"  in  this  sense  of  the  term.  From  the  psychological 
standpoint,  the  only  correspondence  that  exists  is  that  of  effects  to 
causes.  But  from  the  standpoint  of  knowledge,  this  relation  of  cause 
and  effect  is  the  basis  of  a  cognitive  correspondence.  The  experience  of 
the  effects  affords  the  opportunity  for  knowledge  of  the  causes. 
Therefore,  in  raising  the  question  of  the  cognitive  correspondence  of 


H  O  B  B  E  S  23 

idea  and  thing,  we  are  inquiring  how  Hobbes  uses  the  physical  effects 
in  the  sentient,  that  is,  the  phantasms,  in  order  to  arrive  at  a  knowledge 
of  objects,  that  is,  of  causes. 

Now  the  mere  possession  of  images  is  not,  according  to  Hobbes,  in 
itself  knowledge.  Image-phantasms  are  more  accurately  regarded  as 
the  occasions  and  opportunities  for  cognition  than  actual  cases  of 
knowing.  Images  afford  a  certain  guidance  to  the  sentient  organism  in 
its  activities,  but  are  not  in  themselves  knowledge.  As  physical  effects 
in  the  all-embracing  system  of  nature,  phantasms  and  images  are  part 
of  the  subject-matter  of  inquiry  rather  than  the  knowing  itself.  Real 
knowledge  depends  on  the  consistent  use  of  the  terms  of  discourse, 
and  ratiocination  is  computation  involving  such  consistent  manipula- 
tion of  terms.  But  the  terms  must  be  connected  up  with  objects 
(which  are  really  causes  in  the  dynamic  system  of  nature)  in  a  scheme 
of  definite  correspondence.  This  is  secured  through  the  instrumentality 
of  the  image-phantasms. 

Now  the  image-phantasms  which  make  up  experience  are  as  varied 
as  their  outside  causes.  The  possession  of  certain  phantasms  leads  to 
the  adoption  of  a  name  as  a  sign  of  the  causes  of  the  phantasm-effects. 
Thus,  as  in  the  illustration  cited  above,  the  term  "sun"  will  signify  the 
extra-organic  cause  of  the  intra-organic  state  or  phantasm  "sun-being- 
the-size-of-a-dish,"  and  of  experiences  of  a  similar  nature.  The  "real 
sun,  which  creates  these  fancies"  is  the  cognitive  correlate  of  the  term 
"sun"  which  is  adopted  in  order  to  connect  the  "diversity  of  fancy"  or 
phantasms  with  the  "real  sun."  Through  the  use  of  names  as  signs 
associated  with  a  given  group  or  kind  of  phantasms,  we  are  able  to 
discriminate  and  distinguish  the  external  causes.  Thus  the  cognitive 
function  of  phantasms  resides  not  so  much  in  the  images  themselves 
(for  the  image  in  and  by  itself  is  not  knowing)  as  in  their  capacity  to  be 
indices  of  the  extra-organic  causes,  and  in  fixation  of  this  causal  refer- 
ence by  means  of  names.  The  names  once  fixed,  agreed  upon,  and 
their  reference  maintained,  ratiocination,  or  computation  by  means  of 
names,  furnishes  knowledge. 

It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  the  doctrine  of  cognitive  correspon- 
dence in  Hobbes  is  far  from  any  implications  of  psychophysical  dualism. 
The  Gorrespondence,  to  repeat,  is  based  on  the  relation  of  cause  and 
effect.  And  both  cause  and  effect  are  of  the  same  order  of  existence, 
physical  changes  in  a  mechanical  system.  The  similarity  of  idea 
(phantasm)  and  object  is  a  similarity  of  cause  and  effect. 

In  the  philosophy  of  Hobbes,  accordingly,  plurality  of  substances  is 
supplanted  by  a  mechanical  system  of  nature.  The  cognitive  corre- 
spondence of  idea  and  object,  in  so  far  as  it  means  a  plurality  or 
duality  of  substances,  has  no  place  in  his  doctrine.  The  result  is  that 
the  problems  connected  with  the  contrasts  of  two  realms  of  existents, 


24  IDEA    AND    ESSENCE 

the  psychical  and  the  physical,  of  mind  and  matter,  body  and  soul,  of 
"mental  state  and  object,"  of  the  subjective  and  the  objective,  simply 
do  not  arise.  Their  absence  from  his  philosophy  may,  or  may  not,  sig- 
nify grave  deficiencies  in  his  doctrine;  its  freedom  from  such  problems 
may  indicate  its  inadequacy.  That,  however,  is  not  here  in  question. 
The  point  of  interest  is  that,  with  the  rejection  of  a  two-substance 
theory,  there  is  no  occasion  for  such  questions.  Indeed,  the  nature  of 
Hobbes's  epistemology  is  more  truly  grasped  by  keeping  in  mind  his 
conception  of  nature  as  a  mechanical  system  of  causes  and  effects  than 
by  reference  to  the  doctrine  of  one  substance.  For  at  bottom,  as  has 
been  intimated,  the  notion  of  one  substance  plays  a  silent  role.  It  is  an 
empty  notion  for  Hobbes,  and  is  really  supplanted  by  the  theory  of 
nature.  His  concern  with  the  notion  is  derived  mainly  from  the  histori- 
cal importance  of  the  concept  of  substance.  And  this  much  appears 
from  his  philosophy,  that  the  notion  of  a  single  substance,  or  more  cor- 
rectly, the  new  scientific  view  of  nature,  as  the  metaphysical  foundation 
for  his  developed  thought,  did  not  generate  for  him  that  order  of  prob- 
lems which  is  characteristic  of  the  doctrine  of  the  duality  of  substances. 

It  is  our  purpose  to  maintain  that  the  psychology  of  Spinoza  is  simi- 
lar in  character  to  that  of  Hobbes.  This  likeness  in  standpoint  is  but 
one  instance  of  the  several  similarities  existing  between  the  thought  of 
the  two  philosophers.  We  can  not  from  this  infer,  however,  that 
Hobbes  exerted  an  important  influence  upon  Spinoza.  Kuno  Fischer 
is  of  the  opinion  that  the  influence,  if  there  was  any,  was  indirect.36 
Toennies  has  painstakingly  worked  out  in  detail  points  of  resemblance 
without,  however,  satisfactorily  establishing  the  dependence  of  one  on 
the  other.37 

So  far  as  the  similarity  in  character  of  their  psychologies  is  to  be 
considered,  certain  doctrines  held  in  common  by  the  two  men  would 
render  some  degree  of  influence  probable.  Hobbes  and  Spinoza  shared 
the  mechanistic  view  of  nature;  and  for  both,  the  human  body  and 
"human  nature"  were  an  integral  part  of  nature.  For  both,  the  realm 
of  existence  was  the  realm  of  dynamics  and  of  efficient  causes.  This  is 
a  point  of  more  real  similarity  than  their  allegiance  to  a  doctrine  of  the 
oneness  of  substance.  For  Hobbes,  substance  was  after  all  a  rather 
empty  and  unutilizable  notion;  the  dynamical,  mechanical  character 
of  nature,  its  systematic  uniformity,  was  far  more  significant  for  his 
work.  We  may  regard  substance  as  meaning  for  Hobbes  just  this  me- 
chanical system.  That  is,  it  was  substance  as  standing  for  this  me- 
chanical system  that  fructified  his  thinking.  For  Spinoza,  on  the  con- 
trary, the  mechanical  system  of  nature  means  the  attribute  of  exten- 
sion; it  is  secondary  rather  than  primary;  while  substance  is  God, 

88  "Spinoza,"  Geschichte  der  neueren  Philosophic,  1909,  Vol.  2,  pp.  618-619. 

""Studien  zur  Entwicklungsgeschichte  des  Spinoza,"  Vierteljahresschrift  fur  wissenschaftliche 
Philosophic,  Vol.  7,  1883. 


H  O  B  B  E  S  25 

God  or  substance  is  the  first  principle  upon  which  depends  the  organic 
assemblage  of  concepts  that  forms  adequate  knowledge.  The  common 
interest  of  Spinoza  and  Hobbes  in  the  deductive  geometric  method 
really  covers  a  difference  of  spirit.  For  Hobbes  the  importance  of  the 
geometrical  method  is  derived  from  his  practical  identification  of  mathe- 
matics and  dynamics  or  mechanics.  For  Spinoza  the  logically  and  or- 
ganically necessary  relation  and  dependence  of  all  other  concepts  upon 
the  concept  of  God  or  substance  render  the  geometrical  method  the 
type  of  all  true  method.  Expressed  in  a  different  way,  for  Spinoza  the 
metaphysical  doctrine  of  the  oneness  of  substance  was  the  beginning 
and  the  crowning  achievement  of  knowledge ;  while  for  Hobbes  it  was  a 
metaphysical  notion  mainly  valuable  as  clearing  the  way  for  a  mecha- 
nistic science  of  nature. 

In  a  sense,  therefore,  their  psychological  principles  show  similarity 
because  of  a  common  outlook  upon  the  natural  world.  From  this  point 
of  identity,  however,  their  philosophies  radiate  in  different  directions, 
determined  by  significant  differences  of  spirit  and  purpose.  A  detailed 
consideration  of  the  points  of  agreement  and  disagreement  are  not  here 
in  place.  It  is  sufficient  to  indicate  briefly  that  it  is  not  a  priori 
improbable  that  Spinoza's  psychology  should  be  in  essentials  like  that 
of  Hobbes's. 


PART  II 

SPINOZA 

I 

Spinozistic  exegesis  is  complicated  by  the  fact  that  historical  circum- 
stances apparently  render  necessary  the  construction  of  his  work  as  a 
direct  continuation  of  the  thought  of  Descartes.  Exegesis  has  ac- 
cordingly been  generally  eisegesis  in  terms  of  Cartesianism.  Taken 
superficially,  the  setting  of  Spinoza's  work  seems  to  point  unmistakably 
to  such  a  manner  of  envisaging  his  development  and  purpose.  Looking 
forward  from  the  outcome  of  the  Cartesian  philosophy,  the  situation  is 
in  effect  often  summarized  as  follows :  Starting  from  the  dualism  of  sub- 
stances, that  is,  the  conception  of  existence  as  dual,  unity  may  be  at- 
tained in  several  ways.  One  substance  may  be  regarded  as  constituting 
all  reality,  and  the  existence  of  the  other  substance  totally  denied.  Or 
one  might  take  one  substance  "reality"  and  depress  the  other  to  the 
status  of  "appearance."  Or,  finally,  the  duality  of  existence  marked  by 
the  two  finite  opposed  substances  might  be  retained  in  the  field  of 
"appearance,"  the  duality  being,  at  bottom,  validated ;  the  truly  real 
is  then  to  be  found  in  a  single  substance  which  is  neither  of  the  Cartesian 
finite  substances,  these  latter  degenerating  to  the  rank  of  attributes 
of  the  one  substance.  This  would  mean  that  the  distinction  between 
finite  and  infinite  substance  is  pushed  to  its  logical  consequences.  In 
any  case,  Descartes's  distinction  constitutes  a  persistent  menace  to 
the  substantial  character  of  finite  substances  and  to  their  reality.  The 
distinction  represents  instability.  From  this  angle  of  vision,  it  is  easy 
to  assume  that  any  one  after  Descartes  who  spoke  of  attributes  of 
thought  and  extension,  had  simply  substituted  for  his  term  "finite  sub- 
stances" the  term  "attributes,"  accepting,  as  to  the  rest,  the  distinction 
between  orders  of  existence,  the  verbal  change  leaving  unaffected  many 
of  the  implications  of  the  duality  in  existence.  Thus  it  is  powerfully 
suggested  that  we  make  Spinoza  a  Cartesian.  His  passion  for  unity 
and  his  realization  of  the  problems  left  by  Descartes  are  to  be  regarded 
as  leading  him  to  lower  the  finite  substances  to  the  position  of  attri- 
butes of  the  single  real  substance,  and  that  in  this  we  have  the  key  to 
his  philosophy. 

This  may  be  simple  enough,  but  it  is  misleading.  It  presents  Spinoza 
as  primarily  a  sort  of  apostolic  successor  of  Descartes,  the  continuer  of 
the  Cartesian  tradition,  and  the  self-appointed  synthesizer  of  that 


SPINOZA  27 

philosophy.  Descartes's  influence  on  Spinoza,  obviously  not  to  be 
denied,  may  easily  be  overestimated,  and  generally  is.  The  relation  of 
Spinoza  to  Descartes  is  not  that  implied  in  describing  their  relation  as 
one  of  pupil  to  master,  of  disciple  to  apostle.  In  the  first  place,  there 
exists  a  difference  of  spirit,  of  purpose,  and  of  interest  that  should  not 
be  minimized.  And  secondly,  the  interpretation  of  the  doctrinal  se- 
quence, attributed  by  Windelband  to  the  Hegelian  "Geschichts-kon- 
struktion"  which  assigns  to  Malebranche  and  the  occasionalists  the 
role  of  intermediaries  between  Descartes  and  Spinoza,  conflicts  with 
the  chronological  order.  Windelband  points  out  that  the  letters  of 
Geulincx  and  the  chief  work  of  Malebranche  were  antedated  by 
Spinoza's  Ethics.  Spinoza  could  not  have  been  influenced  by  the 
thought  of  the  occasionalists  and  Malebranche  concerning  the  inter- 
action of  substances.1  And  finally,  it  is,  perhaps,  worth  noticing  that 
Spinoza's  contemporaries  do  not  appear  to  have  regarded  him  as  an 
outstanding  champion  of  Cartesianism. 

According  to  Windelband,  the  genesis  of  Spinoza's  doctrine  can  not 
be  substantially  accredited  to  any  one  agency — neither  the  Jewish 
Cabbalists,  nor  the  "Scholastics  of  the  Jewish  Middle  Ages,"  nor  to 
Bruno.  All  these  movements,  as  well  as  the  Cartesian,  were  influential, 
but  not  even  Descartes  can  be  selected  as  the  predominant  agency. 
And  whatever  the  pristine  determinants  were,  it  was  Spinoza's  peculiar 
purposes,  aspirations,  and  genius  that  vitalized  and  utilized  them. 

If  we  approach  Spinoza  by  way  of  Cartesianism  alone,  we  immedi- 
ately land  in  the  midst  of  perplexities.  Spinoza's  philosophy  centers  i 
the  doctrine  of  the  attributes  and  of  their  relation  to  substance.  If  we 
identify  Spinoza's  thought  attribute  with  Descartes's  finite  immaterial 
substance  and  the  extension  attribute  with  the  latter's  finite  material 
extended  substance — if  the  only  point  of  difference  between  them  is 
that  implied  by  "attribute  of  substance"  as  contrasted  with  "finite  sub- 
stance"— then  a  host  of  difficulties  are  imported  into  the  situation. 
For  Spinoza's  parallelism  of  modes  becomes  virtually  a  parallelism  of 
the  spiritual  or  psychical  to  the  material  or  physical.  Spinoza  must 
then  be  supposed  to  have  started  where  Descartes  finished,  with  the  ir- 
reducible opposition  of  a  spiritual  principle  to  the  material  principle. 
We  should  be  led  to  assume  that  Spinoza  would  accept  for  the  defini- 
tions of  his  attributes  the  meanings  that  his  putative  master  assigned  to 
the  two  finite  substances.  Spinoza,  in  consequence,  is  to  be  understood 
asjhaving  started  with  a  dualistic  view  of  existence  as  the  presupposi- 
tion of  his  philosophy ;  it  must  form  the  unquestioned  and  incontesta- 
ble first  principle  of  his  thought.  Or  stated  without  reservation,  that 
which  for  Descartes  was  a  problem,  recognized  by  him  as  really  un- 
solved in  his  own  speculations,  is  the  point  of  departure  and  basis  for 

1  Windelband,  Geschichte  der  neueren  Philosophic,  Leipzig  1911,  Vol.  I,  pp.  206-207. 


28  IDEA    AND    ESSENCE 

the  investigations  of  Spinoza.  Reducing  finite  substances  to  attributes, 
his  task  may  be  taken  as  the  reconciliation  in  the  unity  of  substance  of 
the  opposition  left  by  Descartes  between  two  finite  substances. 

The  mere  statement  of  the  consequences  following  upon  this  fashion 
of  conceiving  the  origin  and  first  intention  of  Spinoza's  philosophy  is 
sufficient  to  throw  suspicion  upon  it.  The  existence  of  Spinoza's 
Principles  of  the  Cartesian  Philosophy  probably  is  partly  responsible  for 
the  habit  of  judging  Spinoza  in  this  light.  But,  after  all,  it  is  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  Cartesian  philosophy  that  he  is  expounding  for  his  pupil, 
and  we  have  no  warrant  to  assume  that,  therefore,  it  is  the  single  great 
source  of  his  own  thought.  His  appendix  to  the  work  indicates  his 
independence. 

We  are  here  interested  in  Spinoza's  psychology.  Now  if  the  method 
of  interpretation  that  has  just  been  stated  is  not  erroneous,  then  in- 
evitably there  follow  certain  assumptions  that  must  be  made  prepara- 
tory to  the  study  of  his  psychology.  If  Spinoza's  attributes  involve  the 
distinction  and  contrast  that  Descartes's  finite  substances  signified,  his 
psychology  is,  and  must  have  been,  developed  with  those  contrasts  as 
limiting  notions.  Thought,  reason,  intellect,  soul,  idea,  notion,  con- 
ception, mind — such  terms  as  these  must  denote  and  connote  phe- 
nomena of  spiritual  existence,  events  in  what  is  now  an  immaterial, 
spiritual  nonextended  attribute,  or  else  stand  for  that  attribute  itself. 
The  Cartesian  antagonism  between  ideas  in  a  soul  substance  and  extra- 
organic  objects  in  extended  substance  (or  intra-organic  physiological 
processes)  would  surge  up  in  Spinoza's  thought  in  quite  analogous 
form.  The  demotion  of  finite  substance  to  attribute  would  be,  in  many 
respects  Connected  herewith,  a  merely  verbal  change.  The  Cartesian 
hesitancy  about  the  image — the  desire  to  assign  it  unconditionally  to 
the  body  and  the  constraint  to  connect  it  in  some  manner  with  the  soul 
— would  be  duplicated  in  his  successor's  thought.  The  Cartesian  strug- 
gle to  devise  an  interaction  between  the  two  substances  constituting 
the  human  being  without  flagrant  contradiction  would  be  expected  to 
recur  in  Spinoza  in  the  guise  of  interaction  between  the  attributes;  or 
else  a  solution  would  be  sought  in  the  direction  of  the  unity  of  sub- 
stance. In  short,  it  is  difficult  to  understand  why  Spinoza  should  not 
have  experienced  in  his  psychology  precisely  the  perplexities  that 
haunted  Descartes,  if  Spinozism  is  correctly  depicted  as  historically 
and  logically  an  expression  of  the  growth  of  Cartesianism.  Indeed,  one 
would  expect  to  find  the  entanglements  more  vividly  sensed,  indicated, 
and  combated.  Such  an  obviously  artificial  solution  of  the  question  of 
the  reciprocal  influencing  of  mind  and  body  as  that  proffered  by  Des- 
cartes should  accordingly  be  magnified  by  Spinoza  as  a  crucial  point 
in  his  predecessor's  philosophy,  and  to  be  treated  distinctively  either 
as  a  mistaken  concession  to  the  tradition  of  the  interaction  of  a  plur- 


SPINOZA  29 

ality  of  substances,  or  else  as  a  suggestion  for  a  solution  needing  more 
elaborate  justification.  Spinoza,  however,  can  hardly  be  considered 
as  having  grappled  with  these  problems;  on  the  contrary,  he  seems 
largely  to  have  left  them  to  one  side.  Little  or  nothing  in  his  writings 
suggests  that  he  felt  that  these  elements  of  Cartesian  teaching  were 
germane  to  his  own  philosophy.  His  concern  with  them,  wherever  such 
concern  is  traceable,  is  casual,  and  implies  that  he  did  not  recognize 
them  as  indigenous  to  his  own  philosophic  world.  The  doctrine  of  two 
attributes  in  relation  to  one  substance  might,  or  might  not,  have  had 
advantages  over  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  two  finite  substances  to 
one  infinite  substance — but  this  question  is  pertinent:  Would  the 
transformation  of  the  problem,  granting  that  Spinoza's  problem 
is  just  a  transformation  of  that  of  Descartes,  eliminate  really  or  ap- 
parently the  unsolved  questions  of  the  psychology  of  a  being  composed 
of  two  so  different  constituents?  If  the  former  doctrine  were  merely  a 
restatement  of  the  Cartesian  position,  the  differences  being  in  the  main 
terminological,  Spinoza  would  probably  have  shown  himself  to  be 
acutely  aware  ol  all  those  quandaries  and  embarrassments  that  spring 
to  the  fore  when  the  duality  of  finite  existence  is  asserted.  The  con- 
clusion seems  to  be  that,  while  it  would  be  excessive  to  deny  the  in- 
fluence of  the  Cartesian  philosophy  and  psychology,  such  influence  is 
not  what  it  is  generally  supposed  to  be,  and  further,  that  we  can  deny 
that  Spinoza's  philosophy  and  psychology  form  a  restatement  of  Car- 
tesian problems  and  a  direct  doctrinal  continuation  of  Descartes's 
efforts  toward  synthesis. 

The  difficulties  involved  in  putting  such  a  construction  upon  Spinoza 
will  appear  in  the  sequel.  It  is  to  be  maintained  in  this  essay  that 
Spinoza's  philosophy  in  general,  and  his  psychology  in  particular,  can 
not  be  regarded  as  such  a  restatement  of  problems  and  a  later  stage  in 
the  evolution  of  one  doctrine.  The  claim  is  advanced  that  Spinoza's 
psychology  is  thoroughly  like  that  of  Hobbes,at  least  in  its  first  intention. 
It  is,  on  the  whole,  as  radically  "physiological"  as  that  of  Hobbes.  As  was 
asserted  of  the  latter,  so  of  Spinoza  it  is  affirmed,  that  properly  speaking 
he  is  not  concerned  with  "mental  states,"  "states  of  consciousness," 
"spiritual  psychical  entities,"  or  "immaterial  ideas"  in  a  spiritual  prin- 
ciple. His  psychological  terminology  is  free  from  implications  pos- 
sessed by  that  of  Descartes.  Neither  his  philosophy  nor  his  psychol- 
ogy is  rooted  in  a  doctrine  of  existence  as  dual.  Nor  do  his  point  of 
view  and  his  presuppositions  force  him  to  this  position  in  metaphysics. 
His  psychology,  consequently,  has  nothing  to  do  with  that  doctrine. 

This,  to  repeat,  is  Spinoza's  real  psychology.  Whatever  symptoms 
of  tendencies  toward  "spiritualism"  may  appear  in  his  psychology  are 
properly  to  be  taken  as  lapses  from  his  characteristic  standpoint.  The 
extent  to  which  he  may  have  departed  from  the  attitude  intrinsic  to  his 


3O  IDEAANDESSENCE 

system  as  a  whole,  is  a  matter  difficult  to  estimate,  first,  because  of 
terminological  considerations,  and  secondly,  because  it  is  hard  to  cal- 
culate the  extent  to  which  he  felt  the  psychological  implications  of 
Descartes's  doctrine.  And  after  all,  Spinoza  is  a  metaphysician  and 
ethicist  rather  than  a  psychologist;  the  former  interests  determine  the 
latter,  rather  than  the  reverse.  Occasional  departures  from  the  domi- 
nant standpoint  may  occur  in  the  interests  of  a  purpose  other  than 
psychological,  but  the  majority  of  passages  in  which  a  harking  back  to 
pure  Cartesianism  seems  latent  turn  out  to  have  such  allusions  only 
because  of  the  initial  assumption  that  the  essential  in  Spinozism  is  ade- 
quately conceived  only  in  connection  with  the  outcome  of  Descartes's 
work. 

II 

As  a  preliminary  orientation  in  the  study  of  Spinoza  it  may  be 
well  to  enumerate  some  of  the  points  wherein  his  work  and  that  of 
Descartes  are  similar.  Concerning  these  similarities,  however,  certain 
reservations  must  be  made  immediately  in  order  to  render  clear  what 
follows.  In  the  first  place,  the  instances  of  agreement  are  not  those 
which  are  ordinarily  asserted ;  and  secondly,  as  will  become  evident, 
the  common  elements  may  forcefully  suggest,  but  can  not  prove,  that 
Cartesian  writings  are  the  only  source  or  even  the  chief  source  from 
which  Spinoza  might  have  derived  just  these  elements  of  agreement. 
For  the  important  accordances  were  parts  of  the  general  philosophical 
tradition,  and  the  two  men  may  have  depended  on  the  same  sources. 
And  it  is  just  in  respect  to  those  notions  which  are  peculiarly  Cartesian 
innovations  that  Spinoza  shows  least  agreement.  The  concepts  of 
substance,  of  essence,  and  the  mechanical  theory  of  nature,  for  ex- 
ample, are  by  no  means  exclusively  Cartesian.  The  results  of  this 
cursory  survey  of  Descartes  will  indicate  that  just  where  Spinoza  and 
Descartes  are  most  in  accord  there  is  the  least  need  of  assuming  the 
latter  as  the  inspiration  of  the  former.  If  Descartes's  break  with 
tradition  turns  upon  the  discovery  of  the*  method  of  doubt,  and  allied 
changes,  it  is  at  just  this  point  that  the  line  of  cleavage  between  the 
two  systems  begins. 

We  have  been  at  pains  to  state  that  Spinoza's  problem  is  not  set  in 
terms  of  the  relation  of  psychical  ideas  in  a  spiritual  substance  to  modes 
of  a  physical,  extended  substance.  Nor  does  Spinoza  split  existence 
into  halves,  things  of  the  mind  and  things  of  extension.  Idea  means  for 
Spinoza  what  essence  had  denoted  in  scholastic  philosophy.  It  is  a 
logical  entity,  and  in  explicated  form  and  verbally  expressed,  it  is  a 
definition,  Now  historically  speaking,  the  problem  of  the  relation  of 
essence  to  existence  verged  on  the  commonplace,  while  the  Cartesian 
problem  of  relating  two  finite  opposed  substances  was  relatively  novel. 


SPINOZA  31 

It  was,  accordingly,  more  natural  for  Spinoza's  metaphysics  and  episte- 
mology  to  turn  upon  the  former  distinction  than  the  latter — to  con- 
ceive the  correspondence  of  the  order  of  ideas  to  the  order  of  things  in 
terms  of  essence  and  existence  than  in  terms  of  spiritual  entities  in  one 
t  substance  to  physical  things  constituting  the  modes  of  another  sub- 
stance. 

This  both  strengthens  the  considerations  which  render  dubious  the 
envisagement  of  Spinoza  solely  from  the  Cartesian  two-substance 
point  of  view,  and  indicates  the  direction  from  which  a  more  successful 
approach  may  be  undertaken.  In  addition,  we  are  afforded  an  impor- 
tant clue  to  the  real  nature  of  the  Cartesian  influence.  The  Rules  for 
the  Direction  of  the  Mind  comes  nearer  being  the  major  source  of  Des- 
cartes's  influence  on  Spinoza,  or  represents  more  adequately  Spinoza's 
point  of  departure,  than  any  other  of  Descartes's  writings  that  we  can 
assign.  Spinoza's  point  of  departure,  in  so  far  as  it  is  Cartesian  at  all, 
or  is  exemplified  in  Descartes,  is  discoverable,  not  in  the  final  stages  of 
the  earlier  thinker's  work,  but  in  the  first  stages.  It  was  denied  above 
that  the  relation  of  finite  substance  to  infinite  substance,  and  the 
psychological  and  epistemological  consequences  of  the  dualism,  were 
taken  by  Spinoza  as  the  kernel  of  his  problem.  Now  j ust  these  elements 
of  Descartes's  thought  are  least  apparent  in  the  Rules  for  the  Direction 
of  the  Mind.  A  brief  consideration  of  the  position  developed  in  this 
work  of  Descartes  will  afford  a  desirable  approach  to  Spinoza. 

In  the  Rules  for  the  Direction  of  the  Mind,  as  compared  with  later 
writings,  the  dualism  of  substances  had  not  become  a  powerful  or  con- 
trolling feature  in  the  writer's  thought.  The  psychological  and  episte- 
mological consequences  of  that  doctrine  were  avoided,  or  else  had  not 
been  clearly  sensed.  In  this  early  work  Descartes  is  chiefly  concerned 
with  notions  closely  allied  to  typical  doctrines  of  scholasticism.  This 
is  especially  true  of  his  treatment  of  intuition  and  "simple  natures," 
"simple  truths,"  or  essences.  The  question  of  the  status  of  these  simples 
in  relation  to  an  immaterial  spiritual  substantial  mind  was  at  least  in 
abeyance,  or,  more  probably,  had  not  arisen.  The  knowledge  problem 
as  stated  in  the  Rules  for  the  Direction  of  the  Mind  has  close  affiliations 
with  orthodox  scholasticism.  The  position  is  consistently  maintained 
that  the  understanding  alone  is  the  knower,  while  sense,  imagination, 
and  memory  are  "aids"  to  the  understanding  in  its  labors.  "Nothing 
can  be  known  prior  to  the  understanding,  since  the  knowledge  of  all 
things  else  depends  upon  this  and  not  conversely."  When  one  has 
"clearly  grasped  all  those  things  which  follow  proximately  on  the 
knowledge  of  the  naked  understanding,  he  will  enumerate  among  other 
things  whatever  instruments  of  thought  we  have  other  than  the  under- 
standing; and  these  are  only  two,  viz.,  imagination  and  sense.  He  will, 
therefore,  devote  all  his  energies  to  the  distinguishing  and  examining 


32  IDEAANDESSENCE 

of  these  three  modes  of  cognition,  and  seeing  that  in  the  strict  sense 
truth  and  falsity  can  be  a  matter  of  the  understanding  alone,  though 
often  it  derives  its  origin  from  the  other  two  faculties,  he  will  attend 
carefully  to  every  source  of  deception  in  order  that  he  may  be  on  his 
guard."1  But  these  aids  are  of  service  only  with  reference  to  corporeal 
things,  for  if  the  understanding  "deal  with  matters  in  which  there  is 
nothing  corporeal  or  similar  to  the  corporeal,  it  can  not  be  helped  by 
those  faculties'  (i.e.,  sense,  memory,  and  imagination)."2  Now  the 
true  function  of  understanding  in  itself,  aside  from  its  utilization  of 
sense  and  imagination,  is  the  discovery  or  apprehension  (intuition)  of 
the  simple  natures  or  logical  self-evidents  (that  is,  logical  essences  which 
are  known  per  se),  and  their  deductive  ordering.3  Irreducible  mathe- 
matical notions  are  such  essences.  The  essences  are,  of  course,  imma- 
terial, in  accordance  with  the  typical  scholastic  position.  In  knowledge 
of  essences,  for  Descartes,  the  activity  of  understanding  is  its  own 
spontaneity,  for  the  essences  are  congeners  of  an  ideal  or  immaterial 
thinking  principle.  The  knowing  or  understanding  is  thus  the  grasping 
of  the  ideal  or  immaterial  nature  of  essence.  The  discernment  of  such 
ideal  simples  is  an  immediate  act  which  Descartes,  at  this  stage  of  his 
development  at  least,  conceives  as  an  immediate  apprehension  in  a 
logical,  not  a  psychological,  sense.  When  he  speaks  of  the  deductive 
method,  which  rests  upon  the  intuition  of  the  unanalyzable  logical 
elements  as  compared  with  the  method  of  experience,  he  has  in  mind  a 
method  of  ordering  logical  entities  in  a  deductive  scheme  comparable 
to  mathematical  exposition.  Mathematical  formulae,  in  fact,  stand 
for  just  such  logical  simples,  or  the  results  of  thought  upon  such  ele- 
mentary self-evidents. 

In  the  simple  natures  there  is  no  falsity4  and  "in  order  to  know 
these  simple  natures  no  pains  need  be  taken,  because  they  are  of 
themselves  sufficiently  well  known.  Application  comes  in  only  in 
isolating  them  from  each  other  and  scrutinizing  them  separately  with 
steadfast  mental  gaze."  5  Falsity  occurs  only  through  the  failure  to 
corroborate  the  results  of  successive  logical  steps  by  intuition  and  an 
active  use  of  memory,  or  through  uncritical  reliance  on  the  imagination 
and  sense.6 

This  preliminary  stage  in  Descartes's  meditations  forces  a  problem 
upon  him  that  resembles  one  which  Hobbes  had  to  face.  Hobbes  per- 
ceived that  the  experiential  elements  upon  which  knowledge  of  nature 
is  to  be  built  consist  of  phantasms  and  images,  which  are  effects;  but 

1  Philosophical  Works  of  Descartes,  Rules  for  the  Direction  of  the  Mind,  trans,  by  Ross  and  Haldane, 
Vol.  i,  pp.  24-25;  cf.  p.  35. 

2  ibid,  p.  39. 

»  cf.  ibid,  p.  16. 

*  ibid,  p.  42. 

8  ibid,  pp.  45-46. 

•  cf.  ibid,  p.  44 


SPINOZA  33 

reasoning  from  effects  to  causes  can  furnish  only  conjectural  and  par- 
ticular knowledge,  and  not  necessary  knowledge.  Correspondingly  in 
Descartes,  the  starting-point  is  essence,  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the 
other,  the  particular  sense  effects.  With  reference  to  a  science  of  na- 
ture the  mathematical  truths  of  essence,  immaterial  and  ideal,  which 
are  known  with  immediate  certainty,  are  the  bases  of  necessity  in  such 
knowledge.  A  science  of  nature  implies  a  transition  from  ideal  entities 
to  physical  existences. 

Descartes's  Rules  for  the  Direction  of  the  Mind,  with  which  we  are 
here  concerned,  is  hardly  more  than  an  unfinished  sketch,  and  contains 
no  complete  solution  of  the  problem.  But  the  outlines  of  such  a  solu- 
tion are  given.  To  these  outlines  we  may  here  confine  ourselves,  re- 
fraining from  a  consideration  of  the  transformations  in  the  question 
and  solution  which  may  characterize  his  later  thought. 

Now  the  question  of  a  knowledge  of  nature  demands  a  treatment  of 
the  psychology  of  perception  and  imagination.  Sense  and  imagination 
in  the  Rules  for  the  Direction  of  the  Mind  are  purely  properties  of  the 
body.  The  image  is  the  species,  now  construed  as  essentially  geometri- 
cal form,  which  is  propagated,  "uncontaminated  and  without  bodily 
admixture  from  the  external  senses,"  to  the  fancy  or  imagination.7 
The  perceptual  process  furnishes  an  image  whose  mathematical  kin- 
ship with  the  intuited  pure  logical  essence  of  extension  smooths  over 
many  difficulties.  Because  of  this  kinship,  images  and  sensations  can 
be  subsumed  under  the  deductions  from  essences.  They  are,  therefore, 
at  least  existential  exemplifications  of  a  theoretical  necessary  conclu- 
sion. In  so  far  as  a  science  of  nature  or  physical  existences  is  mathe- 
matical in  structure,  the  constitution  of  the  image  as  a  sort  of  geomet- 
rical form  facilitates  the  transition  from  essence  to  existence,  for  the 
"infinitude  of  figures  suffices  to  express  all  the  differences  in  sensible 
things."  8  Whatever  difficulties  Descartes  found  at  .this  time  in  con- 
ceiving the  possibility  of  immediately  apprehending  the  corporeal 
image  were  similarly  lightened.  The  function  of  imagination  and 
sense  as  the  instruments  of  understanding  is  thus  visible  in  its  correct 
light.  In  order,  therefore,  to  have  knowledge  of  existence,  there  is  no 
necessity  for  having  recourse  to  particular  occurrences,  except  in  order 
to  perceive  the  correspondence  of  the  deductions  from  the  formulae  or 
essences  to  the  particular  modes  of  extension. 

The  purpose  of  this  excursus  is  to  portray  briefly  the  doctrine  which 
served  as  orientating  forces  in  shaping  the  Spinozistic  method  and 
purpose,  whether  the  origin  of  this  influence  be  exclusively,  or  in  part, 
or  not  at  all,  in  Descartes's  Rules  for  the  Direction  of  the  Mind.  In 
opposition  to  the  customary  manner  of  entering  Spinoza's  thought 

7  ibid.  p.  38. 

8  ibid,  p.  37- 


34  IDEA    AND    ESSENCE 

from  the  dualistic  outcome  of  Descartes,  and  of  ascribing  to  Spinoza 
that  dualism  and  its  implications  as  his  point  of  departure,  this  other, 
and  juster,  characterization  of  Spinoza's  point  of  departure  is  given. 
Our  denial  that  Spinoza  was  a  Cartesian  refers  to  the  first  characteriza- 
tion ;  the  obviously  necessary  recognition  that  Descartes  must  have 
exerted  a  directive  influence  upon  Spinoza  refers  to  the  second  charac- 
terization, and  suggests  what  the  deeper  part  of  that  influence  was. 
It  is  not  claimed,  of  course,  that  the  Rules  for  the  Direction  of  the  Mind 
was  the  only  source  of  the  Cartesian  influence.  What  is  asserted  is  that 
the  standpoint  of  this  work  is  more  similar  to  Spinozistic  doctrines 
than  most  of  the  Cartesian  works;  and  that  if  it  were  without  great 
influence  on  Spinoza,  yet  the  work  reveals,  as  will  appear  in  the  sequel, 
such  a  sympathetic  philosophical  kinship  with  the  latter's  position 
that  a  direct  and  fruitful  influence  ns  powerfully  suggested.  On  the 
other  hand,  with  many  of  the  later  transformations  of  Descartes's 
tenets  Spinoza  must  have  been  thoroughly  at  variance.  At  any  rate, 
we  may  venture  the  assertion  at  the  present  stage  that  the  approach 
to  Spinoza  from  this  element  of  Cartesian  teaching  is  a  better  prepara- 
tion for  the  penetration  of  Spinoza's  meaning  than  the  more  customary 
mode  of  procedure.  The  complete  justification  of  this  assertion,  of 
course,  is  found  only  in  this  essay  taken  as  a  whole. 

Spinoza  himself  has  given  us  an  exposition  of  the  "Principles  of  the 
Cartesian  Philosophy."  Obviously,  as  the  writer  of  an  exposition  of 
that  philosophy,  he  writes  as  a  Cartesian,  since  it  is  Descartes's  doc- 
trine that  he  is  expounding.  But  he  has  also  furnished  an  Appendix 
to  that  exposition,  in  which  he  purposed  to  treat,  as  the  sub-title  states, 
of  certain  general  and  special  difficulties  of  metaphysics,  of  being  and 
the  affections  of  being,  of  God  and  His  attributes,  and  of  the  human 
mind.  Here  we  would  naturally  expect  to  discover  indications  of  the^ 
precise  nature  of  Descartes's  influence  on  Spinoza,  signs  of  modifica- 
tion in  the  former's  doctrine  in  Spinoza's  reaction  to  it,  and  clues  to  the 
future  development  of  the  latter.  The  following  questions  accord- 
ingly seem  pertinent:  What  sort  of  philosophy  does  Spinoza  offer  in 
the  Cogitata  Metaphysica?  What  evidence  does  it  afford  that  Spinoza 
attacks  his  problems  from  the  standpoint  of  the  outcome  of  Cartesian 
thought,  and  to  what  extent  are  Cartesian  elements  conscious  or  un-  s 
conscious  presuppositions  for  Spinoza?  What  independence  and 
original  interest  does  the  work  reveal?  In  other  words,  are  such  later 
Cartesian  elements  as  the  duality  of  existence,  the  psychologically  spiri^ 
tual  nature  of  the  idea,  and  the  spiritualistic  trend  of  Cartesian  psy- 
chology with  its  reflex  influences  on  his  epistemology  and  metaphysics, 
reproduced  by  Spinoza  as  accepted  doctrines  or  tacit  assumptions? 

The  briefest  answer  to  these  questions  is  this:   the  Cogitata  Meta- 
physica, in  standpoint  and  spirit,  is  more  closely  affiliated  with  the 


SPINOZA  35 

leading  ideas  of  the  Rules  for  the  Direction  of  the  Mind  than  with  any 
other  Cartesian  work.  Spinoza  impresses  the  reader  as  interpreting 
the  Cartesian  conceptions  of  the  Principles  in  the  light  of  notions 
analogous  to,  if  not  derived  from,  the  principles  of  the  Rules  for  the 
Difection  of  the  Mind. 

The  poles  of  the  thought  of  the  Cogitata  Metaphysica  are  essences,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  existences,  on  the  other — a  logically  organized  sys- 
tem of  essences  forming  knowledge  and  a  causally  determined  and  me- 
chanically organized  world  or  nature.  Essences  are  logical  entities, 
and  just  that.  If  we  inquire  what  we  mean  by  essence,  we  are  referred 
to  definition,  for  every  definition  explicates  the  essence  of  something.9 
Knowledge  is  wholly  a  matter  of  essences;  and  memory,  imagination, 
and,  presumably,  sense  are  devices,  instrumental  in  attaining  knowl- 
edge, but  no  more  than  for  Descartes  in  the  Rules  for  the  Direction  of 
the  Mind  are  they  in  themselves  cognitive.10  Their  serviceableness 
appears  when  Spinoza  confronts  this  difficulty :  The-fonnal  essence  has 
neither  been  created  nor  does  it  exist  by  itself,  but  it  depends  on  the 
divine  essence;  the  essences  of  things  are  eternal.  How,  then,  can  we, 
in  the  absence  of  adequate  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  God,  the  final 
ground  of  all  explanation,  know  the  essences  of  things?  Spinoza's 
Answer  is  that  knowledge  of  the  essences  of  things  is  possible  because 
things  are  already  created.  If  this  were  not  the  case,  knowledge  of 
things  would  be  impossible  except  after  adequate  knowledge  of  the 
nature  of  God.  Analogously,  if  we  were  ignorant  of  the  nature  of  a 
parabola,  it  would  be  impossible  to  know  the  nature  of  its  orderly  ap- 
plications. Spinoza's  thought  may  be  rendered  in  this  way:  true  knowl- 
edge of  existence  is  knowledge  of  essence ;  from  an  adequate  knowledge 
of  the  supreme  essence,  God,  knowledge  of  all  essences  would  follow. 
But  since  we  do  not  possess  such  perfect  knowledge,  we  must  avail  our- 
selves of  the  fact  that  created  things  exist  as  actualized  essences,  and 
through  experience  of  the  esse  existentiae  arrive  at  the  perception  of  the 
essence.  Sense  and  imagination  facilitate  the  process;  they  are  occa- 
sions for,  and  auxiliary  instrumentalities  in,  the  process  of  cognizing 
the  essence,  while  the  actual  apprehension  of  the  essence  through  ex- 
perience of  the  factual  exemplars  is  the  function  of  understanding  or 
reason  alone.  Imagination  and  memory  are,  accordingly,  in  Spinoza's 
language,  mere  entia  rationis,  or  modes  of  thinking,  which  enable  us 
more  easily  to  retain,  explain,  and  represent  things  of  the  mind 
(res  intellectas)  .n  And  knowledge  as  the  system  of  apprehended  es- 
sences relates  to  understanding  alone. 

The  mechanical  theory  of  nature,  sponsored  by  Descartes,  is  advo- 

9  cf.  Cogitata  Metaphysica,  Pt.  i,  ch.  2,  p.  193.     All  references  to  the  works  of  Spinoza,  unless 
otherwise  specified,  are  to  the  Van  Vloten  and  Land  edition  of  the  Opera,  3rd  edition,  1914. 

10  Cogitata  Metaphysica,  Pt.  I,  ch.  i,  p.  188. 

11  cf.  ibid,  Pt.  i,  ch.  i,  p.  188;  ch.  2,  p.  192. 


36  IDEA    AND    ESSENCE 

cated  by  Spinoza.  Existence,  the  world,  natura  naturata — all  these 
terms  express  the  same  thing — is  a  mechanical  system.  In  matter 
there  is  "nothing  beyond  mechanical  textures  and  operations."12 
Had  we  sufficient  knowledge,  we  would  find  everything  in  the  order  of 
nature  as  necessary  as  that  which  mathematics  teaches.13  Natura 
naturata  is  only  one  single  thing,  and  man  is  a  part  of  nature,  and  as 
such  a  part  must  cohere  with  other  parts.14  It  is  significant  that 
Spinoza  does  not  say  that  man's  body  is  a  part  of  nature,  but  that  man 
is  a  part  of  nature.  He  is  subject  to  causal  law,  either  as  external 
cause  or  as  internal  cause.15 

The  assertion  that  the  Cogitata  Metaphysica  does  not  ratify  the  Car- 
tesian duality  of  finite  existence  may  encounter  the  obvious  reply  that 
Spinoza  does  speak  of  more  than  one  substance;  that  he  divides  cre- 
ated substances  into  exlension  and  thought.16  But  terminological 
identities  are  compatible  with  dissimilarities  of  meaning.  In  the  first 
place,  it  is  to  be  remarked  that  Spinoza  uses  the  term  "substance" 
loosely;  it  is  clear  that  he  has  in  mind  what  later  on  he  signifies  by 
attribute.  But  a  more  significant  observation  is  this :  he  uses  the  terms 
"cogitatio"  and  "mens  humana"  for  the  created  thought  substance,  and 
"mens  increata"  for  the  divine  thought.  Uppermost  in  Spinoza's  mind 
is  the  relation  of  thought  to  essence.  This  uncreated  mind,  or  divine 
thought,  is  the  system  of  essences  (which  in  God  can  not  be  separated 
from  existence).  The  created  thought  substance,  or  mens  humana,  is 
that  kind  of  being  called  esse  ideae — being  in  so  far  as  it  is  contained  ob- 
jectively (objective)  in  the  idea  of  God.17  The  spiritualistic  and  psycho- 
logical connotations  of  Descartes's  thinking  substance  are  in  the  main 
neglected.  The  only  place  in  the  Cogitata  Metaphysica  in  which  Spinoza 
seems  to  recognize  these  implications  is  in  the  last  paragraph  of  the 
work,  where  we  meet  for  the  only  time  the  contrast  between  res  cor- 
poreales  and  res  spirituales.  One  may  admit  that  Spinoza  may  be 
oscillating  between  the  interpretation  of  thought  substance  as  sub- 
jective essence  (essences  as  knowledge),  and  as  a  spiritual,  immaterial, 
soul  substance,  with  an  existential  status  and  possessing  self-conscious- 
ness. But  summarizing  the  tendencies  of  the  Cogitata  Metaphysica,  it 
is  unmistakable  that  the  drift  of  Spinoza's  reflection  is  away  from  the 
latter  interpretation.  This  movement,  as  we  shall  see,  is  completed 
definitely  in  the  Ethics. 

In  short,  in  the  Cogitata  Metaphysica,  as  in  the  Rules  for  the  Direction 
of  the  Mind,  essence  is  a  logical  entity,  its  incorporeality  relates  to  the 
ideality  of  form  and  not  to  the  spirituality  of  an  existential  soul  sub- 

ltibid,  Pt.  2,  ch.  6,  p.  212. 
*»ibid,Pt.  2,  ch.  6,  p.  218. 
"  ibid. 

15  ibid,  ch.  4,  p.  200. 
uibid,  Pt.  2,  ch.  i,  p.  203. 
17  ibid,  Pt.  i,  ch.  2,  p.  192. 


SPINOZA  37 

stance,  and  knowledge  rests  upon  logically  immediate  self-evidence. 
Knowledge  of  essences  is  a  science  of  ideal  forms ;  the  science  of  nature 
or  existence  is  a  science  of  hypotheses  involving  motion,  divisibility, 
and  causal  necessity.  The  fundamental  distinction  is  between  essence 
and  existence.  The  division  of  being  into  real  entities  and  mental  en- 
tities (entia  realia  and  entia  rationis)  Spinoza  repudiates  as  a  bad  divi- 
.sion.18  The  true  division  of  being  is  into  being  which  necessarily  exists, 
or  whose  essence  necessarily  involves  existence,  and  being  whose  es- 
sence does  not  involve  existence  except  in  possibility.19  Mental  beings 
— entia  rationis — are  looked  upon  without  any  notion  of  spiritual  im- 
materiality. In  an  important  passage  he  says  that  entia  rationis  out- 
side the  mind  (extra  intellectum)  are  pure  nothing :  but  if  by  the  term 
is  signified  the  modes  of  thinking  (modi  cogitandi)  themselves,  they  are 
real  entities.  "For  when  I  ask:  what  is  a  species?  I  ask  after  nothing 
else  than  the  nature  of  the  mode  of  thinking  itself,  which  is  indeed  a 
being,  and  is  distinguished  from  another  mode  of  thinking.  But  these 
modes  of  thinking  can  not  be  called  ideas,  nor  can  they  be  said  to  be 
true  or  false,  just  as  love  can  not  be  called  true  or  false,  but  only  good 
or  bad."20  When  this  is  connected  with  what  Spinoza  writes  just  before 
about  imagination  and  memory  as  modes  of  thinking,  and  their  identi- 
fication with  movements  of  the  (animal)  spirits  in  the  brain,  it  becomes 
evident  that  entia  rationis  or  modi  cogitandi  are  existences  like  the 
human  body,  and  as  operations  of  the  human  being  are  part  of  the 
order  of  nature.  Essences  as  knowledge  entities,  that  is  esse  ideae, 
have  no  existential  status  at  all,  and  to  inquire  concerning  such  a  status 
is  illegitimate  because  it  assumes  that  they  are  existences.  And,  above 
all,  is  it  significant  that  Spinoza  enumerates  intellect  itself  as  one  of 
these  modes  of  thought  that  is  a  real  entity.21 

It  was  pointed  out  above  that  it  was  more  natural,  with  reference  to 
Spinoza's  whole  philosophical  inheritance,  for  him  to  conceive  meta- 
physical and  epistemological  problems  in  terms  of  essence  and  existence 
than  in  terms  of  a  finitely  irreducible  duality  of  incommutable  sub- 
stances. The  excursus  into  the  thought  of  the  Cogitata  Metaphysica,  a 
work  which  emanates  from  an  early  phase  of  the  philosopher's  medita- 
tions, has  shown  that  essence  and  existence  were  the  foci  of  his  thought 
at  that  period,  and  that  Spinoza  seems  on  the  whole  to  have  inter- 
preted, with  conscious  intent  or  otherwise,  Descartes's  Principles  in 
terms  of  this  ancient  contrast.  It  is  the  purpose  of  this  essay  to 
demonstrate  that  Spinoza's  thought  was  faithful  in  its  development  to 
this  beginning.  Spinoza's  terminology  was  undoubtedly  affected  by  the 
Cartesian,  and  this  has  been  a  help  in  misleading  the  historian.  The 

18  ibid,  Pt.  i,  ch.  i,  p.  189. 

19  ibid,  p.  190. 

20  ibid,  Pt.  r,  ch.  i,  p.  189. 
»iW</,  Pt.  i,  ch.  i.  p.  1 88. 


38  IDEA.  AND    ESSENCE 

term  "idea"  was  for  scholasticism  preferably  used  of  ideas  in  the  mind  of 
God.  Descartes  comes  to  use  it  of  ideas  in  the  finite  mind  substance, 
and  signifies  by  it  not  only  the  logical  concept,  innate  ideas,  but  also  at 
times  any  "psychological  state."  He  was  led  to  this  departure  from 
medieval  usage  through  the  reduction  of  the  plurality  of  substances  to 
a  duality.  For  it  is  hardly  doubtful  that  for  Descartes  the  finite  soul 
substance  was  more  nearly  a  congener  of  the  divine  substance  than  was 
finite  extended  substance.  The  doctrine  of  innate  ideas  and  the  onto- 
logical  argument,  when  stripped  of  their  formal  elements,  depend  upon 
the  awakening  of  the  soul  to  its  own  finiteness  and  imperfection ;  and 
the  germination  of  this  thought  is  the  necessary  implication  of  the 
budding  comprehension  of  a  perfect  being.  The  enlightenment  of  the 
mind  is  primarily  just  this  discovery  of  the  correlative  notions  of  the 
perfection  of  the  infinite  being  and  the  imperfection  of  the  finite  being. 
Now  such  a  process  connotes  a  certain  peculiar  intimacy  between  soul 
and  God.  This  insight  is  the  divinity  of  the  finite  mind.  Thus  the  ap- 
plication of  the  term  "idea"  to  at  least  some  of  the  notions  possessed  by 
the  finite  mind  in  the  dawning  of  rational  comprehension  is  rendered 
facile  by  this  implied  relationship  between  finite  and  infinite  mind  sub- 
stance. The  widening  of  the  field  of  usage  of  the  term  comes  with  the 
acceptance  of  the  psychological  consequences  of  the  dualism  of  sub- 
stances in  the  special  form  of  the  relation  of  two  substances  in  one 
human  being.  So  Spinoza's  wider  usage  of  the  term  may  be  ascribable 
to  Cartesian  example.  The  esse  ideae  means  the  being  of  essence  as 
known  or  cognized  or  comprehended,  as  object  of  the  (finite)  mind.  But 
if  this  account  is  accurate,  new  light  is  thrown  upon  the  legitimacy  of 
the  common  "Cartesian"  interpretation  of  Spinoza,  and  upon  Spinoza's 
interpretation  of  Descartes.  For  Spinoza,  in  accepting  certain  rela- 
tively novel  terminological  usages  of  Descartes,  does  not  necessarily 
accept  every  such  usage  and  all  the  Cartesian  implications  of  terms. 
For  the  new  application  of  the  term  "idea"  in  Descartes,  shared  by 
Spinoza  whether  derived  from  Descartes  or  not,  retroactively  facili- 
tates Spinoza's  understanding  of  Descartes  as  primarily  concerned 
with  essence,  and  helps  to  explain  his  neglect  of,  or  indifference  to, 
the  spiritualistic  psychological  connotations  of  the  term  in  his  pre- 
decessor's writings. 

The  kinship  of  the  Cogitata  Metaphysica  and  the  Rules  for  the  Direc- 
tion of  the  Mind  in  their  outlook  upon  problems  is  evident.  As  has 
been  observed  above,  we  are  not  here  concerned  with  demonstrating 
important  influences  of  the  Rules  for  the  Direction  of  the  Mind  upon 
Spinoza.  It  would  be  an  exceedingly  difficult  matter  to  corroborate 
such  a  claim.  The  point  of  interest  is  that  the  starting-points  of 
both  thinkers  contained  striking  similarities,  and  that  a  more  ade- 
quate conception  of  their  work  is  provided  when  we  view  them  as  pur- 


SPINOZA  39 

suing  divergent  paths,  as  they  carry  out  their  work,  although  starting 
from  similar  beginnings,  rather  than  by  involuting  Spinoza's  doctrine 
with  the  Cartesian  speculations  as  a  later  stage  of  one  development. 

Spinoza  proceeds  from  the  Cogitata  Metaphysica  without  signal  devi- 
ations from  the  general  position  therein  indicated.  Descartes,  on  the 
other  hand,  does  change  in  more  than  one  momentous  way  from  the 
thought  scheme  of  the  Rules  for  the  Direction  of  the  Mind.  Within  the 
limits  of  this  essay  these  differences  can  only  be  summarized.  Des- 
cartes's  test  of  truth  in  this  work  is  logical  immediacy,  the  self-ev  idence 
of  the  logical  entity  or  simple  nature.  To  this  Spinoza  subscribesand  to 
this  he  holds  fast.  But  Descartes  switches  over  to  psychological  im- 
mediacy, the  certainty  of  the  self-conscious  soul  in  its  awareness  of  its 
own  states.  The  duality  of  existence,  the  spiritualistic  psychology, 
influence,  and  are  influenced  by,  the  acute  problems  of  teleology  and 
mechanism,  freedom  and  determinism,  and  personal  immortality. 
Spinoza  calmly  accepts  the  consequences  of  the  new  science  of  nature, 
and  passes  on  to  doctrines  concerning  freedom,  immortality,  and 
teleology  that  could  hardly  have  been  other  than  exasperating  and 
heretical  to  a  true  Cartesian.  In  the  interplay  of  force^  that  drove  Des- 
cartes to  the  new  positions,  the  duality  of  existence  emerges,  more  sig- 
nificant as  result  than  as  cause.  Spinoza  either  escapes  these  forces,  or 
does  not  succumb  to  them,  or  finally  may  have  remained  insusceptible 
to  many  considerations  that  were  vital  to  other  men  of  his  day  because 
they  were  uncongenial  to  his  native  interests.  He  is  not  driven  to  the 
doctrine  of  existence  as  dual,  nor  does  the  doctrine,  through  the  media- 
tion of  Descartes,  affect  him  more  than  superficially.  And  there  is 
good  reason  for  saying  that  Spinoza  never  fully  realized  what  the  issues 
that  resulted  from  the  duality  of  substances  really  implied.  In  short, 
Spinoza  was  never  truly  a  Cartesian. 


Ill 

Having  thus  outlined  the  approach  and  the  point  of  view  from 
which  this  study  is  undertaken,  it  behooves  us  to  present  Spinoza's 
doctrine  in  more  detailed  and  positive  fashion.  The  introductory 
remarks  and  the  contentions  therein  outlined  will  be  justified,  it  is 
hoped,  by  the  results  of  an  investigation  free  from  the  customary 
Cartesianism  of  the  interpretations  of  the  majority  of  commentators 
and  historians.  In  showing  the  exact  character  of  Spinoza's  problem 
and  the  traits  of  his  attempted  solution,  we  shall  first  sketch  the 
leading  features  of  his  doctrine  concerning  ideas  and  existence;  after 
which  will  be  considered  his  account  of  the  idea  and  the  image  from 
the  standpoint  of  psychology,  attending  in  some  detail  to  the  difficul- 
ties that  result  from  injecting  Cartesian  meanings  into  his  terminology. 


40  I  D  E  A    A  N  D    E  S  S  E  N  C  E 

Since  Spinoza  is  so  often  hailed  as  the  first  "parallelist."  part  of  the 
task  will  be  to  vindicate  the  claim  that  neither  "parallelism"  nor  "inter- 
actionism"  in  their  common  acceptation  can  legitimately  be  applied  to 
this  philosophy;  that  his  teaching  is  not  characterized  by  "spiritualis- 
tic" tendencies  derived  from  the  Cartesian  demarcation  of  two  con- 
trasted fields  of  existence  ;  and  that  the  application  of  such  terms  to  this 
pjnlosophy  imports  alien  meanings  into  all  of  Spinoza's  speculations. 
-^vVe  begin  with  the  essay  On  the  Improvement  of  the  Understanding 
and  the  account  of  knowledge  and  method  there  suggested. 

Knowledge  is  the  possession  of  true  ideas.  All  the  modes  of  knowl- 
edge may  be  reduced  to  four.  The  fourth  and  highest  kind  is  the 
perception  arising  "when  a  thing  is  perceived  through  its  essence 
alone,  or  through  the  knowledge  of  its  proximate  cause."  l  This  mode 
alone  "comprehends  the  adequate  essence  of  a  thing  without  danger 
of  error."  *  But  what  is  a  true  idea?  We  are  informed  first  of  all  that 
it  is  "something  different  from  its  correlate  (ideatum)."  *  Secondly,  it 
is  "capable  of  being  understood  through  itself."  *  The  phrase  "under- 
stood through  itself"  is  pregnant  with  meaning,  and  that  meaning 
reveals  Spinoza's  position.  It  signifies  that  the  idea,  as  logical  essence. 
has  its  place  in  a  deductively  ordered  system,  and  bears  to  other 
\essences  the  relation  of  superordination  or  subordination.  "The  idea, 
in  so  far  as  its  formal  essence  (essentia  formalin)  is  concerned,  may  be 
the  object  of  another  subjective  essence  (essentia  objectiva)  .  And  again 
this  second  subjective  essence  will,  regarded  in  itself,  be  something 
real  and  intelligible;  and  so  on,  indefinitely."5  The  signification  of 
another  characteristic  Spinozistic  phrase,  ''idea  ideae,"  the  idea  of  an 
idea,  expresses  this  same  systematic  arrangement  of  concepts. 

The  adequate  idea  is  the  true  idea;  and  the  adequate  idea  is  "the 
subjective  essence  (essentia  objectiva)  of  a  thing."  6  Finally,  "the  sub- 
jective essence  of  a  thing  and  its  certainty  are  one  and  the  same."  7 
Evidently,  then,  to  have  true  knowledge  is  to  possess  true  or  adequate 
ideas  (essentia  objectiva}  and  to  have  such  ideas  is  in  itself  to  have 
certainty  and  to  be  assured  of  certainty. 

From  this  it  follows  that  certainty  does  not  depend  on  the  estab- 
lishment of  relations  between  ideas  and  things  and  the  determination 
of  the  precise  nature  of  such  relations;  the  test  of  the  validity  of  an 
idea  is  not  in  the  correspondence  of  the  idea  and  the  thing.  Method 
is  not  concerned  with  the  derivation  of  ideas  from  the  experiences  of, 
fact.  "As  for  this  reason  (i.e.,  that  the  subjective  essence  involves 

i  Vol.  I.  p.  7. 
*  Hid,  p.  xo. 


•M.P.IO, 


SPI  NOZ  A  41 

certainty)  the  truth  needs  no  sign — it  being  sufficient  to  possess  the 
subjective  essences  of  things,  or,  what  amounts  to  the  same,  ideas,  in 
order  that  all  doubts  may  be  removed — it  follows  that  the  true  method 
.  is  the  order  in  which  we  should  seek  for  truth  itself,  or  the 
subjective  essences  of  things,  or  ideas,  for  all  these  expressions  are 
synonymous."  8  Certainty  is  thus  inherent  in  the  logical  essences  and 
is  not  to  be  established  by  reference  to  what  is  extrinsic  to  them. 
Method  is,  therefore,  a  question  of  the  apprehension  of  the  logical  cer- 
tainty of  an  idea  and  of  its  involution  in  a  system  of  logical  concepts. 
"Method  ought  necessarily  to  be  concerned  with  reasoning  or  under- 
standing: that  is,  method  is  not  identical  with  reasoning  in  order  to 
understand  the  causes  of  things,  still  less  is  it  the  comprehension  of  the 
causes  of  things;  but  it  is  to  understand  what  a  true  idea  is  by  dis- 
tinguishing it  from  other  perceptions  and  by  investigating  its  nature, 
in  order  that  we  may  know  our  power  of  understanding."  9  "Method 
is  nothing  else  than  reflective  knowledge,  or  the  idea  of  an  idea."  10 
But  if  truth,  as  Spinoza  says,  "makes  itself  manifest,"  method  must 
contain  principles  of  guidance,  or  tests,  by  means  of  which  the  true 
idea  can  be  disentangled  from  the  welter  of  fictions,  inadequate  ideas, 
chimeras,  and  false  ideas.  The  surmounting  of  this  difficulty  pivots 
on  the  distinction  between  essence  and  existence.  "Every  perception 
is  either  of  a  thing  considered  as  existing,  or  of  the  essence  alone. 
Now  'fiction'  is  chiefly  concerned  with  things  considered  as  existing."11 
Error,  in  general,  can  not  arise  from  the  logical  essence,  for  that 
would  be  equivalent  to  error  arising  from  truth,  but  only  from  its 
obscuration  by,  or  its  concealment  beneath,  the  foreign  accretions 
imported  from  the  experiences  of  the  particulars  of  existence.  In  a 
word,  "ideas  fictitious,  false,  and  the  rest,  originate  in  the  imagina- 
tion." 12  Now  as  we  shall  see  later,  the  Spinozistic  conception  of 
imagination  is  purely  physiological  in  nature.  The  operations  of  the 
imagination  "whereby  the  effects  of  imagination  are  produced,  take 
place  according  to  other  laws  quite  different  from  the  laws  of  the 
understanding."  We  fall  into  "grave  errors  through  not  distinguish- 
ing accurately  between  the  imagination  and  the  understanding."13 
"Ideas  fictitious,  false,  and  the  rest"  (that  is,  in  general,  all  error) 
originate  in  the  imagination,  that  is,  in  "certain  sensations,  fortuitous 
(so  to  speak)  and  disconnected,  which  do  not  arise  from  the  power  of 
the  mind  itself,  but  from  external  causes,  according  as  the  body,  sleep- 
ing or  waking,  receives  various  motions."  14  Words  are  a  great  source 

8  ibid,  p.  12. 

*  ibid,  p.  12,  italics  mine. 

™ibid,  p.  12. 

"ibid,  p.  15. 

«  ibid,  p.  26. 

13  ibid,  p.  27. 

"  ibid,  p.  26. 


L 


42  IDEAANDESSENCE 

of  error,  but  words  are  a  part  of  the  imagination.  Words  lead  to  error 
when  we  form  conceptions  that  are  occasioned  by  confusions  in 
memory  because  of  certain  bodily  conditions.  Words,  since  they  are 
formed  at  the  caprice  of  the  vulgar,  are  signs  of  things  as  they  are  in 
imagination,  not  as  they  are  in  the  understanding.  Here  we  find  the 
characteristic  distinction  between  the  facts  of  imagination  and  the 
ideas  of  the  understanding.15  And  error  results  from  the  failure  to 
discriminate  between  the  two.  Imagination,  it  is  clear,  is  the  instru- 
.ment  through  which  the  experience  of  particular  existences  is  made 
possible ;  if  the  presentations  from  imagination  of  particular  existences 
be  selected  as  the  source  of  knowledge,  we  shall  be  deceived.  For  the 
true  knowledge  of  things  is  derived  not  from  the  imaginative  repre- 
sentation (itself  an  existent,  a  thing)  of  particular  existents,  but  from 
the  unalloyed  concept  or  essence.  For  this  reason  the  confusion  of 
essence  and  existence  was  called  the  pivotal  point  in  the  treatment 
of  error. 

The  resolution  of  the  problem  amounts  to  this:  the  true  idea  is 
simple,  clear,  and  distinct,  and  carries  within  itself  the  principle  by 
which  its  certainty  is  made  manifest:  the  fiction,  the  inadequate  idea, 
and  in  general  all  falsities  are  deficient  in  one  or  all  of  these  respects. 
"A  true  idea  (cogitatio)  is  distinguished  from  a  false  one,  not  so  much 
by  its  extrinsic  mark  (denominatio) ,  but  most  of  all  by  its  intrinsic  mark 
.  .  .  there  is  in  ideas  something  real,  whereby  the  true  are  distin- 
guished from  the  false.  .  .  For  thought  is  said  to  be  true,  if  it 
involves  subjectively  (objective)  the  essence  of  any  principle  which 
has  no  cause,  and  is  known  through  itself  and  in  itself.  Wherefore  the 
reality  (forma)  of  true  thought  must  be  situated  in  that  thought  itself, 
without  reference  to  other  thoughts:  nor  does  it  acknowledge  the 
object  as  its  cause,  but  must  depend  on  the  very  power  and  nature 
of  the  understanding."  16  Understanding  in  itself,  therefore,  is  able 
to  establish  the  truth  and  reality  of  its  thought.  The  devoted  mind, 
possessed  of  true  insight  and  correct  method,  can  find  within  itself 
the  guarantee  of  the  validity  of  its  ideas.  This  is  an  expression  of 
Spinoza's  rationalistic  faith. 

Let  us  ask:  What  is  the  "object  aimed  at"?  and  What  are  the  "means 
of  its  attainment"?  As  to  means,  we  learn  that  everything  must  be 
conceived  "either  through  its  essence  alone  or  through  its  proximate 
cause."  17  The  true  method  of  discovery  is  to  "form  thoughts  from 
some  given  definition,"  and  a  definition,  we  note,  "must  explain  the 
inmost  essence  of  a  thing."  18 

If  definition,  expressing  the  inmost  essence  of  a  thing,  that  is,  the 

15  cf.  ibid,  p.  27. 
»•  ibid,  p.  22. 
»  ibid,  p.  28. 
18  ibid,  p.  29. 


SPINOZA  43 

truly  logical  definition,  is  the  means,  what  is  the  object  aimed  at?  It 
is  "the  acquisition  of  clear  and  distinct  ideas,  such  as  are  made  by  the 
pure  intellect  (mens)  and  not  by  chance  motions  of  the  body."  Thd  ix" 
distinction  between  imagination  and  understanding  evidently  under- 
lies this  statement.19  In  a  word,  the  goal  is  completely  unified  knowl- 
edge. But  the  peculiar  meaning  of  such  knowledge  for  Spinoza  must 
be  determined.  "In  order  that  all  ideas  may  be  reduced  to  one," 
Spinoza  asserts,  we  must  so  "associate  and  order  them  that  our  mind 
may,  as  far  as  it  can,  report  subjectively  (objective)  the  reality  of 
nature,  both  as  whole  and  as  parts."  20  But  in  an  ordered- system  nf 
essences T  there  must  be  some  principle  which  contains  in  itself  the 
secret  of  that  order,  coherence,  and  unity.  "In  order  that  our  mind 
may  report  wholly  .  .  .  the  image  of  nature,  our  mind  should 
draw  out  all  its  ideas  from  the  idea  which  represents  the  origin  and 
source  of  the  whole  of  nature."  21  This  first  great  idea,  the  architecr 
tonical  principle  of  the  system  of  essences  as  forming  knowledge,  we 
shall  discover  to  be  the  idea  of  God  or  Substance.  "We  should  inquire 
whether  there  be  any  being  .  .  .  that  is  the  cause  of  all  things,  so 
that  its  essence,  represented  in  thought  (objective),  may  be  the  cause  *,* 
of  all  our  ideas :  and  then  our  mind  will  to  the  utmost  possible  extent 
represent  nature;  for  it  will  possess,  subjectively,  nature's  essence, 
order,  and  union."  22 

Now  the  expressions  "cause  of  ideas"  and  "cause  of  things"  bring 
into  consideration  the  attributes,  thought,  and  extension.  The  term 
"cause"  is  used  in  two  meanings,  dependent  upon  the  distinction  be- 
tween the  attributes.  The  attribute  of  thought  is  nothing  but  the 
series  of  ideas  or  logical  essences  arranged  in  logical  sequence.  "Cause" 
as  referring  to  this  series  has  a  purely  logical  meaning,  expressing  the 
subordination  of  concepts.  One  idea  causes  another  in  the  sense  that  . 
the  concept  of  a  circle  is  the  cause  of  certain  other  ideas,  those  of  the 
properties  of  a  circle,  which  can  be  deduced  therefrom.  The  attribute 
of  extension  comprises  the  series  of  physical  things,  or  simply,  things. 
With  respect  to  this  series,  the  term  "cause"  has  the  ordinary  scientific 
meaning,  the  conditions  of  the  existence  of  a  given  thing. 

All  things,  the  sum  total  called  nature,  as  comprehended  under  the  . 
attribute  of  extension,  are  existences.  But  as  comprehended  under 
the  attribute  of  thought,  they  are  not  existences — they  do  not  exist, 
but  they  are  known.  For  the  attribute  of  thought  is  the  series  of 
essences  or  pure  concepts.  It  is  meaningless  to  ask  whether  the 
essences  exist.  Knowledge,  therefore,  is  the  apprehension  of  things 
under  the  attribute  of  thought,  that  is,  as  essences.  And  just  as  the 

19  cf.  Spinoza's  note. 
"°  ibid,  p.  28. 
21  ibid,  p.  13. 
Kibid,  p.  30. 


44       x  IDEA    AND    ESSENCE 

causal  nexus  of  existence  is  a  processus  from  God  or  Substance,  so 
the  logical  nexus  of  essences  is  a  processus  from  God  or  Substance. 
True  progress  of  the  understanding  requires,  accordingly,  the  con- 
templation of  the  "series  of  fixed  and  eternal  things"  (the  essences), 
not  the  "series  of  particular  and  mutable  things."  Of  the  latter,  Spinoza 
says  that  "their  existence  has  no  connection  with  their  essence,  or 
.  .  .  is  not  eternal  truth.  Neither  is  there  any  need  that  we  should 
understand  their  series,  for  the  essences  of  particular  mutable  things 
are  not  to  be  gathered  from  their  series  or  order  of  existence,  which 
would  furnish  us  with  nothing  beyond  their  extrinsic  denominations,  their 
relations,  or,  at  most,  their  circumstances  .  .  .  these  mutable  particular 
things  depend  so  intimately  and  essentially  .  .  .  upon  the  fixed  things, 
that  they  can  not  either  be  or  be  conceived  without  them."  23 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  understand  aright  what  is- meant  by 
the  assertion  that  the  "order  and  connection  of  ideas  is  the  same  as 
the  order  and  connection  of  things."  This  parallelism  has  no  implica- 
.-^C  tion  of  psychophysical  parallelism.  What  is  intended  by  Spinoza 
is  a  statement  of  the  correlation  of  logical  essence  and  thing,  between 
the  definition  or  explanation  of  a  thing  and  the  thing  itself.  There  is 
but  one  existential  series,  that  of  material  things.  If  our  concept 
system  of  knowledge  is  true,  if  it  is  knowledge  of  actuality,  then  the 
order  and  connection  of  ideas  must  be  the  same  as  the  order  and  con- 
nection of  things.  That  is,  existence  contains  exemplars,  actualiza- 
•  tions  of  the  essences,  or  of  some  of  them  at  least.  All  that  exists  and 
is  actual  illustrates,  conforms  to,  and  bodies  forth  some  essence.  It 
is  necessary  to  refrain  from  identifying  the  "existence"  of  Spinoza 
with  the  "physical"  half  of  the  contrast  between  the  spiritual  and  the 
material.  That  is,  our  conception  of  what  Spinoza  intends  by  existence 
must  be  strictly  divorced  from  any  connection  with  the  connotations 
of  the  dualistic  view  of  existence.  In  the  light  of  the  fact  that  Spinoza 
has  little  or  nothing  to  say  concerning  "spiritual"  existences,  we  have 
no  warrant  for  assuming  the  dual  view  as  the  contextual  setting  of  his 
notion  of  the  existential.  To  assert  that  the  existential  series  is  the 
world  of  the  physical,  the  corporeal,  or  of  "matter"  is  apt  to  introduce 
furtively  just  that  distinction  between  two  fields  of  existence  which 
we  are  here  concerned  to  prove  foreign  to  Spinoza.  It  is  likely,  at 
least,  to  project  his  utterances  upon  such  a  background  that  he  will 
appear  to  be  reacting  against  the  notion  of  spiritual  existence  and  is 
interested  in  denying  such  existence  and  in  affirming  that  all  existence 
is  corporeality.  The  meaning  of  a  Cartesian  finite  substance  is  more 
amply  elucidated  when  each  is  utilized  in  turn  as  the  setting  of  the 
other.  But  it  is  not  being  scrupulously  exact  when  we  adopt  such  a 
procedure  with  Spinoza. 

58  ibid,  p.  34. 


SPINOZA  45 

Whether  Spinoza's  true  position  amounts  to  the  same  thing  as  asssrt- 
ing  that  all  existence  is  matter,  is  one  thing;  but  whether  he  was 
consciously  interested  in  limiting  existence  to  "matter"  and  in  denying 
psychical  or  spiritual  existence,  is  a  very  different  thing.  With  the 
first  we  have  at  present  no  concern;  as  for  the  second,  it  seems  more 
faithful  to  Spinoza's  development,  meaning,  and  purposes  to  repre- 
sent him  as  being  largely  indifferent  to  the  spiritual-physical  contrast 
and  as  having  remained  for  .the  most  part  aloof  from  the  history  of 
the  dualism  in  Cartesian  circles.  When  we  seek  to  identify  Spinoza's 
existential  series  with  the  notion  of  extended  substance  or  with  the 
modern  conception  descending  from  the  Cartesian  idea,  we  are  vir- 
tually regarding  a  reaction  against  the  splitting-up  of  existence  into 
two  opposed  realms  as  helping  to  determine  his  course  of  thought. 
And  it  is  not  easy  then  to  avoid  a  feeling  that  it  was  his  rebound  from 
that  notion  that  eventuated  in  a  limiting  of  existence  to  the  one  type. 
To  repeat,  that  may  be,  in  effect,  what  Spinoza  does:  but  it  is  not  why 
he  does  it.  Unbiassed  elucidation  of  his  doctrine  requires  that  we 
take  the  notions  of  essence  and  existence  as  the  first  terms  in  which 
he  thought  without  attempting  to  identify  this  distinction  with  a  set  of 
ideas  of  different  complexion. 

The  correspondence  of  the  order  and  connection  of  things  to  the 
order  and  connection  of  ideas  is  then  a  statement  of  the  fact  that  for 
every  existence  there  is  an  essence,  discovered  or  discoverable,  which 
is  the  truth  of  that  existence,  its  explanation,  definition — its  law. 
Existence  is  governed  by  causal  necessity;  knowledge  of  existence  is 
regulated  by  logical  necessity.  That  which  exists  actually,  exists 
necessarily;  that  which  is  thought  with  necessity  is  true.  But  we 
must  not  look  for  the  order  and  connection  in  a  cross-section  of  the 
series,  but  longitudinally  as  being  derived  from  substance.  There  are 
two  nexi:  one  causal,  and  of  things,  of  actuality;  the  other  logical, 
in  verbal  form  a  series  of  propositions.  Both  are  derived  from  sub- 
stance. Consider  the  statement:  "I  said  that  God  is  the  cause  of  an 
idea — for  instance,  of  the  idea  of  a  circle — in  so  far  as  he  is  a  thinking 
thing,  simply  because  the  actual  being  of  the  idea  of  a  circle  can  only 
be  perceived  as  a  proximate  cause  through  another  mode  of  thinking, 
and  that  again  through  another,  and  so  on  to  infinity;  so  that,  as 
long  as  we  consider  things  as  modes  of  thinking,  we  must  explain  the 
order  of  the  whole  of  nature,  or  the  whole  chain  of  causes,  through  the 
attribute  of  thought  only."24  This  does  not  mean  that  God  causes  an 
idea  (psychical  or  otherwise)  in  the  usual  sense  of  cause,  but  that  God 
is  the  cause  of  the  idea  of  the  circle  in  the  same  sense  as  that  the 
circle  is  the  "cause"  of  certain  other  ideas  which  are  geometrical  deduc- 
tions from  and  consequences  of  the  idea  of  a  circle.  The  chain  of 

«  Ethics,  Pt.  2,  p.  7,  note. 


46  IDEAANDESSENCE 

natural,  actual,  causes  corresponds  to  a  sequence  of  propositions 
whose  connections  are  logical;  and  if  God  or  substance  is  the  origin 
of  the  causal  series,  he  is  similarly  the  first  principle,  the  source  of 
coherence  and  order,  in  the  logical  series.  The  correspondence  of 
idea  and  thing  is  comparable  to  the  correspondence  of  the  concept  of 
a  curve  as  expressed  in  the  equation  of  the  curve  to  that  curve  as 
actually  existing  or  as  described  by  a  moving  object.25 

A  brief  consideration  of  Spinoza's  classification  of  ideas  and  the 
treatment  of  error  will  substantiate  our  thesis.  The  distinction  be- 
tween kinds  and  classes  of  ideas  corresponds  to  the  various  kinds  or 
degrees  of  knowledge.  Three  kinds  of  knowledge  are  enumerated — 
knowledge  of  imagination,  or  opinion;  knowledge  of  reason,  and 
knowledge  of  intuition.  The  first  is  knowledge  based  on  confused  or 
inadequate  ideas,  the  two  latter  form  knowledge  of  adequate  and  true 
ideas.  Now  it  is  noteworthy  that  these  distinctions  are  based  on 
logical,  not  psychological,  considerations,  and  give  evidence  that 
Spinoza's  scheme  is  logical. 

The  test  of  the  fictitious  idea  is  logical.  The  chimera  is  a  fiction 
the  nature  of  which  implies  contradiction.26  Fictions  in  general  are 
concerned  only  with  the  possible — that  is,  with  things  whose  existence 
or  non-existence  would  not  imply  a  contradiction.27  All  fictitious 
ideas  are  deficient  with  respect  to  clearness  and  distinctness  and  sim- 
plicity, while  the  adequate  idea,  the  logical  essence,  possesses  just 
these  qualities.  All  these  signs  by  which  we  can  detect  the  fictitious 
or  confused  ideas  are  logical  qualities.  And  the  same  is  true  of  the 
false  idea,  which  "only  differs  from  the  fictitious  idea  in  the  fact  of 
implying  a  mental  assent."  28 

Now  all  falsity  consists  in  "the  privation  of  knowledge,  which  inade- 
quate, fragmentary,  or  confused  ideas  involve."  29  Falsity  is  due  to 
nothing  positive  in  ideas ; 30  it  is  due  to  an  inadequacy,  for  the  ade- 
quate idea  is  always  true. 31  "All  confusion  arises  from  the  fact  that 
the  mind  has  only  partial  knowledge  of  a  thing  .  .  .  and  does  not 
distinguish  between  the  known  and  the  unknown."  32  And  fictitious 
and  false  ideas  are  confused  ideas.  Thus,  this  confusion  is  the  result 
of  a  privation  in  knowledge — or  it  may  be  called  that  privation  itself. 

The  point  involved  can  be  rendered  as  follows:  the  simple  logical 
essence  necessarily  has  its  correlate  in  existence  either  actually  or  po- 
tentially. But  the  simple,  adequate  idea  may  be  obscured  by  the  pre- 

*  cf.  De  Intelledus  Emendatione,  p.  33. 
M  De  Intelledus  Emendatione,  p.  17. 

27  ibid,  p.  1 6. 

28  ibid,  p.  22. 

z»  Ethics,  Pt.  2,  prop.  35- 

so  ibid,  prop.  33. 

11  ibid,  prop.  34. 

»  De  Intellectus  Emendatione,  p.  20. 


SPINOZA  47 

sentations  of  imagination,  or  the  attainment  of  the  idea  hampered  by 
the  commingling  of  images  and  the  pure  concept.  The  image  is  the 
product  of  two  factors:  the  external  stimulating  "object"  and  the 
organism  itself.33 

Now  while  everything  that  happens  in  nature,  happens  of  necessity, 
we  can  not  always  be  sure  that  the  conjunction  of  circumstances  ne- 
cessary for  the  production  of  the  given  event  actually  occurs.  The 
possibilities  of  such  conjunctions,  that  is,  the  possibility  of  the  thing's 
existence,  must  be  ascertained  from  a  scrutiny  of  the  essgnce;  its 
actuality  can  only  be  observed  by  "attending  to  the  order  of  nature." 
Imagination  is  the  instrument  for  knowledge  of  the  occurrence  of 
particular  and  mutable  things.  It  is  this  latter  type  of  knowledge 
which  is  subject  to  error;  and  in  so  far  as  the  presentations  of  ima- 
gination prevent,  or  hinder,  the  work  of  understanding,  or  obscure  the 
logical  essence  through  alloying  it  with  such  presentations,  we  have 
error,  fiction,  and  falsity.  The  images  themselves,  which  are  them-/ 
selves  existents,  do  not  contain  error.  "The  mind  does  not  err  in  the 
mere  act  of  imagining,  but  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  regarded  as  being 
without  the  idea."  34  The  presentations  of  imagination  are  confused 
and  indistinct  (in  a  logical  sense,  not  psychologically).  The  concept 
or  essence  is  distinct  and  necessarily  true,  since  it  has  its  correlate  in 
actuality.  It  is  not,  therefore,  the  indistinctness  of  the  imagination 
itself  that  is  the  source  of  error,  but  the  confusion  that  results  from 
failing  to  discriminate  between  the  concept  and  the  images.  The 
concept,  so  to  speak,  is  embedded  in  a  mass  of  images  of  the  manifold ; 
the  idea  in  its  simplicity  and  clearness  is  not  given,  but  must  be 
attained.  Once  attained,  its  true  and  necessary  existence  is  given./. 
In  so  far  as  we  have  not  attained  the  concept  in  its  clearness  and  dis- 
tinctness, to  that  extent  we  are  deficient  in  knowledge,  and  are  cor- 
respondingly in  danger  of  error.  Privation  means  deficiency  with 
respect  to  something  that  belongs  to  the  nature  of  the  essence  in  the 
totality  of  its  logical  connections.  Thus,  I  may  have  the  idea  of 
the  circle,  but  I  may  not  know  the  relation  of  the  diameter  to  the 
circumference,  and  to  that  extent  there  is  privation  or  deficiency 
in  my  knowledge,  on  account  of  which  I  may  be  led  to  make  false 
affirmations.  With  further  development  of  the  understanding,  this 
deficiency  is  eliminated. 

The  fictitious,  false,  and  inadequate  ideas  are  logical  confusions.  - 
The  deficiency  and  confusion  concern  the  logical,  not  the  psychological, 
structure  of  the  idea.     Knowledge  of  the  imagination,  or  opinion,  is 
concerned  with  the  presentations  of  particular  and  mutable  things  by 
the  imagination ;  while  knowledge  of  reason  and  of  intuition  is  knowl- 

M  cf.  Ethics,  Pt.  2,  props.  15  et  tcq. 
**  Ethics,  Pt.  2,  prop.  17,  note. 


48  IDEAANDESSENCE 

edge  of  the  pure  concept  or  essence  freed  from  the  trammels  of  the 
empirical  manifold. 

True  knowledge,  which  is  knowledge  of  logical  essences,  is  contrasted 
with  that  information  of  the  manifold  of  experience  which  we  attain 
through  imagination.  This  contrast  corresponds  to  a  contrast  in 
methods.  For  the  method  peculiar  to  the  knowledge  of  essence  is  to 
be  distinguished  from  that  connected  with  the  investigation  of  the 
flux  of  natural  experience.  In  response  to  the  questions  of  "J.  B." 
concerning  the  possibility  of  a  method  by  means  of  which  "we  can 
attain  knowledge  of  the  "most  excellent  things,"  and  whether  our 
mind  is  ruled  by  fortune  rather  than  by  art,  Spinoza  replies  that 
"there  must  necessarily  be  a  method  whereby  we  are  able  to  direct 
and  concatenate  our  clear  and  distinct  perceptions,"  and  that  "the 
mind  is  not,  like  the  body,  subject  to  chance."  The  only  support 
needed  for  this,  he  avers,  is  the  following  consideration:  "One  clear 
and  distinct  perception,  or  several  such  taken  together,  can  be  abso- 
lutely the  cause  of  other  clear  and  distinct  perceptions.  Further- 
more, all  the  clear  and  distinct  perceptions,  which  we  form,  can  arise 
only  from  other  clear  and  distinct  perceptions,  which  are  in  us,  nor 
do  they  admit  of  any  other  cause  without  us.  Whence  it  follows  that 
clear  and  distinct  perceptions  which  we  form  depend  upon  the  certain 

/and  fixed  laws  of  our  nature  alone,  that  is,  on  our  absolute  power,  not 
on  fortune."  35  It  is  evident  that  clearness  and  distinctness  are  logical 
characteristics  of  the  moments  of  a  pure,  logical  power  of  apprehension 
or  mental  vision.  The  clear  and  distinct  perception  of  the  concept 
of  a  square  "causes"  (and  this  alone  can  cause)  the  clear  and  distinct 
perception  of  (say)  the  incommensurability  of  diagonal  and  side. 
Spinoza  has  no  intention  of  freeing  the  "soul"  from  the  vicissitudes  of 
chance  by  raising  it  above  the  causes  which  "although  acting  by  cer- 
tain and  fixed  laws,  are  yet  unknown  to  us."  He  is  pointing  to  the 
fact  of  the  mind's  rational  insight  and  its  power  of  inference,  and 
emphatically  asserting  his  confident  belief  in  the  existence  of  a  method 
whereby  that  capacity  can  operate  successfully.  In  fact,  it  is  easy  to 
imagine  Spinoza  selecting  geometry  as  vindicating  his  claim  that 
there  must  be  such  a  method  and  as  illustrating  his  point  that  clear 
and  distinct  perceptions  cause,  and  that  they  alone  can  cause,  other 
clear  and  distinct  perceptions.  It  is  here,  indeed,  that  the  geometrical 
method  is  seen  in  its  true  significance.  The  geometrical  method 
derives  its  importance  for  Spinoza  from  the  fact  that  from  his  con- 
ception of  the  ordered  system  of  essences  flows  a  demand  for  such  a- 
method.  His  philosophical  task,  as  viewed  by  him,  points  to  a  method, 
the  most  obvious  example  of  which  is  to  be  found  in  geometry. 

Spinoza  now  proceeds  to  tell  what  the  true  method  is  and  to  contrast 

35  Vol.  3,  Epistola  37. 


SPINOZA  49 

it  with  the  method  applicable  to  the  study  of  the  manifold  of  experi- 
ence. "As  for  other  perceptions,  I  admit  that  they  depend  in  the 
largest  part  on  fortune.  Hence  clearly  appears,  what  the  true  method 
ought  to  be  like,  and  what  it  ought  especially  to  consist  in — namely, 
solely  in  the  cognition  of  the  pure  understanding,  and  its  nature  and 
laws.  In, order  to  acquire  this,  it  is  before  all  things  necessary  to  dis- 
tinguish between  the  understanding  and  the  imagination,  or  between 
true  ideas  and  the  rest,  such  as  the  fictitious,  the  false,  the  doubtful, 
and  absolutely  all  which  depend  solely  on  the  memory.  For  under- 
standing these  matters,  as  far  as  the  method  requires,  there  is  no  need 
to  know  the  nature  of  the  mind  through  its  first  cause;  it  is  sufficient 
to  put  together  a  short  history  of  the  mind,  or  of  perceptions,  in  the_ 
manner  taught  by  Verulam."  36  The  method  of  Bacon  for  empirical 
experience,  but  for  final  truths,  the  discernment  of  the  logical  essences 
in  their  eternal  relation  to  their  first  cause,  substance — this  seems 
to  be  Spinoza's  meaning. 

From  this  it  is  clear  that  Spinoza's  theory  of  knowledge  does  not 
involve  psychological  considerations  of  the  relations  of  idea  and 
object.  The  problems  that  cluster  about  the  correspondence  of  the 
psychical  idea  and  the  physical  object  are  simply  outside  his  universe 
of  discourse.  His  classification  of  ideas  and  knowledge  does  not  arise 
from  the  psychological  characteristics  of  mental  states,  but  from  the 
logical  properties  of  the  idea. 


IV 

After  this  exposition  of  Spinoza's  doctrine,  let  us  turn  specifically  to 
the  psychological  analyses.  We  may  thereby  ascertain  to  what 
extent,  if  at  all,  Spinoza  advocates  a  psychology  in  which  the  notion 
of  the  "psychical"  or  the  "spiritual"  (taking  these  terms  in  the  sense 
of  the  usual  contrast)  plays  a  part.  And  if  the  outcome  prove  that 
the  concept  of  the  psychical  or  spiritual  does  not  control  his  psycho- 
logical opinions,  we  may  then  seek  confirmation  of  our  theses  in  a 
negative  way  by  enumerating  some  of  the  difficulties  that  ensue 
when  the  concept  is  forced  upon  him.  The  primary  task  in  the  dis- 
cussion before  us  is  to  examine  the  treatment  of  the  idea  and  image, 
and  their  relation,  from  the  standpoint  of  psychology. 

We  may,  therefore,  begin  with  idea  and  image.  A  distinction 
between  them  runs  through  Spinoza's  philosophy,  and  is  as  charac- 
teristic and  as  necessary  as  the  corresponding  distinction  in  Descartes ; 
but  Spinoza  seems  to  maintain  the  distinction  more  consistently. 
The  question  inevitably  arises  in  an  effort  to  free  the  interpretation  of 
Spinoza  from  the  Cartesian  meanings  read  into  Spinoza's  words, 

w  ibid. 


5O  IDEAANDESSENCE 

whether,  that  is,  the  distinction  between  image  and  idea  in  Spinoza  is 
one  and  the  same  as  the  distinction  in  Descartes.  Does  the  verbal 
identity  express  an  identity  of  meaning? 

Now  the  differentiation  of  image  and  idea,  of  understanding  (think- 
ing) and  imagination,  is,  in  Descartes,  directly  connected  with  the 
dualism  of  finite  substances  in  the  less  general  form  of  the  dualism 
of  mind  and  body  in  the  human  being.  In  fact,  the  contrast  between 
image  and  idea  in  Descartes  turns  on  the  difference  between  the  im- 
material soul  state  and  the  bodily  state.  Idea  signifies  something  in, 
or  an  act  of,  the  spiritual  soul  substance ;  image  denotes  a  process  that 
is  primarily  a  physiological  process  in  the  brain,  with  occasional  at- 
tempts to  connect  it  with  the  soul  in  some  fashion  that  would  bridge 
the  gap  between  mind  and  body.  If  in  Spinoza  the  doctrine  of  the 
duality  of  existence  is  really  at  the  bottom  of  the  distinction  between 
the  attributes  of  thought  and  extension, — that  is,  if  Spinoza  really 
starts  from  Cartesian  results, — we  should  expect  to  find  the  Cartesian 
distinction  between  image  and  idea  reproduced  in  Spinoza.  It  is 
our  purpose,  however,  to  disprove  this.  In  Spinoza  the  distinc- 
tion is  totally  unanalogous  to  the  Cartesian.  The  establishment  of 
this  claim  retroactively  corroborates  the  more  general  thesis.  The 
more  divergent  the  principles  upon  which  the  distinctions  are  made  in 
the  two  cases,  the  more  indisputable  will  be  the  claim  that  the  two 
systems  diverge  radically  in  ways  that  are  fundamental. 

For  Spinoza,  the  image  is  purely  a  physiological  process.  It  is  a 
phenomenon  of  body,  an  event  in  the  world  of  existence.  That  is, 
as  the  human  being  is  an  existent,  and  is  a  part  of  nature,  the  image 
is  an  occurrence  of  exactly  the  same  general  type  as  other  happenings 
in  the  existential  series.  "The  affections  of  the  human  body,  of  which 
the  ideas  represent  external  bodies  as  present  to  us,  we  will  call  the 
images  of  things,  though  they  do  not  record  the  figures  of  things. 
When  the  mind  contemplates  bodies  in  this  fashion,  we  say  that  it 
imagines."  *  "The  mind  imagines  any  given  body,  because  the  human 
body  is  affected  and  disposed  by  the  marks  (vestiguum)  of  an  external 
body,  in  the  same  manner  as  it  is  affected  when  certain  of  its  parts  are 
set  in  motion  by  the  said  external  body."  2  Imagery  is  the  represen- 
tation of  the  empirical  manifold  of  actuality,  and  the  imagination  is 
the  organ  of  that  representation.  Images  are  bracketed  with  chimeras 
(whose  nature  is  said  to  contain  a  manifest  contradiction)  and  crea- 
tures of  fancy,  as  not  being  realities  at  all.3  We  represent  things  by 
means  of  the  imagination,  which  is  connected  with  brain-processes,4 
and  brain-processes  Spinoza  thinks  of  in  the  customary  phraseology 

^Ethics,  Pt.  2,  17,  note. 

2  Ethics,  Pt.  2,  16. 

3  Cogitata  Metaphysica,  Vol.  4,  Pt.  i,  ch.  i. 
*ibid,  pp.  188-189. 


SPINOZA  51 

of  his  day  as  movements  of  the  animal  spirits.  Imagination,  as  we 
have  already  seen,5  is  a  natural  process  serving  as  an  instrument  in 
assisting  the  mind  in  the  attainment  of  conceptions. 

Even  in  the  Cogitata  Metaphysica,  as  has  been  pointed  out,  Spinoza 
apparently  does  not  use  thinking  substance  as  equivalent  to  imma- 
terial substance,  and,  in  fact,  the  latter  term  seems  not  to  be  used. 
He  asserts  that  the  notion  of  three  souls,  that  of  plants,  of  animals, 
and  of  man  is  an  imaginary  conception,  for  in  matter  there  is  nothing 
but  mechanical  forms  and  activities.6  It  is  noteworthy  that  Spinoza 
offers  as  the  reason  why  the  conception  of  three  souls  is  imaginary 
the  fact  of  the  mechanical  nature  of  matter.  Furthermore,  in  the 
same  connection  he  attributes  life  only  to  those  beings  that  have  a 
soul  united  with  a  body,  which  means  that  life  is  to  be  attributed  to 
men,  and  perhaps  to  animals,  but  not  to  minds  or  God.  Now  the  term 
here  used  for  "soul"  is  anima',*  one  can  not  resist  the  conclusion  that 
soul  here  means  for  Spinoza  a  vital  principle,  something  within  the 
system  of  mechanical  figures  and  textures,  and  not  something  akin  to 
the  spiritual  substance  of  Descartes.  Spinoza  institutes  an  interesting 
contrast  between  mind  and  soul  (mens  and  anima)  by  attributing  life 
to  a  thing  possessing  a  soul,  but  denying  that  life  can  be  attributed 
to  minds.  Life  he  defines  as  the  power  by  which  things  persist  in 
their  existence,  in  order  to  accommodate  the  meaning  of  the  term 
to  popular  usage  which  attributes  life  to  corporeal  things  not  united 
with  minds  and  to  minds  separated  from  bodies.7  The  terms  animus 
and  spiritus  do  not  appear  to  be  used  in  the  Cogitata  Metaphysica, 
except  that  spiritus  appears  in  the  sense  of  "animal  spirits." 

These  statements  and  uses  of  terms  seem  to  imply  that  Spinoza  is 
concerned  with  two  conceptions:  The  first,  that  of  the  soul  (anima), 
the  meaning  of  which  is  close  to  the  primitive  signification  of  the  word 
and  is  free  from  psychological  and  metaphysical  meanings;  the 
second,  that  of  mind  (mens),  which  throughout  the  Cogitata  Meta- 
physica seems  to  be  related  to  essence.  Mind  is  a  class-name  for  the 
collection  of  concepts  or  essences  as  subjective,  as  known  and  pos- 
sessed by  the  human  being;  and  also,  perhaps,  for  the  power  or  pos- 
sibility of  having  such  essences.  The  possession  of  these  concepts  is 
what  is  signified  by  having  a  mind.  It  stands  for  the  "forms"  which 
are  manifested  or  generated  in  the  human  being.  Finally,  the  contexts 
do  not  give  evidence  that  either  word  intends  significations  based 
upon  the  duality  of  substance  as  defined  by  Descartes. 

But  now  turn  to  the  idea.  "By  idea,  I  mean  the  conception  of  the 
mind  which  is  formed  by  the  mind  as  a  thinking  thing."8  To  this 

*  See  above,  pp.  67-68. 

•  Cogitata  Metaphysica,  Vol.  4,  Pt.  2,  ch.  6. 
7  ibid. 

s  Ethics,  Pt.  2,  def.  3. 


52  IDEAANDESSENCE 

Spinoza  adds  the  following  explanation :  "I  say  conception  rather  than 
perception,  because  the  word  perception  seems  to  imply  that  the  mind 
is  passive  in  respect  to  the  object;  whereas  conception  seems  to  express 
an  activity  of  the  mind."  By  this  Spinoza  is  affirming  the  logical 
meaning  in  which  he  is  employing  the  term.  He  is  distinguishing  it 
from  "idea"  in  the  sense  of  "idea  of  perception,"  that  is,  ideas  as  pas- 
sively impressed  upon  the  mind,  coming  in  from  the  outside,  or  re- 
ceived in  sense-perception.  The  conception  expresses  a  logical  func- 
tion of  the  mind.  The  matter  might  be  stated  as  follows:  the  ques- 
tion of  the  origin  or  derivation  of  ideas  or  knowledge,  the  question  of 
how  the  mind  comes  to  be  furnished  with  its  ideas,  in  the  Lockian 
sense,  is  either  subordinate,  or  else  entirely  absent,  from  Spinoza's 
thought,  at  least  in  this  connection.  He  is  rather  concerned  with 
the  logical  worth  of  the  conception.  This  is  borne  out  by  the  definition 
immediately  following,  that  of  the  adequate  idea.  The  idea  is  ade- 
quate when,  considered  in  itself,  "without  relation  to  the  object,"  it 
"has  all  the  properties  or  intrinsic  marks  of  a  true  idea."  The  explana- 
tion appended  declares  that  "intrinsic"  is  used  "in  order  to  exclude 
that  mark  which  is  extrinsic,  namely,  the  agreement  of  the  idea  with 
its  object  (ideatum)"  That  is,  the  test  of  the  adequacy  of  the  idea  is 
in  the  idea  itself,  to  be  found  in  its  coherence  with  other  elements  in  a 
system  of  conceptions,  and  not  in  a  correspondence  to  an  ideate.  He 
distinguishes  ideas  from  images  in  the  statement:  "For  by  ideas,  I  do 
not  understand  images  such  as  are  formed  in  the  bottom  of  the  eye, 
or  in  the  midst  of  the  brain,  but  the  conceptions  of  thought."  9  Despite 
this  assertion,  Spinoza  does  occasionally  use  "idea"  as  equivalent  to 
image,  or  at  least  as  referring  to  a  physiological  process.  Idea,  in  the 
De  Emendatione,  is  even  said  to  be  "in  itself  nothing  else  than  a  certain 
sensation,"10  and  Spinoza's  account  of  sensation  is  certainly  free  from 
all  implications  of  the  "psychical."  Here  as  in  some  other  places  the 
idea  is  given  a  physiological  interpretation ;  in  short,  it  stands  on  the 
same  level  as  the  image. 

But  we  now  seem  in  danger  of  losing  the  distinction  between  image 
and  idea  which  was  taken  as  a  characteristic  doctrine.  But  the  danger 
is  only  apparent,  not  real.  The  point  is  that  the  psychological  ac- 
count of  idea,  and  of  thinking,  in  so  far  as  Spinoza  furnishes  such  an 
account,  is  of  just  the  same  nature  as  his  account  of  image.  It  is  a 
physiological  process.  As  psychological  fact,  image  and  idea  do  not 
seem  to  differ  at  all.  But  the  difference  between  them  is  derived  from 
consideration  of  their  cognitive  function,  their  value  in  knowledge. 
From  this  view-point,  the  "idea"  must  be  considered  apart  from  all 
questions  of  its  psychological  nature.  It  means  concept,  but  concept 

9  ibid,  p.  48,  note. 

10  Vol.  i,  p.  24. 


SPINOZA  53 

not  as  a  psychical  entity,  but  as.  logical  essence.  It  is  a  logical  entity, 
not  a  psychological  entity.  The  idea  as  concept  is  not  an  existent  of 
any  sort.  According  to  Pollock,  definition  for  Spinoza  was  almost 
what  now-a-days  would  be  called  scientific  explanation.  It  is  "an 
equation  of  ideas  corresponding  to  a  constant  relation  between  facts, 
and  expressing  the  reduction  of  something  unknown  to  terms  of  known 
elements."  u  If  definition  is  the  essence  explicitly  formulated,  then 
.surely  by  idea  Spinoza  meant  something  more  akin  to  the  scholastic 
form  than  an  entity  or  state  of  immaterial  soul  substance. 

It  is  the  failure  to  recognize  that  the  distinction  between  image 
and  idea  is  of  this  nature  that  apparently  is  responsible  for  the  opinion 
of  Toennies  (whose  studies  of  Spinoza  seem  to  be  biassed  by  the  errors 
of  which  so  much  has  been  said),  that  Propositions  5  et  seq.,  of  Part  2 
of  the  Ethics  are  in  contradiction  with  Axiom  3  of  the  same  book.  He 
says  of  these  propositions  that  "in  unserer  Sprache  zu  reden,  unter 
dem  Namen  Ding  jede  physische,  unter  dem  Namen  Idee  jede  psy- 
chische  Erscheinung  begriffen  werden  soil.  Hiermit  steht  freilich 
schon  das  dritte  Axiom  desselben  zweiten  Theiles  in  Widerspruch. 
Hier  werden  die  Affecte  als  besondere  modi  cogitandi  von  den  Ideen 
unterschieden  und  diese  deutlich  genug  als  Arten  der  Erkenntniss 
aufgefasst;  welche  Auffassung  freilich  festgehalten  wird,  aber  so,  dass 
jene  anderen  Thatsachen  des  psychischen  Lebens  zunachst  ganzlich 
vergessen  werden"  12.  Toennies  seems  to  understand  Spinoza  as  mean- 
ing in  the  axiom  that  affections  like  love  and  desire,  as  well  as  ideas, 
are  psychical  states;  and  then  takes  the  dictum  (Prop.  7)  that  "the 
order  and  connection  of  ideas  is  the  same  as  the  order  and  connection 
of  things"  as  standing  for  the  parallelism  of  a  psychical  series  to  a 
material  series.  Taken  so,  it  follows  that  Spinoza,  in  this  statement 
of  the  parallelism,  drops  out  of  consideration  all  the  elements  of  the 
psychical  life  save  the  ideas.  To  make  up  for  this  oversight,  appa- 
rently, it  would  be  necessary  to  revise  Spinoza's  dictum  to  read:  "the 
order  of  ideas,  affections,  etc.,  is  the  same  as  the  order  and  connection 
of  things" — which,  as  will  appear  later,  would  make  nonsense  of 
Spinoza's  words.  But  if  we  recognize  that  by  idea  in  the  axiom  and 
the  propositions  referred  to  Spinoza  does  not  mean  psychological 
(much  less  psychical)  facts  at  all,  but  logical  essences,  no  such  difficulty 
appears. 

We  need  not  be  content  with  this  presumptuous  emendation  of 
Spinoza's  dictum  in  refuting  Toennies.  We  have,  moreover,  grounds 
for  maintaining  that  the  dictum  contains  only  the  term  "idea,"  for  the 
reason  that  affections  are  processes  in  the  region  of  things,  of  extension, 
of  nature.  They  are  as  much  physical  events  as  the  rising  of  the  sun. 

11  Pollock,  Spinoza,  His  Life  and  Times,  p.  147. 

12  Studien  zur  Entwicklungsgeschichte  des  Spinoza,  Vierteljahresschrifi  fur  wissenschaftiiche  Philoso- 
pkie,  Vol.  7,  p.  159. 


54  IDEA    AND    ESSENCE 

And  as  events,  they  have  their  correlated  ideas  or  logical  essences. 
So  that  the  dictum  as  it  stands,  instead  of  being  deficient  or  incon- 
sistent, precisely  embodies  Spinoza's  meaning.  The  order  and  con- 
nection of  things,  of  existents,  including  therein  affections  and  emo- 
tions, correspond  to  the  order  and  connection  of  ideas.  The  point  is 
forcefully  corroborated  by  the  opening  sentences  of  Part  3  of  the 
Ethics:  "Most  writers  on  the  emotions  and  on  the  nature  of  human 
life  seem  to  be  treating  rather  of  things  outside  nature  than  of  things 
following  nature's  general  laws.  They  appear  to  conceive  man  to  be 
situated  in  nature  as  a  kingdom  within  a  kingdom:  for  they  believe 
that  he  disturbs  rather  than  follows  nature's  order."  And  later 
he  adds :  "Nature's  laws  and  ordinances,  according  to  which  all  things 
are  and  change  from  one  form  to  another,  are  everywhere  and  always 
the  same ;  so  that  there  should  be  one  and  the  same  method  of  under- 
standing the  nature  of  all  things  whatsoever,  namely,  through  nature's 
universal  laws  and  rules.  Thus  the  passions  of  hatred,  anger,  envy, 
and  so  on,  considered  in  themselves,  follow  from  this  same  necessity 
and  power  of  nature;  in  like  manner  they  answer  to  certain  definite 
causes,  through  which  they  are  understood,  and  possess  certain 
properties  as  worthy  of  being  known  as  the  properties  of  anything 
else."  These  sentences,  serving  as  preface  to  a  treatise  on  the 
emotions,  are  unmistakable  in  meaning,  unless  we  vitiate  the  mean- 
ing of  the  passage  by  making  "nature"  signify  the  duality  of  existence. 
Without  importing  this  foreign  element,  it  is  clear  that  affections  are 
processes  in  existence,  which  have  in  the  world  of  knowledge  (not  the 
world  of  the  psychical)  their  correlated  logical  processes.  The  entire 
note  to  Proposition  2  of  this  Part  indicates  that  Spinoza  advances  a  me- 
chanical conception  of  body  and  its  states.  "A  mental  decision  and  an 
appetite  or  determination  of  the  body  are  simultaneous,  or  rather  are 
one  and  the  same  thing,  which  we  call  decision,  when  it  is  regarded 
under  and  explained  through  the  attribute  of  thought,  and  a  deter- 
mination, when  it  is  regarded  under  the  attribute  of  extension,  and 
deduced  from  the  laws  of  motion  and  rest."  Clearly  we  are  dealing 
with  one  thing  here,  not  two  assigned  to  different  worlds. 

Emotions  are  definitely  ascribed  to  the  body  by  their  description  as 
modifications  of  the  body.  "By  EMOTION  I  mean  the  modifications 
of  the  body,  whereby  the  power  of  acting  of  the  body  itself  is  increased 
or  diminished,  aided  or  constrained,  and  also  the  ideas  of  such  modi- 
fications." 13  Emotion  is  also  called  a  passivity  of  the  soul,  or  confused 
idea.14  The  meaning  of  these  phrases,  and,  in  general,  the  reason  why 
emotions  are  "ideas  of  the  modifications  of  the  body"  are  given  in  the 
following  statement :  "Now  the  power  of  the  mind  is  defined  by  knowl- 

"  Ethics,  Pt.  3,  def.  3. 

"  Ethics,  Pt.  3,  "General  Definition  of  the  Emotions." 


SPINOZA  55 

edge  only,  and  its  impotence  or  passion  is  defined  by  the  privation  of 
knowledge  only."15  To  speak  of  emotions  as  confused  or  inadequate  idea 
is  to  use  an  expression  of  logical,  or  cognitive,  rather  than  psychological, 
import.  Emotions  "involve  some  clear  and  distinct  conception,"  but 
the  conception  suffers  from  the  obscuration  characteristic  of  all 
confused  and  inadequate  ideas.16  And  finally,  it  is  worth  nothing  that 
the  dictum  of  correspondence  is  formulated  with  especial  reference  to 
affectional  states.  "Even  as  thoughts  and  the  ideas  of  things  are 
ordered  and  associated  in  the  mind,  so  are  the  modifications  of  the 
body  or  the  images  of  things  exactly  in  the  same  way  ordered  and 
associated  in  the  body."  17  And  Spinoza  does  not  say  "order  and 
connection  of  ideas,  emotions,  affections." 

The  thesis  of  this  essay  receives  a  more  or  less  indirect  confirmation 
from  Spinoza's  polemic  against  the  general  idea  or  notion.  His  ac- 
count of  the  general  notion  demonstrates  clearly  that  the  "idea"  in 
his  terminology  can  not  be  identified  with  the  general  notion  or 
abstract  idea.  These  notions,  he  says,  are  due  to  the  inability  of  the 
imagination  to  form  distinctly  more  than  a  certain  number  of  images 
at  a  time.  When  the  imagination  is  overburdened  with  images,  it 
"imagines  all  bodies  confusedly  without  any  distinction ;"  18  and  this 
is  the  origin  of  the  general  or  abstract  idea.  Such  notions  are  extremely 
confused  and  vary  greatly  from  individual;  they  are  adventitious, 
variable,  dependent  upon  the  chance  variations  in  the  experience  of 
individual  men.  Evidently  the  infinite  mode  of  thought  or  series  of 
ideas  is  not  an  aggregation  of  these  empirically  derived,  confused, 
variable  notions,  nor  a  collection  of  individual  streams  of  such  notions. 
They  are  but  confused  images,  and  it  "is  not  to  be  wondered  at,  that 
among  philosophers,  who  seek  to  explain  natural  things  merely  by 
the  images  formed  of  them,  so  many  controversies  should  have  arisen."19 
The  idea  or  pure  concept  is  then  a  logical  entity,  wholly  different  in 
significance  from  the  abstract  ideas  whose  psychology  has  just  been 
outlined. 

This  leads  us  to  Spinoza's  distinction  between  an  association  of 
ideas,  which  is  the  principle  of  memory,  and  a  second  association  of  j 
ideas,  which  arises  from  the  order  of  the  intellect.  A  comparison  of 
the  two  kinds  of  associations  illustrates  both  the  physiological  charac- 
ter of  the  Spinozistic  psychology  and  the  purely  logical  character  of 
the  "idea."  Memory  is  "nothing  else  than  a  certain  association  (con- 
catenatio)  of  ideas  involving  the  nature  of  things  outside  the  human 
body,  which  association  follows  in  the  mind  according  to  the  order 

»  Ethics,  Pt.  5,  prop.  20,  note. 
11  Ethics,  Pt.  s,  prop.  4,  corol. 

17  ibid,  prop.  i. 

18  Ethics,  Pt.  2,  prop.  40,  note  i. 
i«  ibid. 


56  IDEAANDESSENCE 

and  association  of  the  modifications  (affectiones)  of  the  human  body. 
I  say,  first,  it  is  an  association  of  those  ideas  only  (tantum),  which 
involve  the  nature  of  things  outside  the  human  body;  not  of  ideas 
which  answer  to  (exfilicant)  the  nature  of  the  said  things:  ideas  of 
the  modifications  of  the  human  body  are,  in  truth,  those  which  involve 
the  nature  both  of  the  human  body  and  of  external  bodies.  I  say, 
secondly,  that  this  association  follows  according  to  the  order  and 
association  of  the  modifications  of  the  human  body,  in  order  to  dis- 
tinguish it  from  the  association  of  ideas,  which  follows  according  to 
the  order  of  the  intellect,  whereby  the  mind  perceives  things  through 
their  primary  causes,  and  which  is  in  all  men  the  same."  20  One  kind 
of  ideas,  involving  the  nature  of  outside  things,  is  associated -according 
to  the  order  and  connection  of  bodily  modifications;  this  is  memory, 
the  order  and  association  being  evidently  conceived  in  what  we 
should  call  physiological  terms.  Compare  the  statement  in  which 
imagination  is  said  to  be  "the  idea  by  means  of  which  the  mind  con- 
templates a  thing  as  present;  yet  this  idea  indicates  rather  the  present 
constitution  of  the  human  body  than  the  nature  of  the  external 
thing."  21  This  sort  of  association  of  ideas  is  that  which  corresponds 

Ito  inadequate  knowledge,  confused  ideas — "hearsay,"  "mere  experi- 
ence," and  perhaps  is  responsible  for,  or  represents,  inadequate  infer- 
ence. The  ideas  thus  associated  depend  upon  both  the  human  body 
and  outside  things;  this  seems  to  mean  simply  that  the  physiological 
process  is  a  function  of  two  things,  stimulus  and  bodily  conditions. 
Now  this  set  of  ideas  and  manner  of  ordering  ideas  are  in  sharp  contrast 
with  ideas  which  answer  to,  or  explain,  the  nature  of  the  things  outside, 
and  this  association  arises  from  the  order  of  the  intellect.  Here  we 
are  no  longer  in  the  domain  of  psychology,  but  of  knowledge.  These 
ideas,  which,  perhaps  as  psychological  phenomena,  would  probably 
receive  a  physiological  explanation  similar  to  that  given  the  other  set, 
are  cognitively  the  logical  essences  of  things,  and  their  connection  is 
(ideal  and  logical.  The  contrast  is  thus  stated  between  connections 
of  fact  and  connections  of  a  logical  nature.  The  use  of  the  term  "idea" 
in  both  instances  is  not  a  matter  of  terminological  inconsistency,  or 
a  sign  of  a  parallelistic  hypothesis  in  the  mind  of  the  writer,  unless  we 
do  violence  to  its  intention  by  forcing  such  extraneous  considerations 
upon  the  passage. 

A  search  for  an  unmistakable  enunciation  of  the  theory  of  existence 
as  dual,  or  of  the  principle  of  psychophysical  parallelism,  or  finally  of 
the  spiritual  status  of  the  idea,  would  naturally  lead  to  the  work  in 
which  Spinoza  is  commenting  on  the  philosophy  of  Descartes.  But 
even  in  the  Cogitata  Metaphysica  where,  if  anywhere,  we  should  expect 

20  Ethics,  Pt.  2,  p.  18,  note  (italics  mine). 
11  Ethics,  Pt.  5,  p.  34. 


SPINOZA  57 

to  find  prominent  the  duality  of  existence  and  its  resultant  psycho- 
logical conceptions,  Spinoza's  teaching  is  fairly  free  from  oppor- 
tunities for  misconstructions  in  terms  of  a  spiritualistic  psychology. 
Other  things  being  equal,  Spinoza  is  in  accord  with  Hobbes.  The  ensu- 
ing quotations  are  as  illuminating  as  any  that  could  be  selected. 
"Finally,  entity  of  the  mind  (ens  rationis}  is  nothing  more  than  a  mode 
of  thinking,  which  renders  easier  the  retaining,  explaining,  and  ima- 
gining of  known  things.  Herewith  is  to  be  noted,  that  by  mode  of 
thinking  we  understand  .  .  .all  affections  of  thought,  such  as 
understanding  (intellectus) ,  joy,  imagination,  etc."22  This  statement 
assigns  understanding  and  emotion  to  the  same  level  as  memory  and 
imagination.  Now  we  find  shortly  after  that  "imagination  is  indeed 
nothing  else  than  to  feel  those  traces  which  appear  in  the  cerebrum 
because  of  the  motion  of  the  spirits  which  are  excited  in  the  senses  by 
objects."  2?  It  is  evident  that  Spinoza  has  in  mind  the  common  notion 
of  animal  spirits,  and  that  this  is  the  leading  idea  in  his  physiological 
psychology.  And  furthermore,  so  far  as  these  statements  go,  under- 
standing is  as  much  a  physiological  process  as  memory,  imagination, 
and  emotion. 

Let  us  recall  at  this  point  Spinoza's  distinction  between  ens  rationis, 
modus  cogitandi,  and  idea.  The  first  is  described  as  a  mode  of  thinking, 
and  we  have  seen  that  joy  and  understanding  are  cited  as  such  modes. 
Now  the  modes  of  thinking  are  not  ideas,  for  only  the  idea  has  an 
ideate  which  necessarily  exists  or  can  exist.  But  Spinoza  asserts 
emphatically  that  the  division  of  being  into  ens  reale  and  ens  rationis 
is  illegitimate  and  a  source  of  error  among  the  "verbal  philosophers." 
The  true  division  is  between  being  whose  essence  necessarily  involves 
existence  and  that  which  involves  existence  only  in  possibility,  but  not 
necessarily.  This  division,  however,  does  not  parallel  the  division 
into  real  entities  and  entities  of  the  mind.  We  can  aojt  say  that  real 
entity  corresponds  to  entity  which  necessarily  exists  and  that  entity 
of  the  mind  corresponds  to  entity  which  may,  but  does  not  necessarily, 
exist.  Let  us,  therefore,  put  aside,  following  Spinoza's  own  injunction, 
the  division  into  ens  reale  and  ens  rationis.  There  remains,  however, 
something  that  Spinoza  thinks  can  correctly  be  termed  ens  rationis — 
what  is  it?  We  learn  that  if  we  mean  by  the  words  the  modes  of  think- 
ing, they  are  real  entities;  but  as  real  entities  they  are  not  ideas,  are 
neither  true  nor  false,  but  can  only  be  called,  like  love,  good  or  bad. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  we  signify  by  the  phrase  something  other  than 
the  modes  of  thinking,  it  is  pure  nothingness.  That  is,  what  we  should 
call  "mental  entity"  is  pure  nothingness;  there  is  no  such  kind  of 
entity  or  existence.  By  "mental  entity"  we  must  mean  either  an  idea, 

22  Cogitata  Metaphysica,  Vol.  4,  Pt.  I,  ch.  i 
»  ibid. 


58  IDEAANDESSENCE 

that  is,  an  essence,  a  pure  logical  function,  or  else  we  must  mean  think- 
ing processes  themselves.  The  first  use  of  these  words  Spinoza  de- 
plores, for  he  specifically  states  that  mental  entities  are  not  ideas. 
But  granting  the  first  usage,  as  idea,  nothing  psychological,  much  less 
anything  spiritual  or  psychical,  is  intended.  In  the  second,  a  usage 
which  Spinoza  seems  inclined  to  admit,  as  thinking  process,  we  have 
something  which  is  a  natural  process  in  existence  and  has  just  been  so 
described. 

But  what  then  is  fictitious  entity?  It  is  not  to  be  confounded  (as 
many  do  confound  it)  with  the  ens  rationis,  asserting  that  it  "has  no 
existence  outside  of  the  mind;"  for  this  assertion  presupposes  precisely 
that  distinction  between  ens  rationis  and  ens  reale  which  has  just  been 
discarded  as  invalid.  Finally,  the  ens  fictum  is  not  a  mode  of  thinking 
like  imagination  or  understanding.  It  is  simply  a  union  of  terms 
(terminus}  effected  in  an  arbitrary  manner  by  the  will  alone  without  any 
reason  for  so  doing.  The  ens  rationis,  on  the  contrary,  depends 
neither  on  the  will,  nor  consists  of  a  uniting  of  different  terms.  Spino- 
za's thought  in  these  difficult  passages24  may  be  summarized  as  fol- 
lows :  modes  of  thinking  such  as  imagination  are  real  entities,  for  they 
are  processes  in  nature;  they  are  not  ideas,  but  as  real  entities  have 
their  corresponding  essences  or  concepts,  their  definitions  and  "scien- 
tific" causal  explanations.  Fictions,  from  the  standpoint  of  knowledge, 
are  unclear  and  indistinct  ideas,  and  are  worthless  cognitively;  but 
as  "psychological"  facts  they  are  arbitrary  combinations  of  the  pre- 
sentations of  imagination  and  sense, — facts,  therefore,  of  nature  and 
human  nature.  Logically  and  cognitively  they  are  not  knowledge 
and  do  not  represent  anything.  As  facts,  with  reference  to  their 
causes,  they  are  products  of  will  and  imagination.  With  reference 
to  knowledge,  the  chimera  differs -from  the  fiction,  for  the  former 
involves  a  manifest  contradiction  and  can  not  possibly  be  true;  the 
latter  is  rather  characterized  by  unclearness  and  indistinctness,  and 
may  be  true.  But  as  psychological  facts,  chimera  and  fictions  are  on 
the  same  basis.  As  we  have  seen,  they  are  brain-processes,  for  ima- 
gination is  the  operation  of  the  animal  spirits  in  the  cerebrum.  The 
true  point  at  issue  in  this  whole  discussion  is,  as  Spinoza  indicates, 
the  confining  of  the  meaning  of  entity  of  the  mind  to  modes  of  thinking, 
and  the  rejection  of  any  other  meaning,  together  with  the  whole 
scheme  of  thought  represented  by  the  division  of  entities  into  real  and  - 
mental. 

Spinoza  then  proceeds  to  carry  out  his  division  of  being.  The 
being  of  essence  (esse  essentiae)  is  being  whose  essence  involves  exis- 
tence; it  is  "nothing  else  than  that  mode  under  which  created  things 
are  comprehended  in  the  attributes  of  God."  Being  of  idea  (esse 

**cf,  Cogitata  Metaphysica,  Vol.  4,  ch.  i,  pp.  189-190. 


SPINOZA  59 

ideae)  is  being  in  so  far  as  everything  is  contained  objectively  (objective) 
in  the  idea  of  God.  Being  of  possibility  (esse  potentiae)  refers  to  the 
power  of  God,  by  which  He  could  create  all  things  not  yet  existing 
from  his  absolute  liberty  of  will.  Being  of  existence  (esse  existentiae) 
is  the  essence  itself  of  things  considered  as  outside  God  and  in  them- 
selves, and  is  apportioned  to  things  after  they  have  been  created  by 
God.25  These  kinds  of  being,  including  the  esse  potentiae,  are  sep- 
arated only  in  things,  but  in  no  wise  in  God.  Now  what  we  have  called 
the  system  of  logical  essences  or  concepts,  the  body  of  truth,  which 
forms  the  thought  attribute  is  evidently  what  Spinoza  intends  by  esse 
ideae.  The  term  "objective"  in  Spinoza  has  a  meaning  almost  the 
inverse  of  what  the  term  now  means.  But  if  we  put  "subjective"  in  its 
place  in  the  definition  of  esse  ideae,  it  must  be  noted  that  esse  ideae 
refers  to  everything  as  contained  in  the  idea  of  God,  not  as  contained 
in,  or  dependent  on,  a  knowing  finite  mind.  The  supplanting  of  one 
term  by  the  other  does  not  make,  and  should  not  be  allowed  to  make, 
the  esse  ideae  a  matter  of  the  knowing  subject,  knowing  consciousness, 
or  psychical  knowing  soul.  The  "subject"  implied  is  the  idea  of  God. 
So  that  esse  ideae  means  everything  in  so  far  as  the  "ideas"  or  concepts 
of  things  depend  upon,  or  are  contained  in,  the  idea  of  God.  The 
esse  essentiae  looked  upon  as  the  body  of  rational  truth  or  knowledge, 
but  aside  from  all  question  as  to  the  particular  knowing  subject,  is  the 
esse  ideae.  Being  of  idea  of  a  thing,  therefore,  stands  for  the  logical 
essence  of  the  thing  taken  in  its  systematic  and  logical  relation  to  the 
idea,  or  thought  essence,  of  God.  The  parallelism  of  the  modes  of 
the  attributes  as  knowledge  or  truth  is  a  parallelism  of  logical  essences 
(esse  ideae)  to  the  system  of  things,  the  existential  series,  that  is,  esse 
existentiae.  Basically  the  distinction  is  one  between  form  (essence) 
and  matter  (existence,  actuality),  as  Spinoza  himself  indicates.26  From 
this  summary  it  appears,  consequently,  that  by  "idea"  Spinoza  has 
no  thought  of  signifying  some  entity  of  a  psychological  nature,  and 
still  less  to  denote  a  psychical  fact  of  any  sort.  The  division  of  being 
is  logical,  not  psychological.  His  explicit  rejection  of  the  notion  of 
mental  entity,  save  in  the  one  sense  of  a  mode  of  thinking  such  as 
understanding  and  imagination,  which  are  natural  phenomena  like 
sunset  or  sunrise,  evinces  his  impatience  with  distinctions  between 
existences  based  on  psychological  considerations. 

Having  examined  the  Cogitata  Metaphysica  with  a  view  to  discover- 
ing grounds  for  credence  in  Spinoza's  putative    inclination  towards 
p.sychophysical  parallelism  or  the  Cartesian  dual  view  of  existence, 
let  us  next  consider  the  Short   Treatise.     A  translator  of  this  work 
nds  in  it  the  "first  formulation  of  the  Law  of  Parallelism  which  plays 

x  cf.  Cogitata  Metaphysica,  Pt.  I,  ch.  2. 

28  Cogitata  Metaphysica,  Vol.  4,  Pt.  i,  ch.  2,  last  paragraph. 


60  IDEA    AND    ESSENCE 

such  a  prominent  part  in  the  psychology  of  to-day."27  If  this  can  be 
substantiated,  doubt  is  thrown  upon  the  thesis  of  this  essay.  On  the 
contrary,  however,  it  is  not  difficult  to  demonstrate  that  this  "discov- 
ery" is  a  good  example  of  the  common  fallacy  in  Spinozistic  exegesis. 
A  brief  survey  of  the  discussion  of  soul  and  body,  idea  and  under- 
standing, given  in  the  treatise  is  sufficient  to  vindicate  this  claim. 

In  its  general  theses,  the  Short  Treatise  is  not  at  variance  with  the 
three  other  works  that  have  been  considered.  Essence  and  existence 
are  its  dominating  concepts.  In  minor  points  there  are  differences. 
Thus  the  distinction  between  entia  rationis  and  entia  realia  is  appa- 
rently accepted.  The  former  seems  to  comprise  elements,  such  as 
images,  not  included  under  the  term  in  what  was  regarded  as  a  pos- 
sible legitimate  use  in  the  Cogitata  Metaphysica.  For  "some  things 
being  in  our  understanding  and  not  in  Nature,  and  so  these  alone 
being  also  only  our  own  work,  they  serve  to  understand  things  dis- 
tinctly; among  them  we  comprehend  all  relations  which  have  refer- 
ence to  several  objects;  and  these  we  call  Entia  Rationis"™  But 
Spinoza  evidently  does  not  mean  by  entia  rationis  anything  incon- 
sistent with  the  psychological  view-point  that  has  been  described. 

Truth  reveals  itself.29  The  highest  type  of  'thought  is  a  rational 
intuitive  comprehension  that  has  no  need  of  discursive  thinking.30 
Understanding  is  a  name  we  give  to  "all  the  ideas  which  every  one  has," 
and  of  which  we  "make  a  whole."  31  By  idea  Spinoza  means  essence. 
He  distinguishes  between  ideas  which  arise  necessarily  from  the  reality 
of  things,  together  with  the  essence  in  God,  and  the  ideas  which  ex- 
hibit to  us  the  things  now  existing  by  their  effects  on  us.  This  dis- 
tinction is  made  in  connection  with  the  statement  that,  "Between  the 
Idea  and  the  object  there  must  necessarily  be  a  union,  since  the  one 
can  not  be  without  the  other;  for  there  is  no  thing  the  idea  of  which 
is  not  in  the  thinking  thing  and  no  idea  can  be  unless  the  thing  also 
exists." 32  This  statement  refers  only  to  the  first  of  the  two  kinds  of 
ideas  enumerated.  The  reason  is  clear,  for  we  can  have  ideas  of  things, 
that  is,  images,  without  the  thing  itself  existing.  Understanding  is 
consequently  a  name  for  the  collection  of  essences — the  whole  of  ideas 
which  every  one  has. 

Now  the  crucial  question  is  this:  are  Spinoza's  remarks  concerning 
body  and  soul  capable  of  being  construed  as  an  expression  of  a  dual- 
istic  view,  in  such  a  sense  that  a  contrast  of  spiritual  and  physical 
aspects  of  existence,  or  a  statement  of  the  Law  of  Parallelism,  is 
implied?  It  must  be  admitted  that  he  constantly  conjoins  the  terms 

27  God,  Man,  and  Human  Welfare,  Open  Court  Publishing  Co.,  1909,  Translator's  note,  p.  120.     .   , 

28  Korte  Verhandeling,  Vol.  4,  p.  35. 

29  ibid,  p.  61. 

30  ibid,  p.  39. 

31  ibid,  p.  19. 

32  ibid,  p.  78,  note. 


SPINOZA  6l 

"body"  and  "soul,"  and  the  terms  indicate  some  sort  of  distinction  or 
difference  of  point  of  view.  The  question  is,  what  sort?  And  does  the 
distinction  amount  to  a  dualism,  or  is  it  largely  a  matter  of  verbal 
convenience? 

What  has  Spinoza  to  say  about  the  soul?  "This  knowledge,  idea, 
etc.,  of  each  particular  thing  which  actually  comes  to  be  is,  we  say, 
the  soul  (ziel)  of  this  particular  thing." 33  But  every  particular  thing 
is  a  certain  proportion  of  motion  and  rest,  we  are  told,  and  these  we 
call  bodies;  the  difference  between  bodies  is  the  difference  between 
their  respective  proportions  of  motion  and  rest.34  "Out  of  these  pro- 
portions of  motion  and  rest  comes  also  actually  to  be  this  body  of  ours ; 
of  which,  then,  not  less  than  of  all  other  things,  knowledge,  an  Idea, 
.etc.,  must  be  in  the  thinking  thing,  and,  therefore,  our  soul  also."35 
The  idea  of  the  body,  of  any  body,  is  the  soul  of  that  body.  Does  the 
statement  imply  anything  more  than  that  every  existing  thing  has  an 
essence  or  idea  which  it  embodies,  or  actualizes,  and  that  what  we 
are  pleased  to  call  "our  soul"  is  simply  the  essence,  knowledge,  or  idea, 
(the  form?),  of  what  we  are  pleased  to  call  "our  body?"  So  far  nothing 
unique  is  attributed  to  "our  body; "  it  is  not  exceptional  in  possessing 
a  soul — everything,  as  Spinoza  says,  has  a  soul.  A  triangle,  for  ex- 
ample, has  a  soul,  namely,  the  concept  or  logical  entity  which  is  its 
truth.  And  furthermore,  the  soul-ideas  of  various  bodies  seem  to 
be  on  the  same  level. 

As  the  body  changes  continually,  so  does  its  idea  or  cognition  in  the 
thinking  thing.36  But  this  can  hardly  be  twisted  into  an  assertion  that 
for  every  bodily  change  there  is  a  corresponding  "mental"  or  "psychical" 
change,  that  there  is  a  parallelism  of  two  different  and  contrasted 
series.  For  that  would  make  nonsense  of  what  has  just  been  written 
by  Spinoza.  Perhaps  Spinoza's  real  meaning  can  be  clarified  by  an 
analogy.  Suppose  we  draw  a  curve,  say  a  parabola;  corresponding 
to  the  moments  of  the  curve  are  the  moments  of  its  equation  as  it  is 
explicated,  but  the  changes  in  the  curve  follow  a  law,  are  within 
'limits.  So  as  the  body  changes,  "ours"  or  any  other,  so  does  its 
"equation,"  its  soul.  But  the  changes  are  within  limits,  for  if  the 
proportion  of  motion  and  rest  passes  certain  bounds,  the  result  is 
death.37  When  we  are  aware  of  the  changes  in  "our  body,"  we  have 
feeling.38 

It  would  require  some  ingenuity  to  read  out  of  these  statements 
real  support  for  the  contention  that  Spinoza  is  writing  about  the  Law 
of  Parallelism.  It  is  not  difficult,  however,  to  see  that  he  is  concerned 

33  ibid,  p.  37,  note  6. 

34  ibid,  p.  37,  notes  7  and  8. 

35  ibid,  p.  37,  note  9. 
38  ibid,  p.  37,  note  10. 

37  ibid,  p.  37,  note  14. 

38  ibid,  p.  37,  note  13. 


62  IDEA    AND    ESSENCE 

with  the  correlation  of  the  logical  essence  or  truth  of  a  thing  with  the 
thing  as  existent.  And  it  must  be  contended  that  this  correlation 
can  not  be  identified  with  the  parallelism  between  spiritual  soul-state 
and  the  physical  body-process. 

Question  may  arise,  however,  concerning  the  thinking  thing  in 
which  the  idea-souls  of  things  are  said  to  be.  Now  the  thinking  'thing 
can  not  be  the  "soul"  ^however  we  may  wish  to  define  it).  For,  first,  all 
existing  things  have  souls;  and  secondly,  the  soul,  since  it  is  the  idea 
of  the  thing,  is  the  very  entity  that  is  said  to  be  in  the  thinking  thing. 
This  thinking  thing  appears  to  be  the  thought  attribute,  and  in  final 
analysis,  God  or  Substance.  No  attribute  is  in  man  which  was  not 
first  to  be  found  in  nature;  as  a  mode  of  the  attributes  of  God,  his 
soul,  or  idea,  or  cognition  (to  use  terms  as  juxtaposed  by  Spinoza)  is 
in  God,  the  thinking  thing,  which  is  to  say,  God  as  essence,  as  truth.39 
All  that  man  possesses  of  thought  are  modes  of  the  thinking  attribute 
ascribed  to  God.40  In  this  lies  the  eternity  of  the  soul. 

So  far  our  citations  have  been  statements,  metaphysical  in  meaning, 
affording  little  latitude  for  psychological  interpretation.  We  can  now 
turn  to  those  statements  which  seem  more  susceptible  to  interpre- 
tations at  variance  with  the  thesis  of  this  essay. 

In  a  note  on  the  Will 41  Spinoza  refers  to  a  union  of  body  and  soul 
such  as  is  commonly  assumed  by  philosophers.  But  he  does  not 
inform  us  what  sort  of  a  union  that  is.  Further,  he  refers  to  it  only 
for  the  sake  of  argument.  Conceivably  this  may  mean  that  he  has 
in  mind  the  Cartesian  type  of  body-soul  union,  but  this,  however,  can 
be  only  a  conjecture,  since  he  himself  says  nothing  more  of  it. 

It  is  in  the  chapter  "Our  Blessedness,"  where  the  problem  of  moral 
control,  freedom  from  the  passions,  and  evil  are  of  primary  interest, 
that  the  statements  occur  which  are  most  susceptible  to  the  "parallel- 
istic"  version.  "The  chief  effect  of  the  other  attribute  (the  thinking 
attribute)  is  an  idea  (Begrip)  of  things  so  that  when  it  (the  thinking 
attribute?)  comes  to  conceive  them,  either  love  or  hate,  etc.,  will  arise 
therefrom.  This  effect,  then,  since  it  does  not  bring  extension  with  it, 
can  not  be  ascribed  to  extension,  but  only  to  the  thinking  (attribute) ; 
so  that  the  cause  of  all  the  changes,  which  arise  in  this  mode,  must  be 
sought,  not  in  extension,  but  only  in  the  thinking  thing."  42  In  the 
translation  of  the  Short  Treatise  referred  to  above,  this  passage  is 
translated  as  follows:  "The  most  important  effect  of  the  other  at- 
tribute (thought)  is  such  a  comprehension  of  things  that  after  the  soul 
conceives  them,  either  love,  hate,  or  some  other  passion  will  arise. 
Since  this  effect  does  not  involve  extension,  it  (the  effect)  can  not  be 

»•  ibid,  p.  79,  note. 
«  ibid,  p.  37. 

41  ibid,  p.  63,  note  2. 

42  ibid,  p.  73. 


SPINOZA  63 

ascribed  to  that  extension,  but  only  to  thought,  so  that  the  cause  of 
all  the  changes  which  occur  in  this  mode  (the  mode  of  thought)  must 
by  no  means  be  sought  in  extension,  but  only  in  the  thinking  thing."  43 
In  a  note  appended  to  this  remark,  the  translator  asserts  that  the 
statement  is  "the  first  formulation  of  the  Law  of  Parallelism  which 
plays  such  a  prominent  part  in  the  psychology  of  to-day."  Before 
commenting  upon  this,  it  is  advisable  to  place  Spinoza's  words  in  their 
context. 

In  the  immediately  preceding  paragraphs,  Spinoza  is  interested  in 
showing  that  in  extension  there  is  nothing  but  motion  and  rest,  and 
that  only  through  motion  and  rest  can  motion  and  rest  be  changed. 
It  follows  that  "no  mode  of  thinking  in  the  body  can  bring  about  either 
motion  or  rest."  **  Then  he  proceeds  to  point  out  that  the  direction 
of  the  motion  of  a  body  may  change,  just  as  I  might  stretch  out  my 
arm,  and  thereby  bring  to  pass  that  the  spirits  (geesten)  which  had 
their  motion  in  one  direction  change  it  to  another  direction,  accord- 
ing to  the  "form  of  the  spirits."  "The  cause  of  this  is  ...  that 
the  soul  (ziel),  being  an  Idea  of  the  body,  is  united  with  the  same  in 
such  a  manner  that  it  and  the  body  taken  together  form  one  whole." 
Now  the  term  geest  Spinoza  uses  in  the  plural.  In  the  translation  just 
referred  to,  the  following  note  is  appended  to  the  term  "spirits"  by 
which  geesten  is  rendered :  "Schaarschmidt  inserts  Lebens  in  parenthe- 
sis, '(Lebens)  Geister',  i.e.,  life-spirits.  It  is  obvious  here  that  Spinoza 
means  by  this  concrete  figure  the  spiritual  aspect  of  existence  which 
in  other  places  he  calls 'thought'  or  'consciousness'"  (p.  119).  The 
reader  is  referred  back  to  this  note  in  the  next  chapter  where  the 
term  is  again  used  in  the  plural.45 

But  is  it  credible  that  these  passages  contain  a  formulation  of  the 
Law  of  Parallelism  or  that  Spinoza  intends  by  "spirits"  the  spiritual 
aspect  of  existence,  or  consciousness?  In  the  first  place,  he  has  just 
denied  that  anything  but  motion  and  rest  can  effect  a  change  in  exten- 
sion. So  if  geesten  means  anything  akin  to  the  psychical,  or  spirit 
in  the  sense  defined  by  the  old  dualism,  that  is,  something  of  a  nature 
opposed  to  extension,  the  later  statement  that  the  spirits  can  change 
the  direction  of  motion  is  in  contradiction  with  the  earlier  statement. 
In  objection  to  this  accusation  of  contradiction,  the  following  defense 
may  be  offered:  it  may  be  said  that  in  the  later  passage  Spinoza 
asserts  merely  that  the  spirits  can  change  the  direction,  but  not  the 
amount,  of  motion,  so  that  there  is  no  contradiction.  But  this  seems 
to  be  a  devious  and  laborious  method  of  avoiding  the  obvious  signifi- 
cation of  the  term  geesten  in  favor  of  ideas  imported  into  Spinoza's 

43  Cod,  Man,  and  Human  Welfare,  p.  120. 
"Vol.  4,  P.  73. 

45  God,  Man,  and  Human  Welfare,  p.  129,  translator's  note.  cf.  Spinoza's  note,  Van  V.  and  L.,  Vol. 
4,  P-  77,  PP.  82-83. 


64  .        IDEAANDESSENCE 

thought.    Schaarschmidt's  emendation  is  obviously  correct.    Here  as 
elsewhere  Spinoza  is   utilizing   the  familiar  conception  of   "animal ... 
spirits." 46     Only  by  a  violent  distortion  can  these  statements  be 
regarded  as  having  anything  to  do  with  parallelism. 

We  have  then  four  terms:  soul,  spirits,  idea  of  the  body  (as  soul  of 
the  body),  and  body.  Now  if  Spinoza  is  not  writing  in  terms  of  the 
parallelism  of  psychical  mode  to  physical  mode,  one  might  fairly  ask, 
what  sort  of  distinction  does  he  draw  between  soul,  spirits,  idea,  and 
body?  The  soul  (ziel)  is  spoken  of  as  changing  the  direction  of  the 
movements  of  the  spirits  (p.  74) ;  and  influence  of  body  on  soul  ^nd 
of  soul  on  body  is  considered  (p.  74).  That  the  soul  and  the  body 
have  no  relation  (community,  gemeenschap)  with  each  other  is  also 
claimed  (p.  78).  All  these  remarks  need  explication. 

Now  in  connection  with  these  statements  and  in  defense  of  our  posi- 
tion a  general  observation  is  apposite;  namely,  that  a  distinction  be- 
tween body  and  soul  does  not  necessarily  mean  a  distinction  of  the  type 
defined  by  a  dualism  of  substances.  We  need  not  assume  that  every 
one  after  Descartes  who  uses  the  terms  "soul"  or  "spirit"  or  "thought" 
has  Descartes's  spiritual  substance  in  mind. 

The  uncertainties  that  attach  to  Spinoza's  discussions  of  the  soul 
in  the  Short  Treatise  originate  in  the  fact  that  the  term  is  employed 
in  several  senses.  The  various  significations  of  the  term  are  not  all 
specifically  defined,  but  they  can  be  discriminated.  First,  by  "soul" 
is  meant  the  essence  or  idea  of  an  existent.  In  this  sense  a  soul  is 
defined  as  the  idea  or  cognition  of  a  body.  Secondly,  "soul"  is  on 
occasion  equivalent  to  thinking  power  or  faculty;  it  is  a  name  denoting 
the  concrete  psychological  fact  that  thinking  goes  on,  a  name  for  an 
activity  of  the  organism;  to  have  a  soul  (in  this  employment  of  the 
word)  is  almost  equivalent  to  the  vernacular  expression,  "to  have 
brains."  Thirdly,  soul  seems  to  stand  for  a  vital  principle  governing^ 
the  functions  of  the  body,  the  source  of  its  energies.  In  the  second 
and  third  senses  the  term  is  applicable  only  to  animate  beings,  perhaps 
only  to  human  beings.  But  in  the  first  meaning  it  applies  to  every 
existent  without  exception. 

Correspondingly  there  are  three  ways  of  drawing  a  distinction 
between  soul  and  body.  First,  soul  and  body  are  distinguished  as 
essence  from  existence,  as  form  from  matter,  as  mode  from  mode,  but 
not  as  substance  from  substance.  In  these  terms,  soul  and  body  may 
be  said  to  have  nothing  in  common,  for  they  are  as  diverse  as  the 
thinking  and  extended  attributes.  The  differentiation  is  metaphysical. 

Secondly,  soul  and  body  are  separated  as  power  or  function  or 
capacity  from  that  which  possesses  this  capacity  or  that  in  which  this 
function  resides.  Soul  in  this  signification  of  the  word,  however,  is  a 

«  cf.  Ethics,  Pt*  2,  prop.  17. 


SPINOZA  65 

going-on  in  existence — it  is  in  the  world  of  extension,  so  to  speak.  This 
differentiation  is  psychological.  The  fact  of  thinking  is,  therefore, 
causally  to  be  explained  in  terms  of  the  physiological  conception  most 
available  at  that  time,  namely,  the  notion  of  "animal  spirits."  To 
state  that  the  soul  directs  the  flow  of  the  animal  spirits  would  no  more 
imply  the  spirituality  of  the  soul  than  the  statement  that  the  brain 
exercises  a  control  over  the  flow  of  nerve-currents  would  imply  the 
spirituality  of  the  brain. 

Thirdly,  a  distinction  between  soul  as  vital  principle  and  the  body 
as  its  instrument.  Soul  is  to  be  thought  of  as  a  sort  of  active  principle 
informing  the  body,  guiding  the  operations  of  the  animal  spirits. 
But  here  soul  is  as  physiological  as  body. 

Now  it  is  the  oscillations  between  these  various  meanings  that  are 
largely  responsible  for  the  apparent  inconsistencies  to  be  found  in 
the  Short  Treatise,  particularly  in  Chapters  19  and  20  of  Part  2. 
Spinoza's  problem  inevitably  requires  such  changes  in  the  employ- 
ment of  the  term.  For  he  is  interested  in  establishing  his  deepest 
conviction  that  clear  and  distinct  ideas,  true  knowledge,  will  enable  / 
us  to  control  the  passions.  He  is  obliged,  consequently,  to  relate  the  . 
soul,  on  the  one  hand,  to  knowledge  of  essence;  while,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  must  be  connected  with  the  organism,  as  an  informing,  con- 
trolling principle  that  can  be  affected  by  the  body  and  can  in  turn 
affect  it.  For  knowledge  is  knowledge  of  essence;  and  passions  are  ( 
bodily  changes.  The  metaphysical  point  of  view  shifts  to  the  psycho- 
logical or  physiological,  and  the  latter  is  forsaken  in  turn  for  the 
metaphysical.  The  transition  is  through  the  fact  of  cognition.  For 
the  passions  are  connected  with  opinion  (p.  71,  note),  and  human 
welfare,  which  signifies  release  from  the  passions,  is  secured  only  by 
the  highest  form  of  knowledge.  Such  knowledge  involves  a  penetra- 
tion by  the  soul  as  cognitive  intuitive  power  of  the  infinite  realm  of 
essence  so  that  man  may  be  identified  with  God,  with  Substance,  with 
completed  reality.  We  must  know  God,  and  then  we  shall  be  united 
with  him.  We  need  not  know  him  completely,  for  a  partial  knowledge 
of  him  will  lead  to  that  union  with  him  which  is  our  blessedness  and 
is  knowledge  of  "the  most  excellent  things."  Spinoza  points  out  that 
we  do  not  know  fully  our  own  body,  yet  we  are  intimately  united  with 
it  and  have  great  love  for  it  (p.  81).  The  real  issue  is  thus  clarified: 
how  are  we  to  attain  to  such  a  knowledge  of  God  as  will  effect,  the 
transfer  of  our  love  for  our  body,  that  is,  for  the  contingent  and  the 
transient,  to  God,  to  the  Universal  and  the  Eternal?  The  union  can 
be  brought  about  only  through  knowledge  of  essence,  and  the  knowl- 
edge of  essence  must  in  some  fashion  exert  a  control  over  the  passions. 
It  is  this  problem  which  necessitates  Spinoza's  shifting  from  the  meta- 
physical and  epistemological  world  of  discourse  to  that  of  psychology 


66  IDEAANDESSENCE 

and  physiology.47  Only  on  some  such  basis  as  this  can  we  appreciate 
that  the  seemingly  glaring  inconsistencies  in  Spinoza's  language  are 
apparent,  not  genuine. 

There  are  certain  conclusions  that  this  discussion  discloses.  The 
chief  is  this :  in  no  case  does  the  differentiation  of  "body"  from  "soul" 
force  upon  us  the  belief  that  Spinoza  intends  to  set  over  against  a 
corporeal,  extended,  material  body  an  incorporeal,  psychical,  or  spiri- 
tual soul.  Soul  does  not  mean  consciousness  as  a  series  of  psychical 
mental  states  or  spiritual  entities  in  opposition  to  a  series  of  physical 
events,  or  the  spiritual,  as  opposed  to  the  physical,  aspect  of  existence. 

As  a  final  corroboration  of  the  thesis,  let  us  turn  to  the  Appendix  of 
the  treatise,  where  Spinoza  seeks  to  "express  the  essence  of  the  soul." 

First  of  all  we  learn  that  the  soul  has  its  origin  in  the  body,  that  its 
changes  depend  alone  upon  the  body,  and  in  this  consists  the  union 
of  body  and  soul  (p.  96).  Further  "in  extension  there  are  no  other 
modifications  than  motion  and  rest  .  .  .  the  human  body  is 
nothing  other  than  a  certain  proportion  of  motion  and  rest.  The 
objective  essence,  then,  of  which  the  real  proportion  is  in  the  thinking 
attribute  is,  we  say,  the  soul  of  the  body;  so  whenever  one  of  these 
two  modifications  changes  to  more  or  less  (motion  or  rest)  so  is  the 
idea  too  changed  in  a  similar  degree"  (p.  99).  "Seeing  that  for  the 
real  existence  of  an  idea  (or  objective  essence)  no  other  thing  is  re- 
quired except  the  thinking  attribute  and  the  object  (or  formal  essence), 
it  is  certain  .  .  .  that  the  idea,  or  objective  essence,  is  the  most 
immediate  modification  of  the  attribute.  In  the  thinking  attribute, 
therefore,  there  can  be  given  no  other  modification  which  can  belong 
to  the  essence  of  the  soul  of  a  similar  (every?)  thing,  than  only  the 
idea  of  such  an  actually  existing  thing,  which  must  necessarily  be  in 
the  thinking  attribute:  for  such  an  idea  brings  with  itself  the  other 
modifications,  Love,  Desire,  etc"  (pp.  96-97).  "If  we  should  go  on 
to  ascribe  to  the  essence  of  the  soul  that  by  means  of  which  alone  it 
can  really  exist,  we  would  be  able  to  find  nothing  other  than  the  attri- 
bute and  the  object  of  which  we  have  just  spoken;  and  neither  of 
these  can  belong  to  the  essence  of  the  soul,  since  the  object  has  nothing 
of  Thinking  and  is  distinguished  actually  from  the  soul  . 
Therefore,  then,  the  essence  of  the  soul  consists  alone  in  this,  namely, 
in  the  being  of  an  Idea  or  objective  essence  in  the  thinking  attribute, 
arising  from  the  essence  of  an  object,  which  indeed  actually  exists  in 
Nature.  I  say  of  an  object  which  actually  exists  without  more  particu- 
larity, in  order  to  comprehend  herein  not  only  the  modifications  of 
extension,  but  also  the  modifications  of  all  the  infinite  attributes, 
which  likewise  have  a  soul,  as  well  as  extension"  (p.  97). 

Certainly  this  account  can  be  regarded  as  dealing  with  spiritual 

«  cf.  ch.  22. 


SPINOZA  67 

existence,  or  aspect  of  existence,  only  by  doing  violence  to  its  spirit 
and  direct  expression.    The  idea  is  represented  as  the  formal  essence, 
a  logical  thought  entity.     Existence  is  confined  to  extension,  or  to       III 
extension  and  attributes  other  than  the  attribute  of  thought.     The     /'/ 
essence  of  the  soul  is  jiist  its  being  an  idea  in  the  thinking  attribute. 
The  idea-object  correlation  is  the  correspondence  of  the  essence  with 
the  existent:   and  this  correlation  is  the  relation  of  soul  and  body,  in 
the  metaphysical  and  epistemological  sense. 

The  end  of  thinking  is  to  bring  forth  "an  infinite  Idea,  which  com- 
prehends objectively  (voorwerpelijk)  in  itself  the  whole  of  Nature,  such 
as  it  actually  is  in  itself"  (p.  96).  The  possession  of  this  infinite  idea 
is  the  highest  estate  of  the  soul — or  rather,  it  is  the  soul  in  its  sub- 
sumption  under  the  attribute  of  thought,  the  soul  as  united  with  God. 
It  is  at  this  point  of  our  discussion  that  we  can  comprehend  Spirioza's 
"thinking  being"  and  its  relation  to  the  soul.  The  thinking  being  in 
nature  is  a  single  thing,  "which  is  expressed  in  infinite  Ideas,  according 
to  the  infinite  things  which  are  in  Nature"  (p.  79).  This  single  thinking 
thing  is  the  attribute  of  thought,  it  is  God  as  thought.  If  we  apply 
to  essence  the  distinction  between  natura  naturans  and  natura  naturata, 
the  essences  present  themselves  in  twofold  guise.  On  the  one  hand, 
God  as  thought  or  essence,  corresponding  to  natura  naturans;  on  the 
other  hand,  the  infinite  number  of  essences,  the  idea-souls  of  the 
infinite  numbers  of  things,  corresponding  to  natura  naturata.  The 
soul  as  essence  is  thus  on  the  one  hand  an  essence  amid  an  infinite 
number  of  essences;  on  the  other,  it  is  in  God,  as  Supreme  Essence. 
The  duty  of  thinking  is  to  attain  such  a  comprehension  of  essences 
that  their  unity  is  envisaged,  that  the  soul  can  know  itself  as  essence 
contained  in  the  infinite  essence.  Since  the  idea  which  is  the  soul  of 
a  thing  "can  find  no  rest  in  the  knowledge  of  the  body  without  passing 
over  to  the  knowledge  of  that  without  which  the  body  and  the  idea 
itself  can  neither  be  nor  be  conceived,  so  the  soul  becomes  imme- 
diately united  £>y  love  to  this  latter"  (p.  82).  Thereby  we  are  united 

in  love  with  the  "incorporeal  subject,"  and  this  is  our  second  birth,    

our  regeneration  (p.  82). 

Finally,  we  are  in  a  position  to  comment  correctly  upon  Spinoza's 
use  of  the  words  "spirit"  (geest  used  in  the  singular),  and  "incorporeal." 
The  corporeal  and  the  incorporeal,  the  flesh  and  the  spirit,  are  con- 
trasted (p.  83).  Is  this,  then,  a  lapse  into  Cartesian  dualistic  modes  of 
thought?  The  answer  is  that  we  are  by  no  means  compelled  to  assume 
this.  These  distinctions  are  primarily  moral,  as  the  context  shows, 
not  metaphysical.  But  the  distinction  between  the  corporeal  and  the 
incorporeal  might  be  drawn  by  Spinoza  as  a  metaphysical  distinction 
without  involving  the  dualistic  view  so  often  imputed  to  him.  For  the 
essences  are  incorporeal,  like  the  medieval  forms.  The  incorporeal 


68  IDEAANDESSENCE 

subject  is  God  as  Essence  or  Truth.  This  means  the  ideality  of 
essence  and  of  God  as  Essence.  To  become  attached  to  incorporeal 
things  signifies  that  we  apprehend  and  are  in  union  with  the  per- 
durable essences  and  truths  of  things  and  are  free  from  the  trammels 
of  the  contingent  and  transient.  The  spiritual  being  of  the  soul  for 
Spinoza  means  that  the  soul  is  in  union  with  God,  with  the  infinite 
and  eternal,  that  it  has  attained  the  clearest  vision  of  rational  insight. 
It  is  the  soul  sub  quadam  specie  aeternitatis.  What  man  has  of  thought, 
that  is  what  we  are  to  denote  by  "soul."  In  the  sphere  in  which 
Spinoza's  mind  is  moving,  the  familiar  dualisms  between  body  and 
soul,  spirit  and  matter,  the  psychical  and  the  physical,  conscious  state 
and  physiological  process,  the  world  of  spiritual  existence  and  the 
world  of  material  existence,  have  no  place,  no  relevancy.  To  interpret 
his  doctrine  on  a  basis  of  such  dual  conceptions  obscures  the  genuine 
difficulties  of  his  system  beneath  a  cloud  of  problems  alien  to  the  world 
of  his  thought,  and,  therefore,  in  reference  to  his  doctrine,  extrinsic 
and  artificial. 

There  is,  however,  one  other  point  that  might  be  appealed  to  in 
defense  of  the  position  that  has  been  the  object  of  attack.  It  is  this: 
Spinoza  repudiates  the  notion  that  mind  sets  body  in  motion  and 
asserts  that  such  statements  are  merely  verbal  and  empty  of  meaning.48 
Now  this  may  be  by  some  called  a  repudiation  of  interactionism  and, 
therefore,  a  tacit  admission  of  the  theory  of  the  dual  character  of 
^existence.  From  this,  then,  might  be  derived  some  indirect  justifica- 
tion for  the  "parallelistic"  interpretation  of  Spinoza.  But  this  need 
not  give  us  pause.  For  to  Spinoza,  construed  as  we  have  understood 
him,  interaction  of  mind  and  body  would  not  merely  be  as  impossible 
as  it  would  be  were  he  the  most  stubborn  of  modern  parallelists,  but 
more,  it  would  be  senseless.  Mind,  as  the  thought  attribute,  or  series 
of  logical  essences,  or  truth,  could  in  no  sense  be  looked  upon  as  inter- 
acting with  body;  for  it  is  impossible  to  understand  how  anything 
but  an  existent  could  interact  with  an  existent.  One  might  as  well 
talk  of  the  concept  of  a  triangle  interacting  with  the  triangle  drawn 
upon  the  blackboard.  Besides,  a  denial  that  mind  influences  body 
cuts  two  ways:  it  may  just  as  well  depend  on  a  disbelief  in  a  sub- 
stantial spiritual  principle  and  an  adherence  to  a  psychology  like  that 
of  Hobbes  as  on  an  advocacy  of  a  two-substance  theory.  Spinoza's 
statement  might  legitimately,  perhaps,  be  held  as  a  rejection  of  Des- 
cartes's  position  that  the  mind  could  direct  the  flow  of  the  animal 
spirits;  and  yet  the  rejection  might  be  regarded  as  resulting  from  a 
negation  of  the  doctrine  of  the  dualism  of  existence  rather  than  follow- 
ing from  an  acceptance  of  that  doctrine. 

It  is  worth  pointing  out  that  in  the  Short  Treatise,  as  has  been  shown, 

«  cf.  Ethics,  Pt.  3,  P-  2,  and  note. 


SPINOZA  69 

Spinoza  does  speak  of  the  soul  as  changing  the  direction  of  the  animal 
spirits.  Is  this  then  in  contradiction  with  the  statement  from  the 
Ethics?  It  need  not  be  so  taken.  In  the  former  work  the  term  "soul" 
(ziel)  is  favored,  if  not  exclusively  used,  in  discussions  of  the  influence 
of  the  soul  on  the  body  and  of  body  on  the  soul.  In  the  section  of  the 
Ethics  just  referred  to,  the  term  used  is  "mind"  (mens).  Now  we  have 
observed  that  "soul"  is  employed  in  more  than  one  sense  in  the  treatise. 
In  one  acceptation,  it  stands  for  idea  or  cognition ;  and  in  this  sense  it  is 
what  Spinoza  elsewhere  calls  "mind."  It  was  observed,  further,  that 
in  other  employments  of  the  term  there  was  no  difficulty  in  under- 
standing that  the  soul  could  direct  the  spirits.  The  soul  as  an  activity 
of  the  organism,  or  as  the  vital  principle,  could  be  conceived  as  oper- 
ating in  this  fashion  without  encountering  any  of  the  dualistic  stum- 
bling-blocks. There  is,  then,  no  necessity  for  taking  the  two  works 
as  contradictory.  When  the  term  is  used  in  what  was  called  the  meta- 
physical and  epistemological  significations,  which  usage  renders  it 
equivalent  to  mind  as  the  essences  or  thought  attribute,  we  are  outside 
the  sphere  of  psychological  and  physiological  considerations.  In  this 
case  it  is  nonsense  to  ask  whether  the  mind  or  soul  sets  body  in  motion. 
In  the  Ethics,  in  the  section  referred  to,  we  are  in  the  metaphysical  and 
cognitive  sphere,  and  the  statement  is  compatible  with  the  point  of 
view  of  the  Treatise. 

On  the  customary  basis  of  interpretation,  Spinoza's  statements  - 
that  the  soul  of  a  thing  is  the  idea  of  a  thing,  that  soul  is  the  idea  of 
body,  and  that  the  idea  of  body  is  mind,  are  highly  confusing.  But 
these  expressions  are  in  accord  with  the  interpretation  presented  in 
this  essay — in  fact,  they  are  just  the  sort  of  expressions  that  would 
naturally  follow  from  his  general  position  and  terminological  usages. 

We  may  conclude  that  Spinoza's  psychology  is  in  general  like  that  of 
Hobbes,  and  that  his  treatment  of  the  psychological  problems  involved 
in  the  notions  of  body,  soul,  image,  emotion,  and  idea  is  not  guided  by 
influences  supposed  to  emanate  from  the  Cartesian  dualism  of  sub- 
stance. The  distinction  between  image  and  idea  is  not  a  distinction 
that  obtains  within  the  psychological  field,  nor  is  it  Cartesian.  The 
latter  is  a  distinction  in  existence;  the  Spinozistic  is  not  even  compar- 
able thereto.  Indeed,  it  might  conduce  to  clearness  not  to  speak  of 
such  a  distinction  at  all.  The  real  point  is  that  ideas,  images,  sensa- 
tions, perceptions,  emotions,  as  psychological  phenomena,  are  on  the 
same  footing,  and  fall  within  the  same  field;  they  are  names  for 
various  activities  of  the  human  being,  explicable  by  physiological 
principles.  The  preferred  term  for  mental  process  seems  to  be  image,  ill 
But  from  the  point  of  view  of  knowledge,  the  mental  process  (the 
term  now  referring  to  meaning  and  value)  is  an  idea,  a  conception. 
In  psychological  treatment,  the  nature,  origin,  and  conditions  of  the 


7O  IDEAANDESSENCE 


•'activity  of  thinking  are  in  question:    in  connection  with  knowledge, 
it  is  the  logical  structure  and  implications  of  thought  that  are  up  for 


, 


elucidation.  Body  and  soul  are  distinguished  in  more  than  one  way, 
but  the  distinctions  can  not  be  equated  with  the  Cartesian  distinction 
and  show  little  or  no  sign  that  the  Cartesian  doctrine  represents  their 
source.  And,  finally,  the  thesis  that  Spinoza's  parallelism  of  ideas  and 
v  things  is  a  correspondence  of  logical  entities  and  actually  existing 
things,  and  not  a  parallelism  of  mental  or  spiritual  entities  or  con- 
scious states  with  physical  changes,  seems  to  have  been  substantiated. 


V 

In  the  light  of  the  preceding  discussion,  it  may  be  illuminating  to 
examine  the  features  of  Spinoza's  system  when  the  assumption  is 
made  that  his  work  rests  upon  and  expresses  the  conception  of  psycho- 
physical  parallelism,  with  its  allied  conception  of  psychoneural 
parallelism.  In  a  negative  way  further  support  for  the  thesis  of  this 
essay  may  be  obtained.  Let  us,  therefore,  assume  that  Spinoza  was 
a  psychophysical  parallelist,  and  that  the  attribute  of  thought  denotes 
psychical  or  spiritual  existence,  and  that  the  idea  is  a  psychical  entity. 
With  this  as  the  guiding'  conception,  let  us  observe  what  difficulties 
and  inconsistencies  arise.  That  is,  we  shall  take  the  position  that  the 
Cartesian  doctrine  of  the  duality  of  body  and  mind,  and  of  substances 
in  general,  is  the  basis  of  Spinoza's  work,  assuming  that  as  a  logical 
consequence  the  latter  is  led  to  the  "first  formulation  of  the  Law  of 
Psychophysical  Parallelism."  It  may  then  be  possible  to  estimate  the 
legitimacy  of  these  assumptions  by  the  degree  of  consistency  and 
harmony  within  the  body  of  Spinozistic  teaching  obtained  by  this 
method. 

The  transformation  of  Spinoza  into  the  great  exponent  of  psycho- 
physical  parallelism  is  a  trick  of  many  commentators  because  their  ac- 
counts involve  the  assumption  of  the  essential  continuity  of  Cartesian  ' 
and  Spinozistic  doctrines.  Toennies  l  affords  an  illustration.  Follow- 
ing the  remarks  already  cited,  he  goes  on  to  say  that  "Der  Gedanke, 
welcher  dort 2  und  in  folgenden  Saetzen  ausgefuehrt  wird,  laesst  sich 
auf  eine  einfache  Weise  so  wiedergeben:  Jeder  Partikel  physischen 
(materiellen,  koerperlichen)  Daseins  entspricht  einem  Partikel  psychi- 
schen  (immateriellen,  geistigen)  Daseins,  welcher  in  Wirklichkeit  (oder 
in  Gott)  mit  ihr  identisch,  oder,  was  wiederum  dasselbe  sagt,  das  Be- 
wusstsein  von  ihr  ist.  Wenn  wir  ein  System  von  physischen  Partikeln 
einen  Koerper  nennen  und  das  entsprechende  System  von  psychischen 
Partikeln  einen  Geist,  so  gehoert  dieser  Geist  zu  diesem  Koerper,  ist 

1  Op.  cit.t  pp.  159-160. 
1  Pt.  2,  prop.  n. 


SPINOZA  71 

seine  Idee  oder  sein  Bewusstsein."3  Now  we  are  contending  that  this 
misrepresents  Spinoza's  fundamental  meaning.  In  order  to  clear  up 
the  matter,  let  us  pursue  the  interpretation  on  a  basis  similar  to  this  of 
Toennies.  We  shall  then  find  perplexities  whose  artificiality  suggests 
their  origin  in  misinterpretation,  and  the  irrelevance  of  that  doctrine. 

Construed  in  these  terms,  Spinoza's  analysis  of  the  psychological 
fact  possesses  the  following  features,  reading  from  within  outwards: 
(i)  the  conscious  mental  psychical  state;  (2)  the  physiological  process 
correlated  therewith;  (3)  the  stimulating  extra-organic  object  (the 
metaphysical  mode  of  the  attribute  of  extension).  There  is  a  one  to 
one  correlation  of  the  mental  order  with  the  physical  order.  Now  we 
may  inquire:  Is  the  image  a  psychical  fact  and,  theref ore ,f  spiritual? 
If  this  be  the  case,  how  are  we  to  account  for  the  physiological  explana- 
tion of  the  image?  Do  we  find  the  image  to  be  a  hybrid  thing,  a 
composite  of  utterly  dissimilar  elements?  Our  scheme  is  incomplete 
if  this  interpretation  of  Spinoza's  words  is  to  be  conscientiously  fol- 
lowed out,  for  there  must  be  a  doubling  of  the  psychical  series.  Since 
we  have  now  made  the  distinction  between  idea  and  image  a  psycho- 
logical one,  the  characteristic  phrase,  "ideas  of  images,"  must  be 
given  a  place  in  the  scheme.  Therefore,  we  must  find  room  in  the 
psychical  order  for,  (i)  ideas,  (2)  image-parallels;  and  in  the  physical 
order  for  (i)  physiological  correlates  of  ideas  and  images,  the  differ- 
ence between  them  being  undetermined,  and  (2)  external  sources  of 
stimulation.  Or,  finally,  leaving  the  image  as  purely  physiological, 
we  have  a  correlation  of  three  things — idea,  physiological  image,  and 
external  object.  In  the  one  case  there  is  fourfold  correspondence,  in 
the  other  threefold. 

Now  if  it  is  pointed  out  that  such  a  situation  is  obviously  artificial, 
the  retort  is  that  this  is  precisely  what  is  to  be  indicated.  It, is  clear 
that  the  more  we  insist  upon  foisting  upon  Spinoza  the  notion  of 
existence  as  dual,  and  the  incommensurability  of  the  two  orders  of 
existence,  the  less  simple  becomes  the  status  of  the  image.  Peculiari- 
ties in  the  language  of  Spinoza  heap  new  difficulties  upon  those  en- 
countered by  Descartes. 

If  there  be  any  need  to  illustrate  further  the  puzzles  that  follow  such 
a  course  of  procedure,  one  might  inquire  what  is  to  be  done  with 
Spinoza's  ""idea  ideae"  and  similar  expressions.  Without  adding  more, 
we  may  conclude  that  the  strict  application  of  the  two  realms  of 
existence  theory  forces  into  consideration  difficulties  that  are  sus- 
piciously artificial.  It  is  impossible  to  believe  that  they  are  legitimate 
or  represent  Spinoza. 

One  more  point  remains  to  be  considered.  If  Spinoza  be  taken  as  a 
thorough  psychophysical  parallelist,  the  parallelism  of  the  modes 

1  cf.  p.  170,  and  second  article,  p.  335. 


72  IDEAANDESSENCE 

tends  to  collapse  through  the  elision  of  the  order  of  extension,  as  has 
been  noted  by  more  than  one  commentator.  For  if  the  idea  is  a  psy- 
chical spiritual  entity,  the  order  of  extension — the  material  world- 
can  exist  for  the  knowing  mind  only  as  a  set  of  spirit  entities  called 
ideas-of-extension.  The  incommensurability  of  thought  and  extension, 
their  coordination  without  interdependence,  encloses  knowledge  in  the 
sphere  of  ideas  and  certifies  that  all  that  is  knowable  is  the  mental 
psychical  order.  If  the  element  of  thought  be  totally  unlike  the  unit 
in  the  world  of  extension,  the  correspondence  of  the  one  with  the 
other  can  not  be  given  as  a  fact  of  experience.  For  experience  is, 
according  to  these  principles,  psychical  or  mental  experience,  and  in 
order  to  experience  extension,  extension  must  be  mental,  and,  there- 
fore, must  be  spiritualized.  Which  amounts  to  saying  that  in  order 
for  extension  to  be  a  factor  of  experience,  it  must  assume  the  form  of 
non-extended  extension,  for  it  must  be  psychical  and  spiritual.  And 
this  is  to  land  in  utter  contradiction.  It  literally  amounts  to  the 
assertion  that  the  mind  can  not  know  or  experience  extension  without 
imperiling  the  existence  of  that  extension.  The  frequent  averring  by 
commentators  that,  in  the  last  analysis,  Spinoza's  doctrine  requires 
only  thought  to  exist  is  an  inescapable  conclusion,  if  our  philosopher 
was  couching  his  thought  in  psychophysical  terms.  The  field  of  the 
physical  is  excluded  from  the  field  of  actual  experience  and  knowledge 
since  that  experience  and  knowledge  are  and  can  be  only  spiritual, 
and  the  existences  experienced  and  known  only  psychical.  Accord- 
ingly, to  be,  and  to  be  conceived,  to  be  actual  and  to  be  experienced, 
and,  finally,  to  be  in  the  mind  or  soul,  are  only  different  ways  of  saying 
to  be  in  consciousness  or  to  be  psychical.  For  being,  conception, 
actuality,  experience,  if  they  are  to  mean  anything,  must  stand  for 
differentiations  in  the  series  of  psychical  states. 

Had  this  subjectivistic  construction  of  his  thought  been  the  final 
goal  of  Spinoza's  philosophy,  we  might  properly  expect  him  to  give 
some  explicit  recognition  of  the  fact.  Or  at  least  we  might  look  for 
him  to  take  some  notice  of  the  resultant  difficulties  and  to  have  en- 
deavored to  meet  them.  But  it  seems  that  Spinoza  had  no  inkling 
of  such  a  subjectivistic  cul-de-sac.  More  than  once  the  difficulty  has 
been  recognized  and  slurred  over  by  recourse  to  the  assumed  peculiar 
fact  of  the  copy-character  of  ideas  of  primary  qualities  as  contrasted 
with  the  lack  of  such  imitative  representative  character  in  ideas  of 
secondary  qualities.  There  seems  to  be  no  sign  of  Spinoza's  awareness 
of  such  a  difficulty  and  of  the  availability  of  the  distinction  between 
kinds  of  qualities  as  a  mode  of  outlet  from  his  blind  alley.  It  is  an 
easy  step  to  pass  from  Spinoza,  the  psychophysical  parallelist,  to  the 
interpretation  of  certain  passages  as  standing  for  a  Lockian  repre- 
sentative theory  of  ideas.  But  the  representative  function  of  ideas 


SPINOZA  73 

in  Spinoza  is  very  unlike  what  that  function  is  generally  taken  to 
mean.  Ideas  for  Spinoza  represent  things  somewhat  as  the  equation 
of  a  curve  stands  for  the  curve,  or  the  law  of  gravitation  for  the 
behavior  of  falling  bodies.  The  correct  understanding  of  Spinoza's 
position  simply  leaves  as  irrelevant  questions  the  relation  of  body  and 
soul,  of  representative  idea  and  thing  represented,  and  allied  issues. 
The  vexatious  question  of  the  status  of  the  image,  for  example,  is 
left  to  one  side.  These  problems,  in  so  far  as  they  exist  in  Spinoza 
at  all,  and  in  so  far  as  the  ordinary  formulations  of  them  do  not  embody 
a  misinterpretation,  form  a  part  of  the  general  problem  of  the  relation 
of  the  attributes  to  substance,  and  arise  according  to  any  account 
whatever  of  his  doctrine.  In  so  far  as  they  depend  upon  the  duality 
of  existence,  they  are  totally  irrelevant. 

The  thesis  that  is  being  maintained  receives  indirect,  but  substantial, 
support  from  a  study  of  Spinoza's  statements  concerning  the  attribute 
of  thought  and  the  question  of  the  relation  of  the  attributes  of 
thought  and  extension  to  substance.  The  latter  question  is  the 
central,  and  most  vexatious,  problem  of  his  metaphysics.  It  will 
appear  in  the  sequel  that  the  interpretation  that  has  been  advanced 
does  not  add  new  complications  to  the  problem;  on  the  other  hand, 
while  it  does  not  free  the  issue  of  all  its  perplexities,  it  at  least 
clarifies  it. 

We  may  approach  the  problem  through  the  attribute  of  thought. 
The  point  involved  may  be  expressed  as  follows :  Do  Spinoza's  declara- 
tions concerning  the  attribute  of  thought  indicate  that  he  regarded 
it  as  a  stream  of  mental  and  psychical  existents,  or  as  the  system  of 
logical  essences,  truths  or  definitions? 

The  infinite  attribute  of  thought  is  "one  of  the  infinite  attributes  of 
God,  which  express  God's  eternal  and  infinite  essence."4  Now  this 
attribute  is  eternal,  for  every  attribute  "expresses  the  reality  or  being 
of  substance."  5  And  every  attribute  must  express  the  necessity,  the 
eternity,  and  the  infinity  of  substance.  The  infinite  modes  of  thought 
consist  of  ideas.  It  follows  that  these  ideas  must  be  eternal.6  It  is 
this  eternity,  necessity,  and  infinity  of  the  attributes  that  is  asserted 
in  the  dictum  concerning  the  order  and  connection  of  ideas,  and  gives 
the  idea  of  substance  its  rank  as  the  logical,  and  substance  as  the  causal 
fountain-head  of  the  infinite  mode  of  thought  and  extension.  "What- 
soever follows  from  the  infinite  nature  of  God,formaliter,  follows  with- 
out exception  in  the  same  order  and  connection  from  the  idea  of  God 
in  God  objectively  (objective)."7  Shortly  after  occur?  the  following 
illustration:  "The  nature  of  a  circle  is  such  that  if  any  number  of 
straight  lines  intersect  within  it,  the  rectangles  formed  by  their  seg- 

«  Ethics,  Pt.  2,  prop.  i. 

5  ibid,  Pt.  i,  prop.  10,  note. 

6  ibid.  Props,  n,  21. 

1  ibid,  Pt.  2,  prop.  7,  corol. 


74  IDEAANDESSENCE 

ments  will  be  equal  to  one  another;  thus,  infinite  equal  rectangles  are 
contained  in  a  circle.  Yet  none  of  these  rectangles  can  be  said  to 
exist,  except  in  so  far  as  the  circle  exists;  nor  can  the  idea  of  any  of 
these  rectangles  be  said  to  exist,  except  in  so  far  as  they  are  compre- 
hended in  the  idea  of  the  circle."  8  There  is,  then,  implicit  in  the  idea 
(of  God  or  substance  all  the  ideas  that  constitute  the  modes  of  thought, 
as  the  ideas  of  the  infinity  of  possible  rectangles  are  comprehended  in 
the  idea  of  the  circle.  Furthermore,  the  idea  of  the  circle  is  said  to 
be  "in  God."  Now  everything,  which  is,  follows  necessarily  from  God; 
the  processions  of  things  and  ideas  from  God  are  the  explication  of 
God's  existence  and  essence  through  the  attributes.  And,  finally,  we 
find  that  "In  God  there  is  necessarily  the  idea  not  only  of  his  essence, 
but  also  of  all  things  which  necessarily  follow  from  his  essence."  We 
can  not  but  conclude  that  these  ideas  which  follow  from  the  idea  of 
God,  which  form  the  attribute  that  expresses  the  necessity,  infinity, 
and  eternity  of  substance  or  God,  and  which  are  in  God,  must  be 
eternal,  must  be  truths.  It  is  impossible  to  understand  how  these 
ideas,  occupying  such  a  station  and  possessing  such  significations 
•  can  be  identical  with  a  stream  of  particular  psychical  or  spiritual 
entities,  varying  from  individual  to  individual,  and  having  the  ephem- 
eral and  adventitious  character  of  the  individual's  experience.  Nor 
can  we  arbitrarily  select  from  the  totality  of  putative  psychical  pro- 
cesses only  the  so-called  "concepts,"  and  hold  that  Spinoza's  words 
apply  to  these  alone,  for  emotions,  affections,  and  the  rest,  have  also 
their  ideas  and  are  thereby  "represented  in  the  attribute  of  thought." 
The  stream  of  the  individual's  experiences — ideas,  memories,  illu- 
sions, pleasures,  pains,  sensations,  and  the  like — whether  we  regard 
them  as  psychical  or  not,  can  not  be  equated  with  the  series  of  ideas 
which  express  the  essence  of  God,  which  are  in  God,  and  which  follow 
from  the  idea  of  God,  "objectively"  and  "subjectively." 

Furthermore,  it  may  be  observed,  if  by  ideas  Spinoza  means  psychical 
states,  that  is,  if  the  thought  attribute  be  psychical  existence,  then  the 
ideas  are  existences.  They  must,  therefore,  possess  the  particularity 
and  mutability  of  the  concrete  events  of  experience  and  of  physical 
events  or  things.  But  then  they  can  not  be  eternal.  For  the  concrete 
event  or  thing  as  such  is  not  eternal;  it  is  eternal  only  in  so  far  as  it 
is  an  occurrence  in  the  eternal,  necessitated  system  of  nature  and,  as 
a  mode  of  the  extension  attribute,  in  so  far  forth  expresses  the  essence 
of  substance.  Thus  a  given  motion,  say  of  my  pencil,  is  not  eternal, 
although  the  concept  or  idea  of  motion  is.  As  essence  it  is  eternal,  as 
event  it  is  not.  But  the  ideas  are  said  to  be  eternal.  These  ideas, 
moreover,  omitting  all  question  of  their  imputed  psychical  nature,  are 
not  numerically  the  equivalents  and  correlates  of  the  "particular  and 

8  ibid,  prop.  8,  note. 


SPINOZA  75 

mutable"  things;  they  are  the  truths,  the  laws,  the  definitions,  the 
formulae  of  these  things.  The  concept  of  a  circle  is  the  idea  of  any 
circle  whatever;  the  number  of  possible  actual  circles  is  infinite,  but 
their  idea-correlate  is  one.  And  as  a  logical  entity,  it  is  one  and  the 
same  for  all  minds. 

If  the  thought  attribute  means  the  organized  system  of  logical 
essences  or  definitions,  it  forms  the  body  of  truths,  and  as  such  is 
naturally  eternal,  necessary,  and  infinite.  The  eternity  and  necessity 
of  the  idea  mean  something  quite  similar  to  our  meaning  when  assert- 
ing that  mathematical  principles  are  eternal  truths,  or  that  the  laws 
of  science  are  ultimate.  And  as  a  given  mathematical  principle  or 
scientific  law  corresponds  to  or  is  the  explanation  of  an  indefinite  num- 
ber of  specific  cases  or  events,  so  Spinoza's  ideas  of  things  are  related 
to  things.  This  account,  although  it  may  leave  some  problems  un- 
solved, at  least  represents  Spinoza  as  consistent,  and  spares  him  the 
appearance  of  being  oblivious  to  the  obvious  difficulties  that  are  occa- 
sioned by  the  rejected  construction. 

In  what  light  does  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  attributes  and 
substance  now  appear?  What  solution  to  that  problem  is  suggested 
by  this  interpretation?  If  the  account  that  has  been  given  is  truly 
representative  of  Spinoza's  doctrine,  then  an  answer  to  the  question 
based  upon  this  account  should  promise  a  closer  approximation  to  the 
philosopher's  solution  as  he  conceived  it. 

G.od  is  defined  as  a  "being  absolutely  infinite,  that  is,  a  substance 
consisting  in  infinite  attributes,  of  which  each  expresses  the  eternal 
and  infinite  essence."  9  The  essence  of  substance  necessarily  involves 
existence,10  or  "the  existence  of  substance,  just  as  its  essence,  is  an 
eternal  truth."  u 

The  equation,  God  =  Substance  =  Essence,  is  the  simplest  way 
in  which  the  notion  of  God  can  be  expressed.  For  "the  existence  of 
God  and  his  essence  are  one  and  the  same,"  and  "the  same  attributes  of 
God  which  explain  the  eternal  essence  of  God,  explain  at  the  same 
time  his  eternal  existence,  that  is  to  say,  that  itself,  which  constitutes 
God's  essence,  constitutes  at  the  same  time  his  existence."  12  In  God, 
then,  essence  and  existence  reciprocally  and  necessarily  involve  each 
other.  But  with  respect  to  finite  things,  or  modes,  this  does  not 
obtain,  for  the  "essence  of  things  produced  by  God  does  not  involve 
existence."  13  In  saying  that  God  is  substance,  we  are  saying  that  he 
is  infinite  essence  and  necessary  existence,  while  modes  of  thought,  or 
essences,  do  not  necessarily  involve  existence. 

»  Ethics,  Pt.  i.def.  6. 

10  ibid,  prop.  7. 

11  ibid,  prop.  8,  note  2. 
u  ibid,  prop.  20. 

13  ibid,  prop.  20. 


V 


76  IDEAANDESSENCE 

This  difficulty  now  confronts  the  inquirer:  On  the  one  hand,  the 
modes  of  the  attributes  are  not  absolutely  the  same  as  God  or  sub- 
stance, but  are  different  therefrom  in  some  way;  on  the  other  hand, 
since  the  attributes  express  or  explicate  substance,  they  must  in 
some  sense  constitute  substance,  and  be  one  and  the  same  with  it. 
How  is  this  apparent  contradiction  to  be  solved? 

The  answer  seems  to  be  of  this  nature:  God  or  substance  can  be 
understood  in  two  (complementary)  ways.  First,  as  substance  or 
essence  simply,  without  accidents;  this  is  substance  or  essence,  appre- 
hended sub  quadam  specie  aeternitatis ;  it  is  substance  as  the  fountain- 
head,  the  totality  and  unity,  of  all  forms  or  essences,  that  do  or  can 
exist;  and  as  this  coherent  totality  it  necessarily  exists.  Thus  we 
contemplate  substance  in  its  infinity,  eternity,  necessity,  potency, 
and  unchangeableness.  But,  secondly,  substance  can  be  conceived 
and  apprehended  in  its  explicated  form.  The  attributes  represent, 
express,  and  constitute  substance  considered  as  explicated,  unfolded, 
and  displayed.  This  unfolding  is  to  be  conceived,  not  as  an  evolution 
or  natural  history,  but  as  the  logical  explication  and  exhibition  of 
substance.  With  respect  to  God  as  essence,  this  manifestation  is  a 
logical,  timeless  procession  analogous  to  the  explication  of  the  concept 
of  a  circle  by  the  deduction  of  its  manifold  properties,  aspects,  and 
implications.  It  is  the  "actual  being  of  the  idea."  And  just  as  the 
deductions  from  the  concept  of  the  circle  can  be  regarded  as  contained 
within  the  concept  of  the  circle,  so  the  logical  procession  of  essences 
j'can  be  looked  upon  as  comprised  within  God  as  essence.  This  would 
.be  the  first  point  of  view,  essence  without  accidents,  or  essence  as 
unexplicated.  With  respect  to  God  as  essence  that  necessarily  exists, 
that  is,  God  as  existence,  the  series  of  events,  or  causes,  the  concrete 
embodiments  of  essences  in  existence,  which  compose  the  attribute  of 
extension,  is  the  explication  of  that  existence  in  actuality.  It  is  natura 
naturata. 

The  first  method  of  contemplating  substance  reveals  substance  as 
source  and  dynamic  center.  The  second  discloses  substance  as  result 
and  effect.  For  Spinoza,  these  are  complementary,  for  substance,  or 
reality,  is  both  at  once. 

This  appears  to  be  the  most  consistent  construction  that  can  be 
placed  upon  Spinoza's  statements.  A  similar  consistency  obviously 
can  not  be  attained  if  the  thought  attribute  is  taken  as  a  stream  -of 
psychical,  spiritual,  immaterial  existents.  And  reciprocally,  the 
consistency  of  doctrine  put  upon  this  basis  strongly  suggests  the 
validity  of  the  construction  essayed,  and  the  falsifying  character  of 
the  account  based  upon  what  may  summarily  be  called  psychophysical 
parallelism. 

And,  finally,  with  regard  to  the  strife  between  those  who  uphold  the 


SPINOZA  77 

"formalistic"  interpretation  (taking  the  attributes  as  mere  modes  of 
intellectual  apprehension)  and  those  who  maintain  the  view  that  the 
attributes  are  real  properties  of  substance,  the  results  of  this  study 
would  favor  in  the  main  the  second  opinion.14  God  possesses  an  infi- 
nite number  of  attributes,  of  which  thought  and  extension  are  two. 
The  system  of  essences,  which  forms  the  thought  .attribute*  is  a  real 
property;  it  is  God  as  thinking  being.  As  comprehended  by  us,  as 
subjective  essences  (essentia  objective,)  contemplated  by  the  under- 
standing, the  system  of  ideas  is  knowledge  of  God  as  thinking  and  as 
extended  being.  Whether  our  knowledge  reaches  any  further,  to  any 
other  attributes  of  God,  would  seem  to  be  doubtful.  The  knowledge 
of  God  as  extended  being  involves  knowledge  of  existence,  of  the 
world  of  nature.  Mind,  in  a  very  real  sense,  is  just  this  system  of 
concepts.  The  question  of  whether  thought  is  objectively  valid,  of 
how  it  is  possible  for  understanding  to  grasp  the  essences,  and  similar 
questions,  are  foreign  to  Spinoza's  universe  of  discourse.  They  are 
unwarranted  intrusions  that  follow  in  the  wake  of  misapprehensions 
and  misinterpretations  that  arise  when  alien  ideas  are  imagined  to  be 
the  dominating  elements  of  his  doctrine.  That  understanding  is 
endowed  with  powers  commensurable  with  the  greatness  of  its  ap- 
pointed task  is  a  conviction  that  for  Spinoza  does  not  stand  in  need 
of  elaborate  justification.  For  the  fruits  of  reason  demonstrate  its 
competency  and  dominion.  The  whole  of  method  is  but  the  liberation 
of  understanding  and  resolute  faith  in  its  pronouncements.  The  pro- 
vince of  thought  need  not  be  demarcated  nor  its  objective  validity 
proved;  for  after  all,  the  equation  of  "to  be"  with  "to  be  conceived" 
is  the  ultimate  presupposition  of  Spinoza's  system. 

14  cf.  Falckenberg,  History  of  Modern  Philosophy,  trans,  by  Armstrong,  p.  127. 


CONCLUSION 

The  purpose  of  this  essay  is  to  portray  the  gross  misconstructions 
that  have  been  placed  upon  the  work  of  Hobbes  and  Spinoza  by  taking 
as  the  basis  of  investigation  the  psychological  standpoint  of  a  later 
day.  Such  failures  to  comprehend  them  as  have  been  touched  upon 
in  this  paper  are  derived  almost  exclusively  from  ascribing  to  them 
the  theory  of  dual  existence,  which,  explicitly  or  implicitly,  has  been 
a  characteristic  element  of  latter-day  psychological  doctrine.  The 
perversions  of  Hobbes's  and  Spinoza's  meaning  are  specific  instances 
of  a  lack  of  historical  perspective  and  insight — of  a  tendency  to  read 
into  beginnings  everything  that  later  accrued  to  a  movement.  Spinoza 
and  Hobbes,  whatever  may  have  been  their  contributions  to  the 
development  of  our  psychology,  were  not  originators  of  the  movement 
to  place  it  upon  the  basis  of  existence  as  twofold,  nor  did  their  teach- 
ings impel  psychology  in  that  direction.  The  notion  of  existence  as 
dual,  and  of  experience  as  possessing  a  twofold  character  corresponding 
to  the  two  disparate  realms  of  existence  with  which  experience  is 
concerned,  is  no  longer  a  philosophical  abstraction  nor  a  discovery — it 
is  a  commonplace  of  popular  speech.  With  a  varying  degree  of  clear- 
ness and  precision,  it  characterizes  the  greater  part  of  ordinary  reflec- 
tion. It  is  not  confined  to  the  lecture-room,  but  permeates  popular 
thought  from  street-corner  conversation  to  Sunday-school  instruction. 
"Mind  and  matter,"  "soul  and  body,"  "the  spiritual  and  the  material," 
and  other  customarily  juxtaposed  terms  embody  this  duality  of 
existence  as  a  vaguely  grasped  truism  of  discourse.  Professor  Dewey, 
in  voicing  his  suspicion  of  this  condition,  remarks  that  "the  student 
of  philosophy  comes  to  his  philosophical  work  with  a  firmly  estab- 
lished belief  in  the  existence  of  two  distinct  realms  of  existence,  one 
purely  physical  and  the  other  purely  psychical.  The  belief  is  estab- 
lished not  as  speculative,  not  as  a  part  of,  or  incident  to,  the  philosophy 
he  is  about  to  study,  but  because  he  has  already  studied  two  sciences. 
For  every  science  at  once  assumes  and  guarantees  the  genuineness 
of  its  own  appropriate  subject-matter."  l 

To  lay  bare  the  misapprehensions  of  the  meaning  of  old  systems  that 
result  from  the  sway  possessed  by  these  notions  through  their  status 
as  almost  unquestioned  commonplaces  serves  a  threefold  purpose. 
First  of  all,  it  leads  to  a  more  correct  presentation  of  the  history  of  the 
systems.  And,  secondly,  it  prepares  the  way  for  a  more  adequate 

1  "Psychological  Doctrine  and  Philosophical  Teaching,"  Journal  of  Philosophy,  Psychology,  and 
Scientific  Method,  Vol.  XI,  p.  505. 


CONCLUSION  79 

account  of  the  origin  and  growth  of  the  ideas  that  are  responsible  for 
many  of  the  perplexities  that  confront  the  philosopher  of  the  present. 
And,  finally,  it  fosters  that  mistrust  of  previous  speculation  which 
is  a  healthy  manifestation  of  the  philosophy  of  the  day. 

The  latter  points  require  some  elucidation.  In  many  quarters  to-day 
an  attitude  of  suspicion,  directed  not  towards  the  results,  but  towards 
the  problems  and  methods,  of  previous  thought,  is  a  noticeable  trait. 
We  are  beginning  to  doubt  the  genuineness  of  the  problems  which 
have  been  handed  down  to  us.  Instead  of  asking  how  much  truth 
and  enduring  value  there  is  in  the  historical  philosophies,  the  enquirer 
to-day  is  apt  to  ask  if  the  problems,  or  the  historical  formulations  of 
problems,  which  are  delivered  to  us  as  the  supposed  foci  of  investiga- 
tion, are  real  and  vital.  There  is  a  demand  for  the  searching  investi- 
gation of  the  presuppositions  of  old  systems  and  traditional  questions 
rather  than  for  an  evaluation  of  the  old  solutions  and  types  of  solution. 
Instead  of  taking  the  attitude  that  our  task  is  to  continue  the  work  of 
our  predecessors  and  to  solve  the  difficulties  remaining  in  their  sys- 
tems, we  desire  to  discover  whether  the  problems  are  legitimate  and 
inescapable.  Those  who  suffer  from  such  misgivings  concerning  the 
persistent  problems  of  philosophy  would  prefer  to  find  out  what  the 
problem  is  rather  than  seek  to  improve  upon  the  old  answers  to 
problems  that  may  have  been  radically  biassed  from  the  start  through 
unrecognized  presuppositions.  The  feeling  obtains  that  in  accepting 
the  issues  of  previous  philosophical  inquiry,  even  if  we  perceive  the 
inadequacy  of  opinions  on  the  issues,  we  may  be  unwittingly  admitting, 
as  presuppositions,  ideas  and  standpoints  that  are  actually  question- 
able in  themselves ;  or  that,  while  no  longer  duped  by  certain  theories 
and  worn-out  dogmas  of  speculation,  we  are  nevertheless  misled  by 
their  after-effects  which,  although  imperceptible,  may  be  influential. 

The  animus  of  this  attitude  may  be  expressed  in  this  way;  if  the 
historical  problem  is  genuine,  human  experience  at  any  age  will  gen- 
erate it,  for  it  will  possess  certain  traits  which  reflection  feels  compelled 
to  shape  into  that  problem;  if,  on  the  contrary,  the  problems  are 
artificial,  or  stated  in  an  unreal  form,  they  are  in  so  far  unauthentic, 
unreal,  and  irrational.  In  the  latter  case,  with  changed  conditions  of 
experience,  the  problem  will  not  be  directly  generated,  but  will  persist 
as  a  legacy  of  history.  If  the  problem  be  unreal,  factors  alien  to  the 
traits  of  experience  under  consideration  determined  its  appearance 
and  its  form.  With  recognition  of  the  alien  character  of  these  factors, 
the  validity  of  the  problem  is  impeached.  To  endeavor  to  improve 
upon  the  previous  solution  of  such  a  problem  is  to  perpetuate  mis- 
directed effort.  What  is  needed  is  a  regenesis  of  the  problem  through 
an  analysis  that  is  at  least  freed  from  the  pervasive  influence  of  such 
foreign  elements,  and  a  consequent  restatement  of  the  issue  in  a 


80  IDEAANDESSENCE 

form  freed  from  the  embarrassments  of  a  mischievous  artificiality. 
In  short,  the  historicity  of  a  problem  offers  no  guarantee  of  its  validity, 
and  a  fresh  start,  a  reexamination  of  the  traits  of  experience,  is  required. 

It  does  not  require  much  reflection  upon  the  situation  resulting  from 
the  belief  in  two  distinct  realms  of  existence  to  notice  that  it  is  one 
calculated  to  present  difficulties.  On  the  whole,  it  amounts  to  this, 
that  our  deliberations  rest  upon  the  dual  character  of  experience  and 
existence  as  a  presupposition,  more  or  less  clearly  recognized,  and  when 
recognized,  frequently  accepted  as  valid.  "Let  a  man  be  persuaded 
as  you  please  that  the  relation  between  psychology  and  philosophy  is 
lacking  in  any  peculiar  intimacy,  and  yet  let  him  believe  that  psychol- 
ogy has  for  its  subject-matter  a  field  antithetical  to  that  of  the  physical 
science,  and  his  problems  are  henceforth  the  problems  of  adjusting 
the  two  opposed  subject-matters:  the  problems  of  how  one  such 
field  can  know  or  be  truly  known  by  another,  of  the  bearing  of  the 
principles  of  substantiality  and  causality  within  and  between  the 
two  fields.  Or  let  him  be  persuaded  that  the  antithesis  is  an  unreal 
one,  and  yet  let  his  students  come  to  him  with  beliefs  about  conscious- 
ness and  internal  observation,  the  existence  of  sensations,  images,  and 
emotions  as  states  of  pure  consciousness,  the  independence  of  the 
organs  of  action  in  both  observation  and  movement  from  'conscious- 
ness' (since  the  organs  are  physical)  and  he  will  be  obliged  to  discuss 
the  type  of  epistemological  and  metaphysical  problems  that  inevitably 
follow  from  such  belief.2  "The  student  of  philosophy  comes  to  his 
work  having  already  learned  that  there  is  a  separate  psychic  realm; 
that  it  is  composed  of  its  unique  entities;  that  these  are  connected 
and  compounded  by  their  own  unique  principles,  thereby  building  up 
their  own  characteristic  systematizations ;  that  the  psychic  entities 
are  by  nature  in  constant  flux,  transient  and  transitory,  antithetical 
to  abiding  spatial  things;  that  they  are  purely  private;  that  they 
are  open  to  internal  inspection  and  to  that  only;  that  they  constitute 
the  whole  scope  of  the  'immediately'  given  and  hence  the  things  that 
are  directly — non-inferentially — 'known',  and  thus  supply  the  sole 
certainties  and  the  grounds  of  all  other  beliefs  and  knowings;  that  in 
spite  of  their  transient  and  surface  character,  these  psychic  entities 
somehow  form  the  self  or  ego,  which,  in  turn,  is  identical  with  the 
mind  or  knower.  The  summary  of  the  whole  matter  is  that  with  states 
of  consciousness  and  with  them  alone  to  be  and  to  appear,  to  appear 
and  to  be  certain,  to  be  truly  known,  are  equivalents."  3 

One  can  not  refrain  from  answering  affirmatively  Professor  Dewey's 
inquiry  as  to  whether  these  conceptions  contain  in  germ  "the  substance 
of  the  questions  most  acutely  discussed  in  contemporaneous  philoso- 

2  ibid,  p.  506. 
*  ibid,  p.  507. 


CONCLUSION  8l 

phy."  Hesitancy  in  accepting  the  questions  as  genuine  and  real  nat- 
urally follows.  Unless  the  duality  of  existence,  which,  as  a  presuppo- 
sition, activates  and  directs  so  much  of  our  thought,  is  above  question, 
little  reliance  can  be  placed  upon  problems  formulated  within  the 
limits  of  that  conception.  Professor  Creighton  seems  to  have  had 
this  in  mind  in  the  admirable  paper  in  which  he  considers  the  question 
of  the  possibility  of  an  existential  science  of  psychology.4 

A  study  of  the  origin  and  growth  of  these  conceptions,  and  of  their 
influence  upon  the  character  of  modern  philosophy  and  psychology, 
should  place  the  epistemological  questions  of  present-day  discussion 
in  a  clearer  light;  and  if  it  so  happens  that  these  problems  are  per- 
vaded by  a  vicious  artificiality,  the  recognition  of  the  fact  would  facili- 
tate the  presentation  of  the  real  issue. 

The  origin  of  this  division  of  reality  into  two  realms  lies,  in  the 
first  instance,  in  the  Cartesian  conception  of  the  dualism  of  sub- 
stances.5 The  roots  of  the  doctrine  lie,  of  course,  still  further  back. 
The  notion  of  immaterial  substance  becomes  clearly  defined  in  scholas- 
ticism, and  the  distinction  between  matter  and  form  gradually  crys- 
tallizes into  a  contrast  of  spirituality  and  immateriality  to  materiality 
and  extension.  At  the  same  time,  the  conception  of  a  plurality  of 
substances,  hierarchically  arranged  from  relatively  formless  matter 
to  form  that  is  pure  and  free  from  matter,  tends  to  telescope  into  a 
dualism  of  mind  and  matter  substances.  With  Descartes  the  move- 
ment is  completed. 

This,  however,  is  but  one  of  the  factors  in  the  genesis  of  these  con- 
ceptions. There  is  another  doctrine,  characteristic  of  scholasticism, 
which  converges  toward  the  two-substance  doctrine  and  finally  be- 
comes interlaced  with  it.  This  is  the  orthodox  epistemological  tenet 
of  the  cognitive  correspondence  of  idei  and  thing.  The  various  forms 
of  this  theory  are  at  bottom  similar  in  that  they  look  upon  the  idea 
as  in  some  sense  a  copy,  a  photographic  duplication,  or  imitative 
representation  of  the  object.  To  the  scholastics,  knowledge  is  the 
correspondence  of  forms  actualized  in  intra-organic  potentiality  and 
forms  actualized  in  extra-organic  matter  or  potentiality.  So  long  as 
the  notion  of  a  graded  hierarchy  of  substances  persists,  the  corre- 
spondence is  of  one  hierarchical  arrangement  to  another  hierarchical 
arrangement.  Substances  were  qualitatively  distinct  things,  ordered 
serially,  beginning  with  the  actual  things  of  the  perceptual  world, 
and  passing  through  persons  and  angels  to  culminate  finally  with  God 
or  pure  form.  But  through  various  movements  of  thought,  which 

«  "The  Standpoint  of  Psychology,"  Philosophical  Review,  Vol.  23,  No.  2. 

8  The  following  is  a  brief  statement  of  the  thesis  maintained  by  the  writer  in  an  essay  originally  in- 
tended as  a  dissertation  for  the  doctorate.  At  the  suggestion  of  Professor  Dewey,  only  those  portions 
of  that  essay  dealing  with  Hobbes  and  Spinoza  are  submitted  as  a  thesis.  The  theme  of  the  original 
essay  is  stated  here  in  order  to  make  clear  the  general  setting  of  the  discussion  of  Hobbes  and 
Spinoza. 


82  IDEAANDESSENCE 

can  not  be  enumerated  at  this  place,  the  hierarchy  is  broken  up.  In 
the  place  of  a  scale  of  actualities,  the  several  ranks  collapse  to  compose 
two  groups.  The  process  of  change  consists  of  two  moments.  On  the 
one  hand,  human  beings,  in  so  far  as  they  are  thinking  beings  (spiritual 
beings,  possessed  of  a  soul),  and  angels  are  excluded  from  the  world 
of  nature  ("nature"  as  it  appeared  to  a  Galileo),  and  are  no  longer 
regarded  as  in  serial  continuity  therewith.  The  assemblage  of  souls, 
angels,  spiritual  forces,  and  even  the  Deity,  come  to  form  one  substan- 
tial realm.  On  the  other  hand,  and  coincidently,  the  world  of  nature 
as  the  assemblage  of  things  loses  its  qualitative  subordination  of 
lower  to  higher,  and  in  the  place  of  qualitative  heterogeneity  acquires 
quantitative  homogeneity;  it  accordingly  reduces  to  one  realm  of 
existence.  All  existents,  that  is,  gravitate  toward  one  of  two  extremes, 
while  the  extremes  finally  settle  down  into  two  spheres  not  contrasted 
as  contraries,  but  opposed  as  contradictories.  And  in  an  accordant 
fashion,  with  less  radical  thoroughness,  that  part  of  the  scale  contain- 
ing minds,  angels,  and  God  falls  into  a  substantial  continuity  approxi- 
mating the  continuity  in  a  quantitative  system  of  nature.  The 
hierarchy  of  substances  is  thus  concentrated  into  two  substances,  and 
this  position  comes  to  be  taken  over  by  succeeding  speculation  in 
many  cases  almost  without  question. 

This  condensation  defines  two  realms  of  substantial  existence,  and 
coincidently  formal,  final,  and  efficient  causes  become  divorced,  the 
formal  and  final  causes  being  applicable,  if  at  all,  only  in  the  world  of 
spiritual  substance,  while  in  the  world  of  matter-substance  efficient 
causes  alone  are  operative.  Mind  and  things,  knower  and  known,  per- 
sonality and  the  world  of  nature,  the  soul  and  the  body,  idea  and 
thing,  fall  into  such  sharp  contrast  as  finally  to  assume  the  shape  of 
just  so  many  antitheses.  For  a^ong  time  after  the  inception  of  modern 
philosophy  the  reciprocal  affecting  of  the  two  substances  was  insisted 
upon  or  postulated  as  necessary.  Somewhat  grudgingly  such  inter- 
action came  to  be  recognized  as  a  mystery  defying  explanation,  finally 
to  be  called  by  many  impossible  and  inconceivable. 

The  theory  of  the  cognitive  correspondence  of  species  or  idea  and 
thing  persists  alongside  of  the  process  of  reducing  a  plurality  of  sub- 
stances to  two.  But  the  result  is  the  arising  of  many  epistemological 
perplexities.  The  situation,  in  brief  outline,  is  this:  knowing  goes 
on  in  a  substantial  world,  which,  by  definition,  is  so  unlike  the  world 
of  the  known  as  to  be  in  sharp  opposition  thereto,  and  even  antithetical 
to  the  assemblage  of  things  known.  But  knower  and  known,  being 
in  such  opposition,  the  possibility  of  this  cognitive  correspondence  is 
itself  in  question,  and  yields  the  first  problem  of  epistemology.  The 
recognition  of  this  situation  appears  only  gradually,  as  is  to  be  ex- 
pected. The  more  keenly,  however,  the  opposition  of  substances  is 


CONCLUSION  83 

realized,  the  more  problematic  becomes  the  correspondence  of  idea 
to  object. 

For  psychology,  the  problem  is  that  of  the  relation  of  ideas  in  a 
realm  of  spiritual  immaterial  substance  to  correspondent  things  in  an 
extended  material  substance.  With  development  of  the  appreciation 
of  the  antithesis  of  the  two  substances  and  the  parallel  growth  of 
doubt  concerning  the  interaction  of  those  substances,  the  problem 
becomes  acute.  A  bold  science  of  nature,  measuring  everything,  shov- 
ing all  qualities  into  the  soul  as  the  easiest  method  of  ridding  a  quanti- 
tative world  of  them,  and  intent  upon  atoms  and  molecules,  sets  for 
psychology  a  pretty  problem.  Bidding  psychology  become  "scientific," 
it  offers  psychology  its  instruments  of  investigation — but  at  the  same 
time  bids  it  investigate  those  qualitative  phenomena  with  respect  to 
which  this  science  of  nature  asserts  by  implication  the  unavailability 
of  its  instruments.  When  attention  is  directed  to  the  physiological 
process  in  perception,  the  relation  of  thought  to  things  is  transmuted 
into  the  relation  of  a  mental  psychical  state  to  a  physiological  process 
in  the  nervous  system  which  natural  science  has  incorporated  into  its 
own  world  of  investigation.  The  advance  of  knowledge  concerning 
the  world  of  matter  does  not  abate  the  exigencies  of  the  situation,  but 
rather  accentuates  its  difficulties.  There  are  two  worlds  of  existents 
defined  by  opposition  to  one  another.  Psychology  in  some  queer 
fashion  is  a  science  of  both,  with  the  task  of  relating  the  two  assigned 
it.  Psychology  must  concern  itself  with  both  fields,  straddling  the 
gap  between  like  a  colossus.  In  short,  it  has  the  unwelcome  task  of 
relating  two  spheres  that  from  the  outset  are  declared  in  effect  to  be 
unrelatable.  Approaching  the  spiritual  from  the  side  of  the  physical, 
with  the  methods  and  devices  of  that  field,  it  runs  the  danger  of  falsi- 
fying its  subject-matter.  Approaching  the  physical  from  the  side  of 
the  spiritual,  its  work  seems  perverse,  unverifiable,  and  capricious. 
Rejecting  the  problem  of  the  ultimate  nature  of  either  substance,  and 
in  particular  that  of  the  soul,  as  metaphysical  and  beyond  its  province, 
and  giving  more  and  more  attention  to  investigations  of  correspon- 
dences of  material  changes  in  the  sphere  of  stimuli  and  nervous 
processes,  to  the  conscious  experience,  its  subject-matter  assumes  the 
form  of  two  series  of  phenomena,  one  series  physical,  material,  and 
physiological,  the  other  psychical,  mental,  and  spiritual.  The  oppo- 
sition of  two  substances  is  undiminished  in  the  opposition  of  the  two 
series.  With  the  surrender  of  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  the  two 
substances,  the  same  problem  with  respect  to  the  two  series  must  also 
be  surrendered.  Psychology,  in  effect,  proceeds  on  the  conception  of 
the  parallelism  of  the  series;  its  problem  is  the  determination  of  the 
correspondences;  and  its  postulate,  its  heuristic  principle,  only  too 
often  taken  as  an  established  theory  of  explanation,  is,  in  narrow 


84  IDEAANDESSENCE 

form,  psychophysical  parallelism.  And  even  the  school  of  interaction- 
ists,  lineal  descendants  of  those  who  insisted  upon  the  mystery  of 
inter-substantial  action,  do  not  so  much  deny  the  parallelism  of  the 
two  existential  series,  as  insist  upon  their  unprovable,  but  metaphysi- 
cally and  scientifically  necessary,  reciprocal  influence.  And  the 
struggle  between  parallelists  and  interactionists  leads  back  again  to 
conflicting  metaphysical  systems. 

For  epistemology,  having  recourse  to  this  psychology  at  every  stage 
of  its  development,  psychological  principles  aggravate  the  acerbity 
of  its  problems.  For  the  correspondence  theory  of  knowledge,  in  its 
varying  guises,  is  prejudiced  by  the  psychology  to  which  it  appeals, 
and  for  which  it  is  itself  largely  responsible.  The  more  radically  unlike 
the  series  of  ideas  and  the  series  of  events  in  nature,  the  more  irrational 
becomes  the  assertion  of  a  cognitive  correspondence.  Yet,  be  it  noted, 
just  because  of  this  incommensurability  of  the  two  series,  all  that  can 
be  asserted  is  just  some  form  of  this  inexplicable  correspondence. 
Knowing,  broken  up  into  a  series  of  ideas,  is  ruled  out  of  a  world  of 
nature  to  which  that  knowing  refers,  and  nature  is  paradoxically 
regarded  as  known  by  thoughts  that  are  wholly  beyond,  and  dis- 
connected from,  nature.  The  correspondence  being  in  no  wise  im- 
peached, it  must  be  taken  for  granted  or  asserted  as  an  ineluctable 
mystery,  or,  finally,  retained  in  part  and  disguised  through  the  device 
of  ideas  of  primary  qualities.  Still  more  radical  measures  may  be 
taken,  and  the  world  of  the  other  substance  becomes  a  vanishing  point. 
We  must  act  as  if  it  existed,  but  there  is  no  hope  of  proving  it.  With 
the  evanescing  of  that  world,  knowledge  and  the  knowing-process 
reduces  to  a  concern  of  the  mental  world,  in  truth  a  "bloodless  ballet" 
of  ideas.  The  laws  of  knowing  are  laws  of  the  combinations  of  ideas, 
discoverable  in  the  series  of  ideas.  But  since  to  be  in  and  of  spiritual 
substance  comes  to  mean  to  be  in  and  of  the  mind ;  and  to  be  mental 
and  psychical  comes  to  mean  to  be  in  consciousness,  knower,  know- 
ing, and  the  known  are  all  literally  in  consciousness  and  nowhere  else. 
To  pass  from  mental  substance,  from  mind,  from  consciousness,  or, 
finally,  from  the  ideas  of  consciousness,  to  an  extra-mental  world  is, 
in  terms  of  the  presuppositions,  an  impossible  feat.  Like  Baron 
Miinchhausen's  feat  of  lifting  himself  by  tugging  at  his  boot-straps,  it 
involves  a  denial  of  the  conditions  in  which  alone  the  endeavor  can 
succeed. 

Metaphysically,  the  readiest  outlet  is  a  frank  and  peremptory 
repudiation  of  one  or  the  other  substance  or  of  one  or  the  other  series. 
The  history  of  the  two-substance  doctrine  shows  that  such  an  unmiti- 
gated dualism  will  content  no  one.  But  the  customary  fashion  of  get- 
ting rid  of  it  is  first  to  accept  it,  then  to  deny  it,  and,  finally,  to  rein- 
troduce  it  in  a  disguised  form.  The  assumption  is  made  that  one  of  the 


CONCLUSION  85 

two  substances  alone  exists,  although  it  is  defined  only  by  reference  to 
the  other  and  supposedly  non-existent  substance,  and  a  spiritualistic  or 
materialistic  metaphysics  results.  Or  failing  so  radical  an  extirpation 
of  one  substance,  both  substances,  losing  their  substantiality,  may  be 
conceived  as  "appearances"  or  "aspects"  of  one  really  real  substance. 
Finally,  a  still  different  course  may  be  followed,  and  one  substance  be 
related  to  the  other  as  appearance  to  reality,  phenomenal  being  to 
noumenal.  Psychology  is  put  upon  these  various  metaphysical  bases, 
at  one  time  "materialistic,"  at  another  concerned  with  "epiphenomena," 
or  else  settling  comfortably  upon  a  spiritualistic  metaphysics.  But  in 
any  case,  the  sciences  of  physical  nature  remain  and  are  a  persistent 
challenge  to  psychology. 

The  results  are  many,  but  all  involve  in  some  fashion  the  after- 
effects of  a  metaphysical  theory  of  a  dualism  of  substances.  The  pres- 
ent dissatisfaction  with  psychology  among  psychologists  and  episte- 
mologists  seems  to  derive  its  animus  from  an  increasing  recognition  of 
this  metaphysics  that  has  for  so  long  functioned  as  a ^determining  pre- 
supposition of  the  science.  The  notion  of  the  two  realms  of  experience 
and  existence  is  the  point  fundamentally  involved  in  the  prevailing 
dissatisfaction  with  existential  psychology  in  general,6  and  its  availa- 
bility as  a  propaedeutic  for  epistemology.  Professor  Dewey,  in  the 
article  already  quoted,  points  out  that  "in  so  far  as  there  are  grounds 
for  thinking  that  the  traditional  presuppositions  of  psychology  were 
wished  upon  it  by  philosophy  when  it  was  yet  too  immature  to  defend 
itself,  a  philosopher  is  within  his  own  jurisdiction  in  submitting  them 
to  critical  examination."  7  "The  prospects  for  success  in  such  a 
critical  undertaking  are  increased  ...  by  the  present  situation 
within  the  science  of  psychology  as  that  is  actually  carried  on.  .  . 
If  one  went  over  the  full  output  of  the  laboratories  of  the  last  five 
years,  how  much  of  that  output  would  seem  to  call,  on  its  own  behalf 
and  in  its  own  specific  terms,  for  formulation  in  the  Cartesian-Lockian 
terms?"  8 

The  situation  as  outlined  by  Professor  Dewey  has  an  important 
retroactive  effect  upon  the  interpretation  of  the  history  of  philosophy, 
as  the  preceding  essay  has  indicated.  One  outcome  of  the  develop- 
ment of  psychology  is  that  so  many  of  the  terms  of  psychology  and 
epistemology,  such  as  sensation,  idea,  mind,  soul,  spirit,  will,  intelli- 
gence, consciousness,  personality,  and  the  like  have  acquired  connota- 
tions that  relate  them  to  the  spiritual  substance  side  of  the  duality. 
The  image  may  be  selected  as  illustrating  the  fluctuations  of  termino- 
logical meaning,  particularly  as  it  is  in  the  early  stages  of  modern 
psychology  so  far  removed  from  the  psychical.  The  image  has  hov- 

8  cf.  Creighton,  op.  cit. 
1  op.  cit.,  p.  508. 
• ibid. 


86  IDEAANDESSENCE 

ered  between  the  two  spheres  without  settling  down  unequivocally 
in  either  realm.  Although  it  rather  stubbornly  resists  being  placed  in 
the  psychical  realm,  it  has  nevertheless  acquired  a  connotation  that 
implies  such  a  status;  it  is  treated  in  a  psychical  context.  With 
greater  or  less  clearness,  such  terms  are  construed  as  referring  to  a 
psychical  principle  or  its  states.  As  Professor  Dewey  has  asserted, 
this  connotation  is  not  merely  sensed  by  the  technical  student,  but 
it  is  almost  a  dogma  of  popular  usage,  and  familiarity  has  engendered 
implicit  credence  in  the  reality  of  that  which  the  terms  connote. 

It  has  been  asserted  that  the  theory  of  a  duality  of  substances,  com- 
bined with  the  theory  of  the  cognitive  correspondence  of  idea  and 
thing,  were  the  chief  factors  in  splitting  existence  into  psychical  and 
physical  spheres  and  in  developing  the  doctrine  of  psychophysical 
parallelism.  But  then  Hobbes  and  Spinoza,  each  of  whom  insisted 
upon  the  oneness  of  substance,  would  be  expected  to  afford  a  crucial 
test  of  the  truth  of  the  assertion.  A  study  of  them  should  reveal,  by 
contrast,  what  does.not  happen  when  psychological  and  epistemological 
investigations  are  not  founded  upon  a  platform  of  a  duality  of  sub- 
stance, nor  carried  on  in  the  interests  of  such  a  position.  In  short, 
if  it  is  the  notion  of  a  spiritual  thinking  substance  that  turns  idea, 
concept,  and  even  sensation  and  perception,  into  mental,  spiritual 
states  of  a  soul  or  mind,  then  investigation  might  be  expected  to  dis- 
close that  in  Hobbes  and  Spinoza  there  were  no  "mental  psychical 
states"  properly  so  called.  To  neither  philosopher  did  the  term  idea, 
much  less  sensation,  perception,  and  image  imply  an  entity  in,  or  a 
state  and  manifestation  of,  an  immaterial  thinking  substance.  His- 
torians and  commentators  have  found  just  such  meanings  in  the  work 
of  Hobbes  and  Spinoza;  but  their  discoveries  were  possible  only 
because  of  a  preliminary  assumption,  indubitably  to  a  large  extent 
unrealized,  that  these  meanings  were  there  to  be  disclosed.  We  have 
seen,  however,  that  Hobbes  and  Spinoza  really  stand  aloof  from  the 
movement  which  leads  from  the  dualism  of  substances  to  the  doctrine 
of  psychical  existence,  and  the  final  identification  of  the  psychi^c^ 
the  mental,  the  conscious,  and  knowing.  It  is  the  unfortunate  attitude 
of  assuming  their  organic  involution  in  this  current  of  development 
that  eventuates  in  the  many  artificial  perplexities  which  appear  to 
impede  adequate  interpretation  of  their  work,  and  results  in  a  mis- 
representation of  their  qualities  of  insight  and  spirit. 


VITA 

Albert  George  Adam  Balz  was  born  at  Charlottesville,  Virginia, 
January  3,  1887.  He  attended  the  University  of  Virginia,  1905-1912; 
Columbia  University,  1912-1913.  Previous  degrees :  B. A.,  University 
of  Virginia,  1908;  M.A.,  University  of  Virginia,  1909.  Positions  held: 
Instructor  in  Philosophy  and  Psychology,  University  of  Virginia, 
1910-1912;  University  Fellow  in  Philosophy,  Columbia  University, 
1912-1913;  Adjtmct  Professor  of  Philosophy,  University  of  Virginia, 
1913-1916.  Since  1916,  Associate  Professor  of  Philosophy,  University 
of  Virginia.- 


I 


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